{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "compliance-trestle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.12.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "compliance-trestle"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-57171"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:52:34Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-26T05:18:11Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "**At a glance**\n\n- **Actor:** attacker who controls the -o/--output argument to trestle author {catalog,profile,ssp}-generate (e.g. via a CI pipeline that derives the output directory from repository-controlled data)\n\n- **Primitive:** attacker-controlled --output value reaches trestle_root / args.output write sink with only is_directory_name_allowed() (parts[0]-only task-name-collision check), not the PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard added by the CVE-2026-46345 fix\n\n- **Impact:** arbitrary-location file write outside the trestle workspace as the process owner (8.4 High; conservative C:N variant 7.7, still High); with --force-overwrite, the attacker-chosen directory is first recursively deleted shutil.rmtree)\n\n- **Precondition:** attacker influences the -o argument in a CI/automation pipeline or multi-tenant trestle workspace running these generate subcommands\n\n- **Fix:** call PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path(markdown_path, trestle_root) immediately after building markdown_path in catalog.py, ssp.py, and prof.py, mirroring the existing jinja fix\n\n## Overview\n\nThe remediation for **CVE-2026-46345 / GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w** (\"Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in compliance-trestle \u2013 jinja\") added a new PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() guard and wired it into the jinja command\u0027s output path. The identical output = trestle_root / args.output write pattern in the sibling author commands \u2014 catalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate \u2014 was **not** updated. Those commands instead rely on is_directory_name_allowed(), a task-name-collision check that does not stop path traversal: an absolute --output or a --output whose first component is innocuous subdir/../../../...) escapes the trestle workspace and writes generated markdown under an attacker-chosen output root outside the workspace, subject to the invoking process\u0027s filesystem permissions.\n\n## Impact\n\n**Threat model.** This is not a claim that a local user harms themselves by intentionally choosing an unsafe -o. The security boundary is crossed when a trusted automation job, CI workflow, shared trestle service, or wrapper invokes one of these subcommands and derives --output from repository-controlled, tenant-controlled, or otherwise untrusted data while expecting trestle to keep generated output inside the workspace. The attacker does not need local shell access to the trestle host; they only need influence over the data that the trusted automation maps into the --output argument.\n\n**Primary claim (confirmed):** Such an invocation writes control-markdown files **outside** the trestle workspace \u2014 arbitrary-location file write as the process owner. This is runtime-confirmed for catalog-generate: catalog-generate -o /tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_ABS produced files outside the workspace on a v4.0.3 install while the same install blocked the equivalent jinja -o with a Security violation error. profile-generate and ssp-generate are source-confirmed siblings (identical trestle_root / args.output join, the same is_directory_name_allowed-only gate, no validate_local_path call); see Runtime-confirmed scope in the End-to-end verification below.\n\n**Destructive variant --force-overwrite, source-confirmed):** before generating, the force-overwrite path clears the selected output directory via clear_folder(...) trestle/core/commands/common/cmd_utils.py), which performs shutil.rmtree on that directory. Because clear_folder early-returns unless the target is an existing **directory**, the primitive is recursive deletion of an attacker-selected directory tree outside the workspace (e.g. wiping a directory the process owner can write), not pinpoint deletion of an arbitrary single file. This is the integrity + availability impact behind I:HA:H.