GHSA-Q6HG-6M9X-5G9C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-07-10 14:19 – Updated: 2024-07-10 14:19
VLAI
Summary
Evmos vulnerable to exploit of smart contract account and vesting
Details
Summary
This advisory board aims to describe two vulnerabilities found in the Evmos codebase:
- Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount: unauthorized spend of funds.
Details
Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount
With the current implementation, a user can create a vesting account with a 3rd party account (EOA or contract) as funder. Then, this user can create an authorization for the contract.CallerAddress, this is the authorization checked in the code. But the funds are taken from the funder address provided in the message. Consequently, the user can fund a vesting account with a 3rd party account without its permission. The funder address can be any address, so this vulnerability can be used to drain all the accounts in the chain.
Severity
Based on ImmuneFi Severity Classification System the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to direct loss of funds.
Patches
The issue has been patched in versions >=V19.0.0
Severity
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 18.0.1"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/evmos/evmos/v18"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "19.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-39696"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-07-10T14:19:51Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-07-05T19:15:10Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThis advisory board aims to describe two vulnerabilities found in the Evmos codebase:\n\n- _Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount_: unauthorized spend of funds.\n\n### Details\n\n#### Authorization check on the fundVestingAccount\n\nWith the current implementation, a user can create a vesting account with a 3rd party account (EOA or contract) as funder. Then, this user can create an authorization for the contract.CallerAddress, this is the authorization checked in the code. But the funds are taken from the funder address provided in the message. Consequently, the user can fund a vesting account with a 3rd party account without its permission. The funder address can be any address, so this vulnerability can be used to drain all the accounts in the chain.\n\n### Severity\nBased on [ImmuneFi Severity Classification System](https://immunefisupport.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/13332717597585-Severity-Classification-System) the severity was evaluated to Critical since the attack could have lead to direct loss of funds.\n\n### Patches\nThe issue has been patched in versions \u003e=V19.0.0",
"id": "GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c",
"modified": "2024-07-10T14:19:51Z",
"published": "2024-07-10T14:19:51Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/evmos/evmos/security/advisories/GHSA-q6hg-6m9x-5g9c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-39696"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/evmos/evmos/commit/0a620e176617a835ac697eea494afea09185dfaf"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/evmos/evmos"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Evmos vulnerable to exploit of smart contract account and vesting"
}
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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