Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-P28V-F755-9QRG

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-13 20:54 – Updated: 2026-08-13 20:54

Summary

Trigger.dev: Prototype pollution via run metadata operations → process-wide cross-tenant DoS

Details

Summary

The run-metadata update endpoint PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata applies client-supplied "operations" by passing the attacker-controlled operation.key straight into new JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value) (packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts:22-23), with no prototype-pollution guard (@jsonhero/path@^1.0.21 does not reject __proto__/constructor/prototype).

A request with key: "$.__proto__.polluted" sets Object.prototype.polluted in the webapp process. Because every plain object then inherits that property, it corrupts unrelated code process-wide and across tenants — including Prisma query building and the Prometheus metrics client — causing query failures, broken authentication for other tenants' workers, and an uncaughtException (denial of service). Only a normal, low-privilege environment API key is required (one request).

Severity

A single request from any holder of a normal environment API key contaminates Object.prototype in the shared webapp process, breaking other tenants' workers (scope change) and degrading/ crashing the process (high availability impact). Prototype pollution is also a primitive for further gadget chains (integrity/confidentiality).

Affected versions

Introduced in commit 34f8bd588 ("Add ability to update parent and root run metadata from children", PR #1563, 2025-01-08) — the JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set() sink is present from the first commit of operations.ts. SDK was at 3.3.8 at that time.
Still present at HEAD (SDK 4.5.0-rc.7); operations.ts unchanged since 2025-05, and @jsonhero/path is pinned at ^1.0.21 (no proto-guard) throughout.
Affected range: >= v3.3.8 (metadata operations API) through v4-beta / current v4.x — fixed: 4.5.6.

Root cause

packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts — applyMetadataOperations() builds a path from the untrusted operation.key and writes to it, for every operation type (set, append, increment, …):

const path = new JSONHeroPath(operation.key);   // operation.key fully attacker-controlled
path.set(newMetadata, operation.value);         // no __proto__/constructor/prototype rejection

The request schema (UpdateMetadataRequestBody) types key as a plain string with no validation, and @jsonhero/path@1.0.21 walks __proto__ as an ordinary segment → the assignment lands on Object.prototype.

Proof of Concept

Self-host ghcr.io/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev:v4-beta. Authenticated with a normal environment API key (tr_dev_…) and any run id of that environment.

curl -X PUT "http://localhost:8030/api/v1/runs/run_cmqr2bsyo00013js2twwhdsfu/metadata" \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer tr_dev_<env_key>" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  --data '{"operations":[{"type":"set","key":"$.__proto__.polluted","value":"PWNED"}]}'

Result — Object.prototype.polluted = "PWNED" process-wide. Observed in the webapp logs:

The request's own query is corrupted — polluted:"PWNED" injected into every object Prisma enumerates: prisma.taskRun.updateMany({ where:{ id:"…", metadataVersion:2, polluted:"PWNED" }, data:{ …, metadataVersion:{ increment:1, polluted:"PWNED" }, polluted:"PWNED" }, polluted:"PWNED" }) -> Unknown argument `polluted`
Cross-tenant authentication break — the next request from a different client (a worker's POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue) fails inside findEnvironmentByApiKey: prisma.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({ where:{ apiKey:"…", polluted:"PWNED" }, include:{ project:true, …, polluted:"PWNED" } }) -> PrismaClientValidationError i.e. one tenant's request breaks authentication for other tenants' workers → their jobs stop being dequeued/processed.
Denial of service — full process crash. The uncaughtException in prom-client (Error: Added label "polluted" is not included in initial labelset: [ 'kind' ]) crashes the webapp process. Demonstrated with a second tenant: Tenant B (a different org/env, with its own API key) had a working request (POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue → HTTP 400, auth OK) before the attack; immediately after Tenant A's single attack request, B's request returned HTTP 000 (no response) — the whole multi-tenant webapp was down. Logs show the crash at 20:53:41 and the process auto-restarting ~3s later (FairQueue/ScheduleEngine started). Repeating the attack in a loop yields a crash-loop = sustained DoS for all tenants.

(Note: the metadata endpoint itself swallows the Prisma failure with ignoreError:true and still returns HTTP 200 — the damage is the process-wide contamination observed in the logs, not the endpoint's status code.)

Impact

A low-privilege caller (one normal environment API key, one request) pollutes Object.prototype in the shared multi-tenant webapp process, causing:

Full cross-tenant denial of service — the resulting uncaughtException crashes the webapp process, taking the service down for all tenants (demonstrated: a second tenant's request returned HTTP 000 immediately after the attack). Repeating the request produces a crash-loop / sustained DoS. Even without the crash, contaminated Prisma queries break other tenants' worker authentication, halting job processing.
A prototype-pollution primitive usable for further gadget chains (auth/logic bypass, etc.).