\n\n**Secondary (conditional) escalation:** The affected population extends to every consumer that runs these generate subcommands in a CI/automation pipeline, shared/multi-tenant trestle workspace, or wrapper that forwards an externally supplied name \u2014 the same threat model GitHub/the maintainer accepted for CVE-2026-46345. Indirect code execution (e.g. overwriting a script the CI pipeline later invokes) is the bounded escalation beyond the demonstrated file-write primitive.\n\n## Technical Details\n\n**Source \u2192 Transform \u2192 Sink \u2192 Missing-guard \u2192 Result:** attacker-controlled --output CLI argument \u2192 trestle_root / args.output join in catalog.pyssp.pyprof.py \u2192 CatalogAPI.write_catalog_as_markdown() writes files under the resolved path \u2192 only is_directory_name_allowed() (parts[0]-only task-name check) applied, not PathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path() \u2192 files written outside the trestle workspace.\n\n### The fix is scoped to jinja.py only\n\nBoth fix commits 247fcce2\u2026, 7d107b3a\u2026, \"add path traversal protection and prevent SSTI in jinja templating\") touch only trestle/core/commands/author/jinja.py (+ its tests). The new guard:\n\n```python\n# trestle/core/commands/author/jinja.py\noutput_file = trestle_root / r_output_file\nPathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path(output_file, trestle_root)   # :229 (and :278, :297)\n```\n\nvalidate_local_path trestle/core/remote/security.py:326) is the correct guard \u2014 it .resolve()s the path and calls relative_to(trestle_root), rejecting both .. traversal and absolute paths.\n\n### The sibling generate commands were not updated\n\ncatalog-generate, profile-generate, and ssp-generate build the output path with the **same** join but never call validate_local_path. The only check is is_directory_name_allowed:\n\n```python\n# trestle/core/commands/author/catalog.py:69 / ssp.py:97 / prof.py:86  (identical in all three)\nif not file_utils.is_directory_name_allowed(args.output):\n    raise TrestleError(f\u0027{args.output} is not an allowed directory name\u0027)\n...\nmarkdown_path = trestle_root / args.output           # catalog.py:90 / prof.py:110 (var markdown_path); ssp.py:111 (var md_path) \u2014 same join\n```\n\nis_directory_name_allowed trestle/common/file_utils.py:95) was designed to stop task names that collide with OSCAL model directories, not traversal. It inspects only parts[0]:\n\n```python\ndef is_directory_name_allowed(name: str) -\u003e bool:\n    pathed_name = pathlib.Path(name)\n    root_path = pathed_name.parts[0]\n    if root_path in const.MODEL_TYPE_TO_MODEL_DIR.values(): return False  # blocks \"catalogs\", \"profiles\", ...\n    if root_path[0] == \u0027.\u0027:                                return False  # blocks leading \".\" (i.e. \"../x\")\n    if pathed_name.suffix != \u0027\u0027:                           return False  # blocks names with a file suffix\n    if \u0027__global__\u0027 in pathed_name.parts:                  return False\n    return True\n```\n\nTwo payloads defeat it:\n\n1. **Absolute path** \u2014 --output /tmp/pwned. parts[0] is / (not an OSCAL dir, not .-prefixed, no suffix) \u2192 allowed. trestle_root / \u0027/tmp/pwned\u0027 collapses to /tmp/pwned (pathlib discards the left operand on absolute join).\n\n2. **Non-leading ..** \u2014 --output subdir/../../../../../../tmp/pwned. parts[0] is subdir (innocuous) \u2192 allowed. The .. segments resolve out of the workspace at write time.\n\nThe validated value flows unchanged to the write sink with no further sanitisation grep for resolve()/relative_to/validate_local_path across the catalog write path returns zero hits): ControlContext.generate(..., md_root=markdown_path, ...) stores it as a dataclass field trestle/core/control_context.py:46) and CatalogAPI.write_catalog_as_markdown() calls self._context.md_root.mkdir(exist_ok=True, parents=True) trestle/core/catalog/catalog_api.py:72) then writes \u003ccontrol-id\u003e.md files under it.\n\n### Additional unguarded siblings create, replicate)\n\ntrestle create trestle/core/commands/create.py:95, desired_model_dir = trestle_root / plural_path / args.output) and trestle replicate replicate.py:90) have **no** is_directory_name_allowed check at all and accept the same absolute / .. --output. They write a structured OSCAL model file and refuse to overwrite an existing target .exists() raises), so the primitive is create-only there \u2014 lower impact than the generate commands, but the same missing-guard root cause. These are flagged as related defense-in-depth sinks sharing the root cause, not as the primary impact claim of this report.