GHSA-QXJP-W3PJ-48M7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-16 20:13 – Updated: 2026-06-16 20:13Summary
The _safe_eval_expression() function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (gi_frame, f_back, f_builtins) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution.
The attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via POST /crawl with a crafted extraction schema.
Attack Vector
An attacker sends a POST /crawl request with a JsonCssExtractionStrategy schema containing a malicious computed field expression that:
1. Creates a generator to access gi_frame
2. Walks the frame chain via f_back
3. Reaches f_builtins containing the real __import__
4. Imports os and executes arbitrary commands
Impact
Unauthenticated remote code execution inside the Docker container. An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands, read/write files, and exfiltrate secrets.
Fix Details
- Removed
eval()from computed field expression path entirely -- expressions now log a warning and return default value - Deleted
_safe_eval_expression()function and_SAFE_EVAL_BUILTINS(dead security-sensitive code) functionkey with Python callables still works for SDK users- Replaced
eval()in/config/dumpwith JSON-based input validated by Pydantic - Fixed hook_manager sandbox: stripped
__builtins__,__loader__,__spec__from injected modules; removedgetattr,setattr,type,__build_class__from allowed builtins
Workarounds
- Upgrade to the patched version (recommended)
- Enable JWT authentication via
CRAWL4AI_API_TOKENenvironment variable - Restrict network access to the Docker API
Credits
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 0.8.6"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "crawl4ai"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.8.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53753"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-913",
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-16T20:13:07Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nThe `_safe_eval_expression()` function in the computed fields feature uses an AST validator that only blocks attributes starting with underscore. Python generator and frame object attributes (`gi_frame`, `f_back`, `f_builtins`) do NOT start with underscore, enabling a complete sandbox escape to achieve arbitrary code execution.\n\nThe attack requires no authentication (JWT disabled by default) and is triggered via `POST /crawl` with a crafted extraction schema.\n\n### Attack Vector\n\nAn attacker sends a `POST /crawl` request with a `JsonCssExtractionStrategy` schema containing a malicious computed field expression that:\n1. Creates a generator to access `gi_frame`\n2. Walks the frame chain via `f_back`\n3. Reaches `f_builtins` containing the real `__import__`\n4. Imports `os` and executes arbitrary commands\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthenticated remote code execution inside the Docker container. An attacker can execute arbitrary system commands, read/write files, and exfiltrate secrets.\n\n### Fix Details\n\n1. Removed `eval()` from computed field expression path entirely -- expressions now log a warning and return default value\n2. Deleted `_safe_eval_expression()` function and `_SAFE_EVAL_BUILTINS` (dead security-sensitive code)\n3. `function` key with Python callables still works for SDK users\n4. Replaced `eval()` in `/config/dump` with JSON-based input validated by Pydantic\n5. Fixed hook_manager sandbox: stripped `__builtins__`, `__loader__`, `__spec__` from injected modules; removed `getattr`, `setattr`, `type`, `__build_class__` from allowed builtins\n\n### Workarounds\n\n1. Upgrade to the patched version (recommended)\n2. Enable JWT authentication via `CRAWL4AI_API_TOKEN` environment variable\n3. Restrict network access to the Docker API\n\n### Credits\n\n- Song Binglin ([q1uf3ng](https://github.com/q1uf3ng)) - reported the AST sandbox escape\n- by111 ([August829](https://github.com/August829)) - reported the hook sandbox `__builtins__` escape and hardcoded JWT secret bypass\n- [jannahopp](https://github.com/jannahopp) - PR #1855 proposing eval removal\n- [ntohidi](https://github.com/ntohidi) - PR #1886 proposing allowlist approach",
"id": "GHSA-qxjp-w3pj-48m7",
"modified": "2026-06-16T20:13:07Z",
"published": "2026-06-16T20:13:07Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/security/advisories/GHSA-qxjp-w3pj-48m7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/pull/1855"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai/pull/1886"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/unclecode/crawl4ai"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Crawl4AI: AST Sandbox Escape via gi_frame.f_back Chain - Pre-Auth RCE in Docker API"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.