GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-MMG6-4QMV-6PC8

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-08 18:14 – Updated: 2026-09-08 18:14
VLAI
Summary
Infracost: Arbitrary file read via config-template readFile symlink traversal
Details

Impact

Path traversal via link following in the Infracost config-template parser. The readFile, pathExists, isDir, and matchPaths template functions confined repo-supplied paths with a lexical filepath.Rel check plus a leaf-only os.Lstat:

{{ readFile "evil/file" }}

With an intermediate directory symlink committed in the repo (evil -> /), the path is lexically clean and the leaf is a regular file, so both checks pass, but os.ReadFile follows the symlink and reads outside the checkout. The contents are rendered into the generated config and surfaced via the Infracost dashboard and PR comment, so anyone who can open a pull request can read files off the runner.

Affects infracost up to and including v0.10.44. Successful exploitation reads any file the CLI process can reach on the runner. Impact depends on what the run exposes: under on: pull_request (the configuration in Infracost's documentation) fork pull requests run without secrets and with a read-only token, so exposure is limited. If Infracost runs under pull_request_target, or is triggered by a same-repository pull request, the read reaches the repository's secrets, enabling secret theft. The patch confines all four functions regardless of trigger.

Patches

Fixed in v0.10.45 (#3586) by routing all four functions through security.IsPathAllowed, which resolves symlinks anywhere in the path before a segment-aware containment check. The same fix landed in config#14 and parser#144. - Installed via the official script, a package manager, or the latest Docker tag: upgrade to v0.10.45 (or later) to receive the fix. - Pinned to a specific version or image digest: bump to v0.10.45.

Workarounds

No full fix without upgrading. To limit exposure: run Infracost under on: pull_request rather than pull_request_target, and keep fork pull requests from receiving secrets (the defaults).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/infracost/infracost"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.10.45"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-71493"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-59"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-08T18:14:00Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-21T18:16:50Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\nPath traversal via link following in the Infracost config-template parser. The `readFile`, `pathExists`, `isDir`, and `matchPaths` template functions confined repo-supplied paths with a lexical `filepath.Rel` check plus a leaf-only `os.Lstat`:\n\n```\n{{ readFile \"evil/file\" }}\n```\n\nWith an intermediate directory symlink committed in the repo (`evil -\u003e /`), the path is lexically clean and the leaf is a regular file, so both checks pass, but `os.ReadFile` follows the symlink and reads outside the checkout. The contents are rendered into the generated config and surfaced via the Infracost dashboard and PR comment, so anyone who can open a pull request can read files off the runner.\n\nAffects `infracost` up to and including `v0.10.44`. Successful exploitation reads any file the CLI process can reach on the runner. Impact depends on what the run exposes: under `on: pull_request` (the configuration in Infracost\u0027s documentation) fork pull requests run without secrets and with a read-only token, so exposure is limited. If Infracost runs under `pull_request_target`, or is triggered by a same-repository pull request, the read reaches the repository\u0027s secrets, enabling secret theft. The patch confines all four functions regardless of trigger.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in `v0.10.45` ([#3586](https://github.com/infracost/infracost/pull/3586)) by routing all four functions through `security.IsPathAllowed`, which resolves symlinks anywhere in the path before a segment-aware containment check. The same fix landed in [config#14](https://github.com/infracost/config/pull/14) and [parser#144](https://github.com/infracost/parser/pull/144).\n  - Installed via the official script, a package manager, or the `latest` Docker tag: upgrade to `v0.10.45` (or later) to receive the fix.\n  - Pinned to a specific version or image digest: bump to `v0.10.45`.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nNo full fix without upgrading. To limit exposure: run Infracost under `on: pull_request` rather than `pull_request_target`, and keep fork pull requests from receiving secrets (the defaults).",
  "id": "GHSA-mmg6-4qmv-6pc8",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T18:14:00Z",
  "published": "2026-09-08T18:14:00Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost/security/advisories/GHSA-mmg6-4qmv-6pc8"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-71493"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost/pull/3586"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost/commit/4d39331afc0e27752d16d9d91c34583e5e8487fb"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/infracost/infracost/releases/tag/v0.10.45"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Infracost: Arbitrary file read via config-template readFile symlink traversal"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…