GHSA-PX9H-X66R-8MPC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2020-05-13 16:29 – Updated: 2021-08-25 21:08Impact
Access to sensitive information available from classpath.
Patches
Patched version: 1.6.7 and 2.8.2
Commit 1.x: https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/34f526028e6cd0652125baa33936ffb6a8a4a009
Commit 2.x: https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/c81479de67036993f406ccdec23990b44b0bec32
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
References
Latest 1.x version: 1.6.6
Arbitrary class path resource access 1
When sharing a File System directory as in:
assets("/static/**", Paths.get("static"));
The class path is also searched for the file (org.jooby.handlers.AssetHandler.loader):
jooby/AssetHandler.java at 1.x · jooby-project/jooby · GitHub
private static Loader loader(final Path basedir, final ClassLoader classloader) {
if (Files.exists(basedir)) {
return name -> {
Path path = basedir.resolve(name).normalize();
if (Files.exists(path) && path.startsWith(basedir)) {
try {
return path.toUri().toURL();
} catch (MalformedURLException x) {
// shh
}
}
return classloader.getResource(name);
};
}
return classloader::getResource;
}
If we send /static/WEB-INF/web.xml it will fail to load it from the file system but will go into classloader.getResource(name) where name equals /WEB-INF/web.xml so will succeed and return the requested file. This way we can get any configuration file or even the application class files
If assets are configured for a certain extension we can still bypass it. eg:
assets("/static/**/*.js", Paths.get("static"));
We can send:
http://localhost:8080/static/io/yiss/App.class.js
Arbitrary class path resource access 2
This vulnerability also affects assets configured to access resources from the root of the class path. eg:
assets("/static/**");
In this case we can traverse static by sending:
http://localhost:8080/static/..%252fio/yiss/App.class
For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in jooby * Email us at support@jooby.io
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.jooby:jooby"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.jooby:jooby"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2020-7647"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2020-05-12T20:27:09Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Impact\nAccess to sensitive information available from classpath. \n\n### Patches\nPatched version: 1.6.7 and 2.8.2\n\nCommit 1.x: https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/34f526028e6cd0652125baa33936ffb6a8a4a009\n\nCommit 2.x: https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/c81479de67036993f406ccdec23990b44b0bec32\n\n### Workarounds\n_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_\n\n### References\n\nLatest 1.x version: 1.6.6\n\n#### Arbitrary class path resource access 1\nWhen sharing a *File System* directory as in:\n\n``` java\nassets(\"/static/**\", Paths.get(\"static\"));\n```\n\nThe class path is also searched for the file (`org.jooby.handlers.AssetHandler.loader`):\n[jooby/AssetHandler.java at 1.x \u00b7 jooby-project/jooby \u00b7 GitHub](https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/blob/1.x/jooby/src/main/java/org/jooby/handlers/AssetHandler.java)\n\n``` java\n private static Loader loader(final Path basedir, final ClassLoader classloader) {\n if (Files.exists(basedir)) {\n return name -\u003e {\n Path path = basedir.resolve(name).normalize();\n if (Files.exists(path) \u0026\u0026 path.startsWith(basedir)) {\n try {\n return path.toUri().toURL();\n } catch (MalformedURLException x) {\n // shh\n }\n }\n return classloader.getResource(name);\n };\n }\n return classloader::getResource;\n }\n```\n\nIf we send `/static/WEB-INF/web.xml` it will fail to load it from the file system but will go into `classloader.getResource(name)` where name equals `/WEB-INF/web.xml` so will succeed and return the requested file. This way we can get any configuration file or even the application class files\n\nIf assets are configured for a certain extension we can still bypass it. eg:\n\n```java\nassets(\"/static/**/*.js\", Paths.get(\"static\"));\n```\n\nWe can send:\n\n```\nhttp://localhost:8080/static/io/yiss/App.class.js\n```\n\n#### Arbitrary class path resource access 2\nThis vulnerability also affects assets configured to access resources from the root of the class path. eg:\n\n```java\nassets(\"/static/**\");\n```\n\nIn this case we can traverse `static` by sending:\n\n```\nhttp://localhost:8080/static/..%252fio/yiss/App.class\n```\n\n### For more information\nIf you have any questions or comments about this advisory:\n* Open an issue in [jooby](https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/issues)\n* Email us at [support@jooby.io](mailto:support@jooby.io)",
"id": "GHSA-px9h-x66r-8mpc",
"modified": "2021-08-25T21:08:32Z",
"published": "2020-05-13T16:29:26Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/security/advisories/GHSA-px9h-x66r-8mpc"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2020-7647"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby/commit/34f526028e6cd0652125baa33936ffb6a8a4a009"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jooby-project/jooby"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-IOJOOBY-568806"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-IOJOOBY-568806,"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGJOOBY-568807"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://snyk.io/vuln/SNYK-JAVA-ORGJOOBY-568807,"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "path traversal in Jooby"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.