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GHSA-Q4C5-2J6F-R476

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-22 20:37 – Updated: 2026-09-22 20:37

Summary

Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs

Details

Impact

This is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.

Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the approve/deny actions on ApprovalWorkflowStage. The generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can POST approved responses directly and drive a stage past its min_approvers threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes user and state as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.
Escalated impact job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a ScheduledJob, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through ApprovalWorkflow.save() to on_workflow_approved(), which sets the target job to enabled/active.

Patches

Fixed in Nautobot v3.1.8

Workarounds

Restrict the extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage approve/deny actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.

Severity

6.4 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

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JSON

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nautobot"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.1.8"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-83805"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-285",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-22T20:37:33Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThis is an authorization bypass that escalates into unauthorized server-side job execution.\n\n1. Primary impact - self-approval: The approver checks (approver-group membership, `change` permission on the object under review, one-response-per-user) are enforced only in the `approve`/`deny` actions on `ApprovalWorkflowStage`. The generic `ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse` create endpoint enforces none of them, so a user holding only `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` can `POST` approved responses directly and drive a stage past its `min_approvers` threshold with no legitimate approver involved. The serializer also exposes `user` and `state` as writable, letting the attacker attribute responses to arbitrary users.\n\n2. Escalated impact  job activation: Because the approval workflow gates a `ScheduledJob`, self-approval does not stop at the approval record. Stage approval cascades through `ApprovalWorkflow.save()` to `on_workflow_approved()`, which sets the target job to enabled/active.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in Nautobot v3.1.8\n\n### Workarounds\nRestrict the `extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse` permission so that no untrusted user holds it; approval responses should only ever be created via the stage `approve`/`deny` actions. There is no configuration flag that disables the generic create endpoint prior to the patch.",
  "id": "GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476",
  "modified": "2026-09-22T20:37:33Z",
  "published": "2026-09-22T20:37:33Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/8682707d0391cbfd7694e3276127b78dc9cf29d8"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v3.1.8"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs"
}

CVE-2026-83805 (GCVE-0-2026-83805)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-22 19:47 – Updated: 2026-09-26 00:09

Title

Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs

Summary

Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.1.8, the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint does not enforce approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, or the one-response-per-user restriction applied by the intended approve and deny actions. A user with only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can submit approved responses directly, while writable user and state fields permit responses to be attributed to arbitrary users. These forged responses can satisfy min_approvers, approve the workflow, and activate its gated ScheduledJob without a legitimate approver. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.8.

Severity

6.4 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-26 00:09 UTC

CWE

CWE-285 - Improper Authorization
CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/86827…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
nautobot	nautobot	Affected: >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.8

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-83805",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-09-26T00:09:09.099588Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-09-26T00:09:18.288Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "nautobot",
          "vendor": "nautobot",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 3.0.0, \u003c 3.1.8"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Nautobot is a Network Source of Truth and Network Automation Platform. From 3.0.0 until 3.1.8, the generic ApprovalWorkflowStageResponse create endpoint does not enforce approver-group membership, change permission on the object under review, or the one-response-per-user restriction applied by the intended approve and deny actions. A user with only extras.add_approvalworkflowstageresponse can submit approved responses directly, while writable user and state fields permit responses to be attributed to arbitrary users. These forged responses can satisfy min_approvers, approve the workflow, and activate its gated ScheduledJob without a legitimate approver. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.8."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 6.4,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "CHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-285",
              "description": "CWE-285: Improper Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        },
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-639",
              "description": "CWE-639: Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-09-22T19:47:42.826Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/security/advisories/GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/8682707d0391cbfd7694e3276127b78dc9cf29d8",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/commit/8682707d0391cbfd7694e3276127b78dc9cf29d8"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v3.1.8",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/nautobot/nautobot/releases/tag/v3.1.8"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-q4c5-2j6f-r476",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Nautobot: Authorization bypass in approval workflow REST API allows self-approval and unauthorized activation of scheduled jobs"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-83805",
    "datePublished": "2026-09-22T19:47:42.826Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-08-31T23:04:48.172Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-09-26T00:09:18.288Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

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