Suggested remediation

Reject dangerous path segments in operation.key before building the path — block __proto__, constructor, prototype (and validate the $.-rooted JSONHero path shape).
Build metadata on a null-prototype object (Object.create(null)) and/or use a pollution-safe setter, so __proto__ cannot reach Object.prototype.
Upgrade/replace @jsonhero/path for a version that is prototype-pollution safe, or wrap its .set() with a guard.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.5.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "@trigger.dev/core"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.3.8"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.5.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-73654"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-1321"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-13T20:54:11Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nThe run-metadata update endpoint `PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata` applies client-supplied\n\"operations\" by passing the **attacker-controlled `operation.key`** straight into\n`new JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value)`\n(`packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts:22-23`), with **no prototype-pollution guard**\n(`@jsonhero/path@^1.0.21` does not reject `__proto__`/`constructor`/`prototype`).\n\nA request with `key: \"$.__proto__.polluted\"` sets **`Object.prototype.polluted`** in the webapp\nprocess. Because every plain object then inherits that property, it corrupts unrelated code\n**process-wide and across tenants** \u2014 including Prisma query building and the Prometheus metrics\nclient \u2014 causing query failures, **broken authentication for other tenants\u0027 workers**, and an\n`uncaughtException` (denial of service). Only a normal, low-privilege environment API key is\nrequired (one request).\n\n## Severity\n\nA single request from any holder of a normal environment API key contaminates `Object.prototype`\nin the shared webapp process, breaking other tenants\u0027 workers (scope change) and degrading/\ncrashing the process (high availability impact). Prototype pollution is also a primitive for\nfurther gadget chains (integrity/confidentiality).\n\n## Affected versions\n\n- **Introduced** in commit `34f8bd588` (\"Add ability to update parent and root run metadata from\n  children\", PR #1563, 2025-01-08) \u2014 the `JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set()` sink is present from\n  the first commit of `operations.ts`. SDK was at `3.3.8` at that time.\n- **Still present at HEAD** (SDK `4.5.0-rc.7`); `operations.ts` unchanged since 2025-05, and\n  `@jsonhero/path` is pinned at `^1.0.21` (no proto-guard) throughout.\n- **Affected range:** `\u003e= v3.3.8` (metadata operations API) through `v4-beta` / current v4.x \u2014\n  **fixed: 4.5.6**.\n\n## Root cause\n\n`packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts` \u2014 `applyMetadataOperations()` builds a path from\nthe **untrusted** `operation.key` and writes to it, for every operation type (`set`, `append`,\n`increment`, \u2026):\n\n```ts\nconst path = new JSONHeroPath(operation.key);   // operation.key fully attacker-controlled\npath.set(newMetadata, operation.value);         // no __proto__/constructor/prototype rejection\n```\n\nThe request schema (`UpdateMetadataRequestBody`) types `key` as a plain string with no validation,\nand `@jsonhero/path@1.0.21` walks `__proto__` as an ordinary segment \u2192 the assignment lands on\n`Object.prototype`.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nSelf-host `ghcr.io/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev:v4-beta`. Authenticated with a **normal environment\nAPI key** (`tr_dev_\u2026`) and any run id of that environment.\n\n```bash\ncurl -X PUT \"http://localhost:8030/api/v1/runs/run_cmqr2bsyo00013js2twwhdsfu/metadata\" \\\n  -H \"Authorization: Bearer tr_dev_\u003cenv_key\u003e\" -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n  --data \u0027{\"operations\":[{\"type\":\"set\",\"key\":\"$.__proto__.polluted\",\"value\":\"PWNED\"}]}\u0027\n```\n\n**Result \u2014 `Object.prototype.polluted = \"PWNED\"` process-wide.** Observed in the webapp logs:\n\n1. **The request\u0027s own query is corrupted** \u2014 `polluted:\"PWNED\"` injected into every object Prisma\n   enumerates:\n   ```\n   prisma.taskRun.updateMany({ where:{ id:\"\u2026\", metadataVersion:2, polluted:\"PWNED\" },\n     data:{ \u2026, metadataVersion:{ increment:1, polluted:\"PWNED\" }, polluted:\"PWNED\" }, polluted:\"PWNED\" })\n   -\u003e Unknown argument `polluted`\n   ```\n2. **Cross-tenant authentication break** \u2014 the *next* request from a different client (a worker\u0027s\n   `POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue`) fails inside `findEnvironmentByApiKey`:\n   ```\n   prisma.runtimeEnvironment.findFirst({ where:{ apiKey:\"\u2026\", polluted:\"PWNED\" },\n     include:{ project:true, \u2026, polluted:\"PWNED\" } })  -\u003e PrismaClientValidationError\n   ```\n   i.e. one tenant\u0027s request **breaks authentication for other tenants\u0027 workers** \u2192 their jobs stop\n   being dequeued/processed.\n3. **Denial of service \u2014 full process crash.** The `uncaughtException` in prom-client\n   (`Error: Added label \"polluted\" is not included in initial labelset: [ \u0027kind\u0027 ]`) **crashes the\n   webapp process**. Demonstrated with a second tenant: Tenant B (a *different* org/env, with its\n   own API key) had a working request (`POST /engine/v1/dev/dequeue` \u2192 HTTP 400, auth OK) **before**\n   the attack; **immediately after Tenant A\u0027s single attack request, B\u0027s request returned HTTP 000\n   (no response) \u2014 the whole multi-tenant webapp was down**. Logs show the crash at 20:53:41 and the\n   process auto-restarting ~3s later (`FairQueue/ScheduleEngine started`). Repeating the attack in a\n   loop yields a **crash-loop = sustained DoS for all tenants**.\n\n*(Note: the metadata endpoint itself swallows the Prisma failure with `ignoreError:true` and still\nreturns HTTP 200 \u2014 the damage is the process-wide contamination observed in the logs, not the\nendpoint\u0027s status code.)*\n\n## Impact\n\nA low-privilege caller (one normal environment API key, one request) pollutes `Object.prototype`\nin the shared multi-tenant webapp process, causing:\n\n- **Full cross-tenant denial of service** \u2014 the resulting `uncaughtException` **crashes the webapp\n  process**, taking the service down for **all tenants** (demonstrated: a second tenant\u0027s request\n  returned HTTP 000 immediately after the attack). Repeating the request produces a **crash-loop /\n  sustained DoS**. Even without the crash, contaminated Prisma queries break other tenants\u0027 worker\n  authentication, halting job processing.\n- **A prototype-pollution primitive** usable for further gadget chains (auth/logic bypass, etc.).\n\n## Suggested remediation\n\n1. **Reject dangerous path segments** in `operation.key` before building the path \u2014 block\n   `__proto__`, `constructor`, `prototype` (and validate the `$.`-rooted JSONHero path shape).\n2. **Build metadata on a null-prototype object** (`Object.create(null)`) and/or use a\n   pollution-safe setter, so `__proto__` cannot reach `Object.prototype`.\n3. Upgrade/replace `@jsonhero/path` for a version that is prototype-pollution safe, or wrap its\n   `.set()` with a guard.",
  "id": "GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg",
  "modified": "2026-08-13T20:54:11Z",
  "published": "2026-08-13T20:54:11Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/commit/6997aeb05e27d2db47f9eda01fdc8a17c81a1ae0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/releases/tag/v4.5.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Trigger.dev: Prototype pollution via run metadata operations \u2192 process-wide cross-tenant DoS"
}

