GHSA-PM3W-VXP9-CCWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 21:22 – Updated: 2026-09-03 21:22CVE: This vulnerability corresponds to CVE-2026-68585.
Summary
The /api/block/getBlockInfo endpoint returns document root metadata including the document title (rootTitle) for a block in a publish-forbidden document, with no publish-access check. Its sibling /api/block/getDocInfo applies the publish-access filter, getBlockInfo does not. Both are gated by CheckAuth only, so getBlockInfo is reachable by the publish RoleReader token and by the anonymous account when Publish.Auth.Enable is false.
Details
The list/info side of this API is filtered while the block-info twin is not the asymmetry indicates an oversight rather than intended behavior:
| Endpoint | Returns | Publish-access filter | Route |
|---|---|---|---|
getDocInfo |
document info/metadata | present | CheckAuth |
getBlockInfo |
box, path, rootID, rootTitle, rootChildID, rootIcon |
none | CheckAuth |
getBlockInfo takes a caller-supplied block ID, validates only its format, and returns the containing document's root metadata including rootTitle (the document title) with no IsReadOnlyRoleContext / publish-access check. Because getDocInfo performs the filtering for equivalent data, the boundary is clearly meant to apply here; getBlockInfo omits it.
Proof of Concept
Reproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). Setup: a publish-forbidden document D whose title is a unique marker, containing a block BLOCKID.
1. Mark the document publish-forbidden (admin action):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess
Authorization: Token <admin-token>
{"id":"DOC","visible":false,"password":"","disable":true}
2. Disclosure: the block-info endpoint returns the forbidden doc's title (anonymous, port 6808):
POST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockInfo
{"id":"BLOCKID"}
Returns HTTP 200 with data.rootTitle set to the publish-forbidden document's title, along with box, path, rootID, and rootIcon. This document's title is not returned by the reader-facing filtered paths.
Impact
An anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish RoleReader can read the title and root metadata (notebook, path, root ID, icon) of a publish-forbidden document by supplying a block ID from it. This discloses the existence, title, and location of documents an administrator marked as excluded from publishing.
Precondition and scope (stated honestly): the request requires a block ID from the target document; this endpoint does not enumerate arbitrary documents. The disclosure is limited to document metadata, title, notebook, path, root ID, icon — not the document body. Block IDs for forbidden documents are obtainable from other CheckAuth-only endpoints that lack the publish-access filter (reported separately). Impact is confidentiality-only, limited to metadata; no content body, no modification. Encrypted notebooks are out of scope.
Suggested fix
Apply the same publish-access check getDocInfo uses to getBlockInfo before returning root metadata, resolve the block's document and enforce IsReadOnlyRoleContext / the publish-access filter, consistent with the sibling endpoint.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260721014951-ffde3b21eca4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68585"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-03T21:22:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "**CVE:** This vulnerability corresponds to [CVE-2026-68585](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68585).\n\n### Summary\n\nThe `/api/block/getBlockInfo` endpoint returns document root metadata including the document title (`rootTitle`) for a block in a publish-forbidden document, with no publish-access check. Its sibling `/api/block/getDocInfo` applies the publish-access filter, `getBlockInfo` does not. Both are gated by `CheckAuth` only, so `getBlockInfo` is reachable by the publish `RoleReader` token and by the anonymous account when `Publish.Auth.Enable` is `false`.\n\n### Details\n\nThe list/info side of this API is filtered while the block-info twin is not the asymmetry indicates an oversight rather than intended behavior:\n\n| Endpoint | Returns | Publish-access filter | Route |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| `getDocInfo` | document info/metadata | present | `CheckAuth` |\n| `getBlockInfo` | `box, path, rootID, rootTitle, rootChildID, rootIcon` | none | `CheckAuth` |\n\n`getBlockInfo` takes a caller-supplied block ID, validates only its format, and returns the containing document\u0027s root metadata including `rootTitle` (the document title) with no `IsReadOnlyRoleContext` / publish-access check. Because `getDocInfo` performs the filtering for equivalent data, the boundary is clearly meant to apply here; `getBlockInfo` omits it.\n\n### Proof of Concept\n\nReproduced on a local instance (SiYuan running locally, publish mode enabled on port 6808, publish Basic Auth disabled). Setup: a publish-forbidden document `D` whose title is a unique marker, containing a block `BLOCKID`.\n\n**1. Mark the document publish-forbidden (admin action):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6806/api/filetree/setPublishAccess\nAuthorization: Token \u003cadmin-token\u003e\n{\"id\":\"DOC\",\"visible\":false,\"password\":\"\",\"disable\":true}\n```\n\n**2. Disclosure: the block-info endpoint returns the forbidden doc\u0027s title (anonymous, port 6808):**\n```\nPOST http://127.0.0.1:6808/api/block/getBlockInfo\n{\"id\":\"BLOCKID\"}\n```\nReturns HTTP 200 with `data.rootTitle` set to the publish-forbidden document\u0027s title, along with `box`, `path`, `rootID`, and `rootIcon`. This document\u0027s title is not returned by the reader-facing filtered paths.\n\n### Impact\n\nAn anonymous reader (publish mode with auth disabled) or any publish `RoleReader` can read the title and root metadata (notebook, path, root ID, icon) of a publish-forbidden document by supplying a block ID from it. This discloses the existence, title, and location of documents an administrator marked as excluded from publishing.\n\n**Precondition and scope (stated honestly):** the request requires a block ID from the target document; this endpoint does not enumerate arbitrary documents. The disclosure is limited to document metadata, title, notebook, path, root ID, icon \u2014 not the document body. Block IDs for forbidden documents are obtainable from other `CheckAuth`-only endpoints that lack the publish-access filter (reported separately). Impact is confidentiality-only, limited to metadata; no content body, no modification. Encrypted notebooks are out of scope.\n\n### Suggested fix\n\nApply the same publish-access check `getDocInfo` uses to `getBlockInfo` before returning root metadata, resolve the block\u0027s document and enforce `IsReadOnlyRoleContext` / the publish-access filter, consistent with the sibling endpoint.",
"id": "GHSA-pm3w-vxp9-ccwc",
"modified": "2026-09-03T21:22:08Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T21:22:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-pm3w-vxp9-ccwc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68585"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/ffde3b21eca49ae98828747ca126581a553cce8b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/siyuan-before-metadata-disclosure-via-getblockinfo"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "SiYuan: Cross-boundary metadata disclosure via getBlockInfo (publish mode): reader-reachable document title/root info for publish-forbidden docs; sibling getDocInfo is filtered"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.