GHSA-Q5HJ-MXQH-VV77
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-24 16:34 – Updated: 2026-05-08 15:31Claude Code used the git worktree commondir file when determining folder trust but did not validate its contents. By crafting a repository with a commondir file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, an attacker could bypass the trust dialog and immediately execute malicious hooks defined in .claude/settings.json. Exploiting this required the victim to clone a malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and for the attacker to know or guess a path the victim had already trusted.
Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.
Claude Code thanks hackerone.com/masato_anzai for reporting this issue.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@anthropic-ai/claude-code"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "2.1.63"
},
{
"fixed": "2.1.84"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40068"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-20",
"CWE-77"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-24T16:34:03Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-05T21:16:23Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Claude Code used the git worktree `commondir` file when determining folder trust but did not validate its contents. By crafting a repository with a `commondir` file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, an attacker could bypass the trust dialog and immediately execute malicious hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`. Exploiting this required the victim to clone a malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and for the attacker to know or guess a path the victim had already trusted.\n\nUsers on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version.\n\nClaude Code thanks [hackerone.com/masato_anzai](https://hackerone.com/masato_anzai) for reporting this issue.",
"id": "GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77",
"modified": "2026-05-08T15:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-04-24T16:34:03Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code/security/advisories/GHSA-q5hj-mxqh-vv77"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40068"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/anthropics/claude-code"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Claude Code: Trust Dialog Bypass via Git Worktree Spoofing Allows Arbitrary Code Execution"
}
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