GHSA-M77F-652Q-WWP4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2022-09-15 03:25 – Updated: 2022-09-19 19:22
VLAI?
Summary
axum-core has no default limit put on request bodies
Details

<bytes::Bytes as axum_core::extract::FromRequest>::from_request would not, by default, set a limit for the size of the request body. That meant if a malicious peer would send a very large (or infinite) body your server might run out of memory and crash.

This also applies to these extractors which used Bytes::from_request internally: - axum::extract::Form - axum::extract::Json - String

The fix is also in axum-core 0.3.0.rc.2 but 0.3.0.rc.1 is vulnerable.

Because axum depends on axum-core it is vulnerable as well. The vulnerable versions of axum are <= 0.5.15 and 0.6.0.rc.1. axum >= 0.5.16 and >= 0.6.0.rc.2 does have the fix and are not vulnerable.

The patched versions will set a 2 MB limit by default.

Severity ?
7.5 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "axum-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.2.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "crates.io",
        "name": "axum-core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.3.0-rc.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.3.0-rc.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.3.0-rc.1"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2022-3212"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-770"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2022-09-15T03:25:15Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "`\u003cbytes::Bytes as axum_core::extract::FromRequest\u003e::from_request` would not, by default, set a limit for the size of the request body. That meant if a malicious peer would send a very large (or infinite) body your server might run out of memory and crash.\n\nThis also applies to these extractors which used `Bytes::from_request` internally:\n- `axum::extract::Form`\n- `axum::extract::Json`\n- `String`\n\nThe fix is also in `axum-core` `0.3.0.rc.2` but `0.3.0.rc.1` _is_ vulnerable.\n\nBecause `axum` depends on `axum-core` it is vulnerable as well. The vulnerable versions of `axum` are `\u003c= 0.5.15` and `0.6.0.rc.1`. `axum` `\u003e= 0.5.16` and `\u003e= 0.6.0.rc.2` does have the fix and are not vulnerable.\n\nThe patched versions will set a 2 MB limit by default.\n",
  "id": "GHSA-m77f-652q-wwp4",
  "modified": "2022-09-19T19:22:47Z",
  "published": "2022-09-15T03:25:15Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-3212"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/tokio-rs/axum/pull/1346"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/tokio-rs/axum"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://rustsec.org/advisories/RUSTSEC-2022-0055.html"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "axum-core has no default limit put on request bodies"
}


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