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GHSA-MFRJ-V65R-979C

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-04 20:58 – Updated: 2026-09-04 20:58
VLAI
Summary
SiYuan: Publish-access filter on renderAttributeView leaves related-database content unfiltered and fails open on non-block first columns
Details

CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-72798.

Summary

renderAttributeView correctly applies the reader publish-access filter, but the filter's row-accessibility decision is keyed solely to the row's first cell, and it never inspects the remaining cells' values. Relation and Rollup cells carry mirrored content from a different database, so a row belonging to a published database can hand an anonymous reader the contents of a related database whose host document is hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected. Separately, when the first column is not a block value the accessibility check is skipped entirely and the row is returned unchecked.

Note:

This is distinct from the previously reported password-tier omission in the same function that concerns the row's own primary block, whereas these two defects concern (a) other cells' related-database content, which no row-level check covers and (b) rows where the first cell is not a block at all. A fix to the row-drop condition alone would close neither.

Details

renderAttributeView applies the filter (kernel/api/av.go:68):

retDataMap["view"] = model.FilterViewByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, retDataMap["view"].(av.Viewable))

Inside FilterViewByPublishAccess (kernel/model/publish_access.go):

if row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil {
    bt = treenode.GetBlockTree(row.Cells[0].Value.Block.ID)
}
if bt != nil {
    if !CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) {
        row = nil   // drop
    }
}
// every other cell in the row is returned as-is

(a) Relation and Rollup cells leak the related database. These value types carry mirrored content, not just references:

type ValueRelation struct { BlockIDs []string; Contents []*Value }
type ValueRollup   struct { Contents []*Value }

The render pipeline populates them from a different attribute view e.g. kernel/model/attribute_view.go:2731:

v.GroupVal.Relation.Contents = []*av.Value{ relationDestAv.GetBlockValue(groupValue) }

relationDestAv is a separate database that may live in a hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected document. When a published database's row survives the filter (because its column-0 document is public), its Relation and Rollup columns return the related, non-published database's content block text, titles, and mirrored column values. FilterViewByPublishAccess performs no publish-access evaluation on Relation.Contents or Rollup.Contents.

(b) Fail-open when column 0 is not a block. bt is assigned only when row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil. If the first column is a non-block type (Relation, Text, …) or the row is detached, bt remains nil, the if bt != nil guard is skipped, and the row is returned with no accessibility check at all. Column order is user-reorderable, so any database whose first column is not the document block bypasses row filtering entirely.

Verified at origin/master (eef105683).

Proof of Concept

Precondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when Publish.Auth.Enable is false. Two databases: DB-A hosted in a published document, DB-B hosted in a publish-forbidden or password-protected document, with a Relation column in DB-A pointing at DB-B and containing a distinctive marker value.

(a) Related-database content disclosure:

POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/renderAttributeView
{"id":"<DB_A_AV_ID>"}

Rows of DB-A are returned (correctly, since its host document is public), and their Relation/Rollup cell Contents include DB-B's block text and mirrored column values, despite DB-B's host document being excluded from publishing.

(b) Fail-open row: Reorder DB-A so its first column is a non-block type (or use a detached row), mark its host document publish-forbidden, and request the same endpoint the row is returned without any accessibility evaluation.

Verification status: both defects are confirmed by code inspection at origin/master. A live demonstration requires a build from HEAD with two linked databases; available on request.

Impact

An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read content from databases whose host documents are hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected, by requesting a published database that relates to them. Because relation graphs are commonly used to link a public index to private detail records, this exposes exactly the data the publish boundary is meant to withhold. The fail-open path additionally returns rows with no accessibility check whenever the first column is not a block value, which is a user-controlled layout property. Confidentiality-only.

