GHSA-PWPJ-P52H-Q484
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-23 23:12 – Updated: 2026-06-23 23:12Impact
A cross-tenant data injection vulnerability was identified in the Snipe-IT Accessories API when Full Multiple Companies Support (FMCS) is enabled. A low-privileged authenticated user belonging to one company can create an accessory record under another company by supplying a foreign company_id value in the API request body.
The issue occurs because the API create path mass-assigns request parameters directly to the Accessory model, and the Accessory model allows company_id to be mass assigned. Unlike the web controller, which uses Company::getIdForCurrentUser() to enforce the authenticated user’s company context, the API controller does not apply equivalent tenant enforcement during accessory creation.
As a result, a Company A user can inject persistent accessory records into Company B. The injected records are then visible to Company B users as legitimate Company B inventory records. This breaks the integrity of company-scoped inventory data and represents a tenant isolation failure in the accessory creation flow.
Patches
Patched in https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/dc8cbf4786bb38b260b4ae1723ec9e7f81d82fe5
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 8.6.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "snipe/snipe-it"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.6.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-54329"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-74"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-23T23:12:04Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nA cross-tenant data injection vulnerability was identified in the Snipe-IT Accessories API when Full Multiple Companies Support (FMCS) is enabled. A low-privileged authenticated user belonging to one company can create an accessory record under another company by supplying a foreign company_id value in the API request body.\n\nThe issue occurs because the API create path mass-assigns request parameters directly to the Accessory model, and the Accessory model allows company_id to be mass assigned. Unlike the web controller, which uses Company::getIdForCurrentUser() to enforce the authenticated user\u2019s company context, the API controller does not apply equivalent tenant enforcement during accessory creation.\n\nAs a result, a Company A user can inject persistent accessory records into Company B. The injected records are then visible to Company B users as legitimate Company B inventory records. This breaks the integrity of company-scoped inventory data and represents a tenant isolation failure in the accessory creation flow.\n\n### Patches\nPatched in https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/dc8cbf4786bb38b260b4ae1723ec9e7f81d82fe5",
"id": "GHSA-pwpj-p52h-q484",
"modified": "2026-06-23T23:12:04Z",
"published": "2026-06-23T23:12:04Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-pwpj-p52h-q484"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/dc8cbf4786bb38b260b4ae1723ec9e7f81d82fe5"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Snipe-IT API Vulnerable to Cross-Tenant Accessory Injection"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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