GHSA-P8GC-JWRX-PF65
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-01-09 09:31 – Updated: 2025-01-09 15:31Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command ('Command Injection') vulnerability allows OS Command Injection as root This issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.
Likelihood: Moderate – The binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request.
Impact: Critical – The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete files and services.
CVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-43653"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-78"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-01-09T08:15:27Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in a Command (\u0027Command Injection\u0027) vulnerability\u00a0 allows OS Command Injection as root\nThis issue affects Iocharger firmware for AC model chargers before version 24120701.\n\nLikelihood: Moderate \u2013 The \u003credacted\u003e binary does not seem to be used by the web interface, so it might be more difficult to find. It seems to be largely the same binary as used by the Iocharger Pedestal charging station, however. The attacker will also need a (low privilege) account to gain access to the \u003credacted\u003e binary, or convince a user with such access to execute a crafted HTTP request.\n\nImpact: Critical \u2013 The attacker has full control over the charging station as the root user, and can arbitrarily add, modify and delete\nfiles and services.\n\nCVSS clarification: Any network interface serving the web ui is vulnerable (AV:N) and there are not additional security measures to circumvent (AC:L), nor does the attack require and existing preconditions (AT:N). The attack is authenticated, but the level of authentication does not matter (PR:L), nor is any user interaction required (UI:N). The attack leads to a full compromised (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and compromised devices can be used to pivot into networks that should potentially not be accessible (SC:L/SI:L/SA:H). Becuase this is an EV charger handing significant power, there is a potential safety impact (S:P). This attack can be automated (AU:Y).",
"id": "GHSA-p8gc-jwrx-pf65",
"modified": "2025-01-09T15:31:51Z",
"published": "2025-01-09T09:31:42Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-43653"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://csirt.divd.nl/CVE-2024-43653"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://csirt.divd.nl/DIVD-2024-00035"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://iocharger.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:P/AU:Y/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.