Suggested fix

In FilterViewByPublishAccess: 1. For each retained row, evaluate every Relation.Contents and Rollup.Contents entry against CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess (including the publish-password tier) and drop or mask entries that fail. 2. Fail closed: when row.Cells[0] has no accessible block (Value.Block == nil or bt == nil), drop the row rather than returning it unchecked.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260724121519-426991d155c0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-72798"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-04T20:58:04Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-72798](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72798).\n\n### Summary\n\n`renderAttributeView` correctly applies the reader publish-access filter, but the filter\u0027s row-accessibility decision is keyed solely to the row\u0027s **first cell**, and it never inspects the remaining cells\u0027 values. Relation and Rollup cells carry mirrored content from a *different* database, so a row belonging to a published database can hand an anonymous reader the contents of a related database whose host document is hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected. Separately, when the first column is not a block value the accessibility check is skipped entirely and the row is returned unchecked.\n\n### Note:\n\nThis is distinct from the previously reported password-tier omission in the same function that concerns the row\u0027s own primary block, whereas these two defects concern (a) other cells\u0027 related-database content, which no row-level check covers and (b) rows where the first cell is not a block at all. A fix to the row-drop condition alone would close neither.\n\n### Details\n\n`renderAttributeView` applies the filter (`kernel/api/av.go:68`):\n```go\nretDataMap[\"view\"] = model.FilterViewByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, retDataMap[\"view\"].(av.Viewable))\n```\n\nInside `FilterViewByPublishAccess` (`kernel/model/publish_access.go`):\n```go\nif row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil {\n    bt = treenode.GetBlockTree(row.Cells[0].Value.Block.ID)\n}\nif bt != nil {\n    if !CheckPathAccessableByPublishIgnore(bt.BoxID, bt.Path, publishIgnore) {\n        row = nil   // drop\n    }\n}\n// every other cell in the row is returned as-is\n```\n\n**(a) Relation and Rollup cells leak the related database.** These value types carry mirrored content, not just references:\n```go\ntype ValueRelation struct { BlockIDs []string; Contents []*Value }\ntype ValueRollup   struct { Contents []*Value }\n```\nThe render pipeline populates them from a different attribute view e.g. `kernel/model/attribute_view.go:2731`:\n```go\nv.GroupVal.Relation.Contents = []*av.Value{ relationDestAv.GetBlockValue(groupValue) }\n```\n`relationDestAv` is a separate database that may live in a hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected document. When a published database\u0027s row survives the filter (because its column-0 document is public), its Relation and Rollup columns return the related, non-published database\u0027s content block text, titles, and mirrored column values. `FilterViewByPublishAccess` performs no publish-access evaluation on `Relation.Contents` or `Rollup.Contents`.\n\n**(b) Fail-open when column 0 is not a block.** `bt` is assigned only when `row.Cells[0].Value.Block != nil`. If the first column is a non-block type (Relation, Text, \u2026) or the row is detached, `bt` remains `nil`, the `if bt != nil` guard is skipped, and the row is returned with no accessibility check at all. Column order is user-reorderable, so any database whose first column is not the document block bypasses row filtering entirely.\n\nVerified at `origin/master` (`eef105683`).\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nPrecondition: publish mode enabled (default port 6808); anonymous when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`. Two databases: **DB-A** hosted in a published document, **DB-B** hosted in a publish-forbidden or password-protected document, with a Relation column in DB-A pointing at DB-B and containing a distinctive marker value.\n\n**(a) Related-database content disclosure:**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/av/renderAttributeView\n{\"id\":\"\u003cDB_A_AV_ID\u003e\"}\n```\nRows of DB-A are returned (correctly, since its host document is public), and their Relation/Rollup cell `Contents` include DB-B\u0027s block text and mirrored column values, despite DB-B\u0027s host document being excluded from publishing.\n\n**(b) Fail-open row:**\nReorder DB-A so its first column is a non-block type (or use a detached row), mark its host document publish-forbidden, and request the same endpoint the row is returned without any accessibility evaluation.\n\n*Verification status:* both defects are confirmed by code inspection at `origin/master`. A live demonstration requires a build from HEAD with two linked databases; available on request.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read content from databases whose host documents are hidden, publish-forbidden, or password-protected, by requesting a *published* database that relates to them. Because relation graphs are commonly used to link a public index to private detail records, this exposes exactly the data the publish boundary is meant to withhold. The fail-open path additionally returns rows with no accessibility check whenever the first column is not a block value, which is a user-controlled layout property. Confidentiality-only.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nIn `FilterViewByPublishAccess`:\n1. For each retained row, evaluate every `Relation.Contents` and `Rollup.Contents` entry against `CheckBlockIdAccessableByPublishAccess` (including the publish-password tier) and drop or mask entries that fail.\n2. Fail closed: when `row.Cells[0]` has no accessible block (`Value.Block == nil` or `bt == nil`), drop the row rather than returning it unchecked.",
  "id": "GHSA-mfrj-v65r-979c",
  "modified": "2026-09-04T20:58:04Z",
  "published": "2026-09-04T20:58:04Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-mfrj-v65r-979c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72798"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/426991d155c0c7c3a9e71badd6761eddfa8aad5b"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-information-disclosure-via-renderattributeview"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan: Publish-access filter on renderAttributeView leaves related-database content unfiltered and fails open on non-block first columns"
}



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