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GHSA-R5JH-Q2MW-GCX4

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-28 20:18 – Updated: 2026-07-28 20:18

Summary

Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape

Details

SanitizeFilePath in pkg/utils/utils.go validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir). This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: /packages-extra/evil starts with /packages, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted.

Callers included the builder's Clean handler (pkg/builder/builder.go:208) and the fetcher's Fetch / Upload handlers (pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go). A tenant who could pre-create or control a sibling directory under the fetcher / builder's shared volume could induce a write or read outside the intended safe directory.

Affected

Project: github.com/fission/fission
Versions: all versions through v1.24.0 with SanitizeFilePath in the tree
Audited commit: 647c141
Component: pkg/utils/utils.go:SanitizeFilePath
Callers: pkg/builder/builder.go:157,164,208, pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go:296,311,450,496,565,571
Configuration: default; requires a sibling directory to the safe dir to exist on the filesystem

Fix section (paste into the Fix / Patches field)

Fixed in v1.25.0 by:

PR #3445 (commit 8298e33e) — migrate every SanitizeFilePath call site (fetcher: storePath / tmpPath / secretDir / configDir / rename + writeSecretOrConfigMap; builder: srcPkg / deployPkg path validation and srcPkg stat) to new pkg/utils/root.go helpers (RootJoin, RootStat, RootWriteFile, RootMkdirAll, RootRename) that operate through os.Root. os.Root enforces directory confinement in the kernel and is recognized by CodeQL go/path-injection as a traversal barrier.
PR #3446 (commit 5aac6f0b) — delete the deprecated SanitizeFilePath itself once no callers remained. The vulnerable function no longer exists in the tree.

Severity

3.6 (Low)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

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{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.24.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/fission/fission"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.25.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-50568"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-41"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-28T20:18:30Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-10T18:17:13Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "`SanitizeFilePath` in `pkg/utils/utils.go` validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling `strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir)`. This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: `/packages-extra/evil` starts with\n`/packages`, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted.\n\nCallers included the builder\u0027s `Clean` handler (`pkg/builder/builder.go:208`) and the fetcher\u0027s `Fetch` / `Upload` handlers (`pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go`). A tenant who could pre-create or control a sibling directory under the fetcher /\nbuilder\u0027s shared volume could induce a write or read outside the intended safe directory.\n\n### Affected\n\n- Project: `github.com/fission/fission`\n- Versions: all versions through v1.24.0 with `SanitizeFilePath` in the tree\n- Audited commit: `647c141`\n- Component: `pkg/utils/utils.go:SanitizeFilePath`\n- Callers: `pkg/builder/builder.go:157,164,208`, `pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go:296,311,450,496,565,571`\n- Configuration: default; requires a sibling directory to the safe dir to exist on the filesystem\n\n\nFix section (paste into the Fix / Patches field)\n\nFixed in [v1.25.0](https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.25.0) by:\n\n- [PR #3445](https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3445) (commit [`8298e33e`](https://github.com/fission/fission/commit/8298e33ea7457702f893eae11077987cf905edb4)) \u2014 migrate every `SanitizeFilePath` call site (fetcher: `storePath` /\n`tmpPath` / `secretDir` / `configDir` / rename + `writeSecretOrConfigMap`; builder: `srcPkg` / `deployPkg` path validation and `srcPkg` stat) to new `pkg/utils/root.go` helpers (`RootJoin`, `RootStat`, `RootWriteFile`, `RootMkdirAll`,\n`RootRename`) that operate through `os.Root`. `os.Root` enforces directory confinement in the kernel and is recognized by CodeQL `go/path-injection` as a traversal barrier.\n- [PR #3446](https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3446) (commit [`5aac6f0b`](https://github.com/fission/fission/commit/5aac6f0bcdf840e28f3f06c846ca7ae1866b3957)) \u2014 delete the deprecated `SanitizeFilePath` itself once no callers\nremained. The vulnerable function no longer exists in the tree.",
  "id": "GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4",
  "modified": "2026-07-28T20:18:30Z",
  "published": "2026-07-28T20:18:30Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-50568"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3445"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3446"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/commit/5aac6f0bcdf840e28f3f06c846ca7ae1866b3957"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/commit/8298e33ea7457702f893eae11077987cf905edb4"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.25.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape"
}

CVE-2026-50568 (GCVE-0-2026-50568)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-10 17:31 – Updated: 2026-06-11 13:59

Title

Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape

Summary

Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, SanitizeFilePath in pkg/utils/utils.go validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir). This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: /packages-extra/evil starts with /packages, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted. Callers included the builder's Clean handler (pkg/builder/builder.go:208) and the fetcher's Fetch / Upload handlers (pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go). A tenant who could pre-create or control a sibling directory under the fetcher / builder's shared volume could induce a write or read outside the intended safe directory. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0.

Severity

3.6 (Low)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-06-11 13:59 UTC

CWE

CWE-41 - Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root Scorecard

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advis…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3445	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/fission/fission/pull/3446	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.25.0	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
fission	fission	Affected: < 1.25.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-50568",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "none"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-06-11T13:59:24.283843Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
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          "dateUpdated": "2026-06-11T13:59:45.267Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "fission",
          "vendor": "fission",
          "versions": [
            {
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              "version": "\u003c 1.25.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "Fission is an open-source, Kubernetes-native serverless framework that simplifies the deployment of functions and applications on Kubernetes. Prior to version 1.25.0, SanitizeFilePath in pkg/utils/utils.go validated that a path stayed under a safe directory by calling strings.HasPrefix(path, safedir). This is a lexical check, not a directory boundary check: /packages-extra/evil starts with /packages, so it passed. The function did not enforce a path-separator boundary, so any sibling directory whose name began with the safe-directory string was accepted. Callers included the builder\u0027s Clean handler (pkg/builder/builder.go:208) and the fetcher\u0027s Fetch / Upload handlers (pkg/fetcher/fetcher.go). A tenant who could pre-create or control a sibling directory under the fetcher / builder\u0027s shared volume could induce a write or read outside the intended safe directory. This issue has been patched in version 1.25.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 3.6,
            "baseSeverity": "LOW",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-41",
              "description": "CWE-41: Improper Resolution of Path Equivalence",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-06-10T17:31:49.917Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/security/advisories/GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4"
        },
        {
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          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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          "tags": [
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        },
        {
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          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
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          "url": "https://github.com/fission/fission/releases/tag/v1.25.0"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-r5jh-q2mw-gcx4",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Fission: SanitizeFilePath lexical HasPrefix bypass permits sibling-directory escape"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
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    "datePublished": "2026-06-10T17:31:49.917Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-06-04T21:34:34.427Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-06-11T13:59:45.267Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

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Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

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The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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