GHSA-R26J-82CG-5H6C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 03:30 – Updated: 2026-08-15 03:30The User Session Synchronizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.0. The synchronize_session() function, hooked on init and therefore executed on every request, performs no nonce, capability, or shared-secret validation against the attacker-supplied ussync-key, ussync-token, and ussync-ref parameters; when ussync-key references an unregistered slot, get_option() returns false for both the secret key and the domain list, causing the AES-256-CBC encryption key to degrade to the fully predictable md5('') and the referer allowlist to collapse to an empty-string match, while the AES IV is unconditionally hard-coded as md5('another-secret'). This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to supply a crafted request encrypting any known or guessable user email address in the ussync-ref parameter, causing the handler to call wp_set_auth_cookie() for the matched user and granting full authentication as that user — including administrators — with no prior knowledge of site secrets.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-15341"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T03:16:47Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "The User Session Synchronizer plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass leading to Account Takeover in all versions up to, and including, 1.4.0. The `synchronize_session()` function, hooked on `init` and therefore executed on every request, performs no nonce, capability, or shared-secret validation against the attacker-supplied `ussync-key`, `ussync-token`, and `ussync-ref` parameters; when `ussync-key` references an unregistered slot, `get_option()` returns `false` for both the secret key and the domain list, causing the AES-256-CBC encryption key to degrade to the fully predictable `md5(\u0027\u0027)` and the referer allowlist to collapse to an empty-string match, while the AES IV is unconditionally hard-coded as `md5(\u0027another-secret\u0027)`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to supply a crafted request encrypting any known or guessable user email address in the `ussync-ref` parameter, causing the handler to call `wp_set_auth_cookie()` for the matched user and granting full authentication as that user \u2014 including administrators \u2014 with no prior knowledge of site secrets.",
"id": "GHSA-r26j-82cg-5h6c",
"modified": "2026-08-15T03:30:24Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T03:30:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-15341"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/user-session-synchronizer/tags/1.4.0/includes/class-user-session-synchronizer.php#L117"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/user-session-synchronizer/tags/1.4.0/includes/class-user-session-synchronizer.php#L286"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/user-session-synchronizer/tags/1.4.0/includes/class-user-session-synchronizer.php#L310"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/user-session-synchronizer/tags/1.4.0/includes/class-user-session-synchronizer.php#L422"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/user-session-synchronizer/tags/1.4.0/includes/class-user-session-synchronizer.php#L598"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/user-session-synchronizer/tags/1.4.0/includes/class-user-session-synchronizer.php#L631"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/cbc32e6d-47c5-4050-ba77-5a54203fe56a?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.