\n\n### Severity note\n\nMetrics mirror the parent CVE-2026-46345 (8.4, AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H). I:HA:H are direct and demonstrated: out-of-workspace file creation, plus recursive shutil.rmtree of an attacker-chosen directory under --force-overwrite. C:H is proposed for consistency with the parent advisory\u0027s published score for the same out-of-workspace write boundary; however, the directly demonstrated primitive is write/overwrite rather than file read, so a conservative vector with C:N AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H) yields **7.7, still High**. S:U because trestle writes as the invoking user.\n\n### Why OSCAL id-validation does not prevent this\n\nOSCAL model ids control.id, group.id) are NCName-validated constr(regex=\u2026)) and cannot contain /, \\, or a leading .., so the per-control **leaf** filenames grp1/ac-1.md) cannot themselves traverse. That validation does not help here: the **base** output root md_root = trestle_root / args.output is built from the raw, unconstrained -o/--output CLI string and is joined before those safe leaves. An absolute or non-leading.. -o escapes the workspace, and the NCName-safe leaves are written underneath the escaped root \u2014 confirmed by the PoC, where the escape occurs at md_root /tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_ABS) with grp1/ac-1.md written beneath it.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nNon-web target (Python CLI). PoC is a command sequence run against a **local** install of the project\u0027s current source (HEAD e22e35bd, reports as v4.0.3) \u2014 no vendor infrastructure touched.\n\n### Step 1 \u2014 Set up a normal trestle workspace with a one-control catalog\n\n```bash\npip install -e .                      # editable install of the affected source (v4.0.3)\nmkdir /tmp/poc_ws \u0026\u0026 cd /tmp/poc_ws\ntrestle init\nmkdir -p catalogs/mycat\npython3 - \u003c\u003c\u0027PY\u0027\nimport uuid, json\ncat = {\"catalog\":{\"uuid\":str(uuid.uuid4()),\n  \"metadata\":{\"title\":\"PoC Catalog\",\"last-modified\":\"2026-01-01T00:00:00.000+00:00\",\"version\":\"1.0\",\"oscal-version\":\"1.0.4\"},\n  \"groups\":[{\"id\":\"grp1\",\"title\":\"Group One\",\"controls\":[\n     {\"id\":\"ac-1\",\"title\":\"PoC Control\",\"parts\":[{\"id\":\"ac-1_smt\",\"name\":\"statement\",\"prose\":\"PoC statement prose.\"}]}]}]}}\njson.dump(cat, open(\"catalogs/mycat/catalog.json\",\"w\"), indent=2)\nPY\n```\n\n### Step 2 \u2014 Trigger the boundary failure (absolute-path escape)\n\n```bash\ntrestle author catalog-generate -n mycat -o /tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_ABS\nls /tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_ABS/grp1/ac-1.md\n```\n\nRecorded output:\n\n```text\n$ ls /tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_ABS/grp1/ac-1.md\n/tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_ABS/grp1/ac-1.md          # written OUTSIDE /tmp/poc_ws\n$ head -3 /tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_ABS/grp1/ac-1.md\n# ac-1 - \\[Group One\\] PoC Control\n## Control Statement\n```\n\n### Step 3 \u2014 Same escape via non-leading .. (defeats is_directory_name_allowed)\n\n```bash\ntrestle author catalog-generate -n mycat -o \u0027subdir/../../../../../../tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_DOTDOT\u0027\nls /tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_DOTDOT/grp1/ac-1.md   # -\u003e exists, outside the workspace\n```\n\n### Step 4 \u2014 Differential: the patched jinja -o is blocked on the SAME install\n\n```bash\necho \u0027hello {{ 1+1 }}\u0027 \u003e template.j2\ntrestle author jinja -i template.j2 -o \u0027/tmp/TRESTLE_JINJA_BLOCKED\u0027\n```\n\nRecorded output (fix is active; proves this is an incomplete fix, not an unpatched version):\n\n```text\nERROR: ... Security violation: Path traversal blocked. Attempted to access\n\"/tmp/TRESTLE_JINJA_BLOCKED\" which is outside the trestle workspace \"/tmp/poc_ws\"\n# (no file created)\n```\n\ncatalog-generate escapes while jinja is blocked \u2192 the validate_local_path remediation was never applied to the generate commands.\n\n### End-to-end verification (runtime)\n\n- **Lab setup:** editable install pip install -e .) of the affected source at HEAD e22e35bd (reports as v4.0.3, the release that contains the GHSA-4q5v jinja fix). import trestle.core.commands.author.catalog resolves to the in-tree source file, confirming the run exercises HEAD, not a stale wheel.