GHSA-MFRJ-V65R-979C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 20:58 – Updated: 2026-09-04 20:58CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72798.
Summary
renderAttributeView correctly applies the reader publish-access filter, but the filter's row-accessibility decision is keyed solely to the row's first cell, and it never inspects the remaining cells' values. Relation and Rollup cells carry mirrored content from a different database, so a row belonging to a published database can hand an anonymous reader the contents of a related database whose host document is hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected. Separately, when the first column is not a block value the accessibility check is skipped entirely and the row is returned unchecked.
Note:
This is distinct from the previously reported password-tier omission in the same function that concerns the row's own primary block, whereas these two defects concern (a) other cells' related-database content, which no row-level check covers and (b) rows where the first cell is not a block at all. A fix to the row-drop condition alone would close neither.
Details
renderAttributeView applies the filter (kernel/api/av.go:68):
retDataMap["view"] = model.FilterViewByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, retDataMap["view"].(av.Viewable))
Inside FilterViewByPublishAccess (kernel/model/publish_access.go):
if row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil {
bt = treenode.GetBlockTree(row.Cells[0].Value.Block.ID)
}
if bt != nil {
if !CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) {
row = nil // drop
}
}
// every other cell in the row is returned as-is
(a) Relation and Rollup cells leak the related database. These value types carry mirrored content, not just references:
type ValueRelation struct { BlockIDs []string; Contents []*Value }
type ValueRollup struct { Contents []*Value }
The render pipeline populates them from a different attribute view e.g. kernel/model/attribute_view.go:2731:
v.GroupVal.Relation.Contents = []*av.Value{ relationDestAv.GetBlockValue(groupValue) }
relationDestAv is a separate database that may live in a hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected document. When a published database's row survives the filter (because its column-0 document is public), its Relation and Rollup columns return the related, non-published database's content block text, titles, and mirrored column values. FilterViewByPublishAccess performs no publish-access evaluation on Relation.Contents or Rollup.Contents.
(b) Fail-open when column 0 is not a block. bt is assigned only when row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil. If the first column is a non-block type (Relation, Text, …) or the row is detached, bt remains nil, the if bt != nil guard is skipped, and the row is returned with no accessibility check at all. Column order is user-reorderable, so any database whose first column is not the document block bypasses row filtering entirely.
Verified at origin/master (eef105683).
Proof of Concept
Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Two databases: DB-A hosted in a published document, DB-B hosted in a publish-forbidden or password-protected document, with a Relation column in DB-A pointing at DB-B and containing a distinctive marker value.
(a) Related-database content disclosure:
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/renderAttributeView
{"id":"<DB_A_AV_ID>"}
Rows of DB-A are returned (correctly, since its host document is public), and their Relation/Rollup cell Contents include DB-B's block text and mirrored column values, despite DB-B's host document being excluded from publishing.
(b) Fail-open row: Reorder DB-A so its first column is a non-block type (or use a detached row), mark its host document publish-forbidden, and request the same endpoint the row is returned without any accessibility evaluation.
Verification status: both defects are confirmed by code inspection at origin/master. A live demonstration requires a build from HEAD with two linked databases; available on request.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read content from databases whose host documents are hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected, by requesting a published database that relates to them. Because relation graphs are commonly used to link a public index to private detail records, this exposes exactly the data the publish boundary is meant to withhold. The fail-open path additionally returns rows with no accessibility check whenever the first column is not a block value, which is a user-controlled layout property. Confidentiality-only.
Suggested fix
In FilterViewByPublishAccess:
1. For each retained row, evaluate every Relation.Contents and Rollup.Contents entry against CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess (including the publish-password tier) and drop or mask entries that fail.