CVE-2026-73654 (GCVE-0-2026-73654)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-08-13 19:29 – Updated: 2026-08-14 16:34

Title

Trigger.dev: Prototype pollution via run metadata operations → process-wide cross-tenant DoS

Summary

Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. From 3.3.8 until 4.5.6, the PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata endpoint passes attacker-controlled operation.key values to new JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value) in packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts without rejecting dangerous constructor and prototype path segments. A caller with a normal environment API key can pollute Object.prototype in the shared webapp process, corrupting Prisma queries and Prometheus labels, breaking other tenants' worker authentication, and causing a process-wide denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.6.

Severity

8.5 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-08-14 16:33 UTC

CWE

CWE-1321 - Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes ('Prototype Pollution')

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/secu…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/pull/4316	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/comm…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/rele…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
triggerdotdev	trigger.dev	Affected: >= 3.3.8, < 4.5.6

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JSON

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  "containers": {
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        "metrics": [
          {
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                "id": "CVE-2026-73654",
                "options": [
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                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-08-14T16:33:32.438291Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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        },
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          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
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            "url": "https://github.com/triggerdotdev/trigger.dev/security/advisories/GHSA-p28v-f755-9qrg"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "trigger.dev",
          "vendor": "triggerdotdev",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 3.3.8, \u003c 4.5.6"
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      "descriptions": [
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          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Trigger.dev is a platform for building and deploying fully managed AI agents and workflows. From 3.3.8 until 4.5.6, the PUT /api/v1/runs/:runId/metadata endpoint passes attacker-controlled operation.key values to new JSONHeroPath(operation.key).set(newMetadata, value) in packages/core/src/v3/runMetadata/operations.ts without rejecting dangerous constructor and prototype path segments. A caller with a normal environment API key can pollute Object.prototype in the shared webapp process, corrupting Prisma queries and Prometheus labels, breaking other tenants\u0027 worker authentication, and causing a process-wide denial of service. This issue is fixed in version 4.5.6."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
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          "cvssV3_1": {
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            "baseScore": 8.5,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:L/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
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      "problemTypes": [
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          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-1321",
              "description": "CWE-1321: Improperly Controlled Modification of Object Prototype Attributes (\u0027Prototype Pollution\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
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      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-08-13T19:29:05.537Z",
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    "datePublished": "2026-08-13T19:29:05.537Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-13T14:04:09.604Z",
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}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.

Action not permitted

GHSA-P28V-F755-9QRG

Summary

Severity

Affected versions

Root cause

Proof of Concept

Impact

Suggested remediation

CVE-2026-73654 (GCVE-0-2026-73654)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature