GHSA-M69W-P7M4-585J

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-14 20:28 – Updated: 2026-05-19 16:00
VLAI
Summary
Open WebUI: Unauthenticated endpoint can trigger embedding generation (cost/DoS)
Details

Summary

GET /api/v1/memories/ef is accessible without authentication and executes request.app.state.EMBEDDING_FUNCTION(...). This allows any unauthenticated caller to trigger embedding generation which can lead to direct cost exposure if a paid provider is used. Code reference: backend/open_webui/routers/memories.py (@router.get("/ef") -> calls request.app.state.EMBEDDING_FUNCTION("hello world")).

Details

GET /api/v1/memories/ef is reachable without authentication and triggers request.app.state.EMBEDDING_FUNCTION("hello world"). This crosses an intended security boundary by allowing unauthenticated users to invoke potentially expensive embedding computation and/or paid upstream embedding APIs.

PoC

  1. Start Open WebUI in default configuration (no special env hardening; default ENABLE_MEMORIES is true).
  2. From an unauthenticated client (no cookies/Authorization header), call: curl -i http://\<host>:\<port>/api/v1/memories/ef
  3. Observe the server performs embedding generation and returns a response like:
  4. HTTP 200 with JSON containing the result.

How it can be abused / attacker actions:

  • Send repeated requests to /api/v1/memories/ef to:
  • consume CPU/GPU resources (DoS)
  • generate sustained outbound usage to embedding providers if configured (cost + rate-limit exhaustion)
  • degrade latency/availability for legitimate users

Impact

If embeddings are configured to use paid/remote providers (OpenAI/Azure/etc), an attacker can generate unlimited requests and incur charges.

Resolution

Fixed in commit e5035ea31, first released in v0.8.0 (Feb 2026). The /api/v1/memories/ef route was removed entirely. It was a diagnostic/debug-style endpoint that hard-coded "hello world" through the embedding function without any authentication dependency; there was no legitimate caller that depended on it, so deletion was the cleaner fix than retrofitting auth. Users on >= 0.8.0 are not affected.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.7.2"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "open-webui"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.8.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45667"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-14T20:28:02Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-15T22:16:56Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nGET `/api/v1/memories/ef` is accessible without authentication and executes `request.app.state.EMBEDDING_FUNCTION(...)`. This allows any unauthenticated caller to trigger embedding generation which can lead to direct cost exposure if a paid provider is used.\nCode reference: `backend/open_webui/routers/memories.py` (@router.get(\"/ef\") -\u003e calls `request.app.state.EMBEDDING_FUNCTION(\"hello world\"))`.\n\n\n### Details\nGET `/api/v1/memories/ef` is reachable without authentication and triggers request.app.state.EMBEDDING_FUNCTION(\"hello world\"). This crosses an intended security boundary by allowing unauthenticated users to invoke potentially expensive embedding computation and/or paid upstream embedding APIs.\n\n### PoC\n1. Start Open WebUI in default configuration (no special env hardening; default ENABLE_MEMORIES is true).\n2. From an unauthenticated client (no cookies/Authorization header), call:\n      curl -i http://\\\u003chost\\\u003e:\\\u003cport\\\u003e/api/v1/memories/ef\n   3. Observe the server performs embedding generation and returns a response like:\n   - HTTP 200 with JSON containing the result.\n\nHow it can be abused / attacker actions:\n\n- Send repeated requests to `/api/v1/memories/ef` to:\n  - consume CPU/GPU resources (DoS)\n  - generate sustained outbound usage to embedding providers if configured (cost + rate-limit exhaustion)\n  - degrade latency/availability for legitimate users\n \n### Impact\nIf embeddings are configured to use paid/remote providers (OpenAI/Azure/etc), an attacker can generate unlimited requests and incur charges.\n\n## Resolution\n\nFixed in commit [e5035ea31](https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/e5035ea31e179977e805a7032c979ff59a71860a), first released in **v0.8.0** (Feb 2026). The `/api/v1/memories/ef` route was removed entirely. It was a diagnostic/debug-style endpoint that hard-coded `\"hello world\"` through the embedding function without any authentication dependency; there was no legitimate caller that depended on it, so deletion was the cleaner fix than retrofitting auth. Users on `\u003e= 0.8.0` are not affected.",
  "id": "GHSA-m69w-p7m4-585j",
  "modified": "2026-05-19T16:00:43Z",
  "published": "2026-05-14T20:28:02Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/security/advisories/GHSA-m69w-p7m4-585j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45667"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/commit/e5035ea31e179977e805a7032c979ff59a71860a"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/open-webui/open-webui/releases/tag/v0.8.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:L",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Open WebUI: Unauthenticated endpoint can trigger embedding generation (cost/DoS)"
}


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