2. Fail closed: when row.Cells[0] has no accessible block (Value.Block == nil or bt == nil), drop the row rather than returning it unchecked.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260724121519-426991d155c0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72798"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T20:58:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72798](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72798).\n\n### Summary\n\n`renderAttributeView` correctly applies the reader publish-access filter, but the filter\u0027s row-accessibility decision is keyed solely to the row\u0027s **first cell**, and it never inspects the remaining cells\u0027 values. Relation and Rollup cells carry mirrored content from a *different* database, so a row belonging to a published database can hand an anonymous reader the contents of a related database whose host document is hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected. Separately, when the first column is not a block value the accessibility check is skipped entirely and the row is returned unchecked.\n\n### Note:\n\nThis is distinct from the previously reported password-tier omission in the same function that concerns the row\u0027s own primary block, whereas these two defects concern (a) other cells\u0027 related-database content, which no row-level check covers and (b) rows where the first cell is not a block at all. A fix to the row-drop condition alone would close neither.\n\n### Details\n\n`renderAttributeView` applies the filter (`kernel/api/av.go:68`):\n```go\nretDataMap[\"view\"] = model.FilterViewByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, retDataMap[\"view\"].(av.Viewable))\n```\n\nInside `FilterViewByPublishAccess` (`kernel/model/publish_access.go`):\n```go\nif row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil {\n bt = treenode.GetBlockTree(row.Cells[0].Value.Block.ID)\n}\nif bt != nil {\n if !CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) {\n row = nil // drop\n }\n}\n// every other cell in the row is returned as-is\n```\n\n**(a) Relation and Rollup cells leak the related database.** These value types carry mirrored content, not just references:\n```go\ntype ValueRelation struct { BlockIDs []string; Contents []*Value }\ntype ValueRollup struct { Contents []*Value }\n```\nThe render pipeline populates them from a different attribute view e.g. `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:2731`:\n```go\nv.GroupVal.Relation.Contents = []*av.Value{ relationDestAv.GetBlockValue(groupValue) }\n```\n`relationDestAv` is a separate database that may live in a hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected document. When a published database\u0027s row survives the filter (because its column-0 document is public), its Relation and Rollup columns return the related, non-published database\u0027s content block text, titles, and mirrored column values. `FilterViewByPublishAccess` performs no publish-access evaluation on `Relation.Contents` or `Rollup.Contents`.\n\n**(b) Fail-open when column 0 is not a block.** `bt` is assigned only when `row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil`. If the first column is a non-block type (Relation, Text, \u2026) or the row is detached, `bt` remains `nil`, the `if bt != nil` guard is skipped, and the row is returned with no accessibility check at all. Column order is user-reorderable, so any database whose first column is not the document block bypasses row filtering entirely.\n\nVerified at `origin/master` (`eef105683`).\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nPrecondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Two databases: **DB-A** hosted in a published document, **DB-B** hosted in a publish-forbidden or password-protected document, with a Relation column in DB-A pointing at DB-B and containing a distinctive marker value.\n\n**(a) Related-database content disclosure:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/renderAttributeView\n{\"id\":\"\u003cDB_A_AV_ID\u003e\"}\n```\nRows of DB-A are returned (correctly, since its host document is public), and their Relation/Rollup cell `Contents` include DB-B\u0027s block text and mirrored column values, despite DB-B\u0027s host document being excluded from publishing.\n\n**(b) Fail-open row:**\nReorder DB-A so its first column is a non-block type (or use a detached row), mark its host document publish-forbidden, and request the same endpoint the row is returned without any accessibility evaluation.\n\n*Verification status:* both defects are confirmed by code inspection at `origin/master`. A live demonstration requires a build from HEAD with two linked databases; available on request.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read content from databases whose host documents are hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected, by requesting a *published* database that relates to them. Because relation graphs are commonly used to link a public index to private detail records, this exposes exactly the data the publish boundary is meant to withhold. The fail-open path additionally returns rows with no accessibility check whenever the first column is not a block value, which is a user-controlled layout property. Confidentiality-only.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nIn `FilterViewByPublishAccess`:\n1. For each retained row, evaluate every `Relation.Contents` and `Rollup.Contents` entry against `CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess` (including the publish-password tier) and drop or mask entries that fail.\n2. Fail closed: when `row.Cells[0]` has no accessible block (`Value.Block == nil` or `bt == nil`), drop the row rather than returning it unchecked.",
"id": "GHSA-mfrj-v65r-979c",
"modified": "2026-09-04T20:58:04Z",
"published": "2026-09-04T20:58:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-mfrj-v65r-979c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72798"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/426991d155c0c7c3a9e71badd6761eddfa8aad5b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-renderattributeview"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: Publish-access filter on renderAttributeView leaves related-database content unfiltered and fails open on non-block first columns"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.