\n\n- **Observed end-to-end effect (not an intermediate return value):** files physically written outside the workspace \u2014 /tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_ABS/grp1/ac-1.md and /tmp/TRESTLE_ESCAPE_DOTDOT/grp1/ac-1.md \u2014 while /tmp/poc_ws (the trestle root) contained no such directory. Confirmed by findls.\n\n- **Differential control:** the same install rejects the equivalent jinja -o with Security violation: Path traversal blocked \u2026 outside the trestle workspace, writing nothing. The guard exists and works in jinja; it is simply absent from the generate commands.\n\n- **Guard bypass, isolated:** importing is_directory_name_allowed semantics and joining via pathlib confirms -o /tmp/pwned (absolute) and -o subdir/../../../tmp/pwned (innocuous leading component) both pass the check and resolve outside the root, while the naive -o ../../tmp/pwned is the only form the check stops.\n\n- **Runtime-confirmed scope (what was executed vs source-confirmed):** the write escape is runtime-confirmed for catalog-generate (Steps 2\u20134 above). profile-generate and ssp-generate are source-confirmed siblings \u2014 same trestle_root / args.output join prof.py:110, ssp.py:111), same is_directory_name_allowed-only gate prof.py:86, ssp.py:97), no validate_local_path \u2014 and should be fixed in the same patch. The --force-overwrite recursive-delete primitive clear_folder \u2192 shutil.rmtree, with an early return unless the target is an existing directory) is source-confirmed; the PoC above exercises the write escape, not -fo.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n**Root-cause fix:** Mirror the jinja fix in the three generate commands (and, for completeness, createreplicate): after constructing the output path, call the existing guard before any mkdir/write.\n\n```python\n# catalog.py / ssp.py / prof.py, immediately after markdown_path = trestle_root / args.output\nfrom trestle.core.remote.security import PathSecurityValidator\nPathSecurityValidator.validate_local_path(markdown_path, trestle_root)\n```\n\nis_directory_name_allowed() should be retained for its original purpose (OSCAL-dir-collision prevention) but must not be relied on for traversal defence.\n\n**Defense-in-depth:** Harden is_directory_name_allowed to reject absolute paths pathed_name.is_absolute()) and any .. component so it provides a secondary layer even if the primary validate_local_path call is accidentally omitted in future.\n\n## References\n\n- Vendor security policy: https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/policy\n\n- Submission endpoint: https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/new\n\n- Parent advisory (incompletely fixed): GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w / CVE-2026-46345 \u2014 \"Arbitrary File Write via Path Traversal in compliance-trestle \u2013 jinja\"\n\n- Coordinated disclosure batch (part of the same PathSecurityValidator remediation): GHSA-gg2g-p7xc-qqmm (SSTI RCE), GHSA-g3vg-vx23-3858 (cache path traversal), GHSA-mj4x-vf5c-5xg8 (profile-import path traversal read), GHSA-w76h-q7c6-jpjp (SSRF)\n\n- Fix commits (jinja-only scope): 247fcce289f60103f3d8e28d8ec51a6986b94fb6, 7d107b3ac53caca7bde97a6278b23cd739d94525\n\n- Affected sinks: trestle/core/commands/author/catalog.py:69,90; author/ssp.py:97,111; author/prof.py:86,110; bypassed guard trestle/common/file_utils.py:95; write sink trestle/core/catalog/catalog_api.py:72; unused-here correct guard trestle/core/remote/security.py:326\n\n- Additional unguarded siblings: trestle/core/commands/create.py:95, trestle/core/commands/replicate.py:90",
  "id": "GHSA-r4vp-3vw6-r2x5",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T19:52:34Z",
  "published": "2026-09-24T19:52:34Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-4q5v-7g7x-j79w"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/security/advisories/GHSA-r4vp-3vw6-r2x5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-57171"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/pull/2270"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/37ed44f5f2e074202c8eb7c2f203c05d19461cdc"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/commit/5335ff873a2a68eb7de43df029bea09cadff22fd"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/releases/tag/v3.12.4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/oscal-compass/compliance-trestle/releases/tag/v4.1.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Trestle is vulnerable to arbitrary file write via path traversal in author generate commands (Incomplete fix of CVE-2026-46345)"
}