GHSA-RJ6P-XMXR-QJ4H
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-02 17:11 – Updated: 2026-07-02 17:13Summary
MCP loopback could skip owner-only tool policy for non-owner callers. In affected versions, a non-owner caller reaching the affected loopback path could skip owner-only tool policy and before-tool-call hooks.
This advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw's trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.
Impact
When the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could invoke owner-only behavior through that loopback path. Practical impact depends on the operator's configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.
Resolution
Update to a patched OpenClaw release when one is listed for this advisory. If the Patched versions field is populated, use that version or later.
Mitigations
restrict MCP loopback access to trusted operators until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "openclaw"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2026.4.24"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53818"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-02T17:11:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-11T21:16:24Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nMCP loopback could skip owner-only tool policy for non-owner callers. In affected versions, a non-owner caller reaching the affected loopback path could skip owner-only tool policy and before-tool-call hooks.\n\nThis advisory is scoped to the named feature and configuration. It does not change OpenClaw\u0027s trusted-operator model: authenticated Gateway operators, installed plugins, and intentional local execution surfaces remain trusted unless a separate policy, approval, allowlist, sandbox, or auth boundary is crossed.\n\n### Impact\n\nWhen the affected feature is enabled and reachable, this could invoke owner-only behavior through that loopback path. Practical impact depends on the operator\u0027s configuration and whether lower-trust input can reach that path.\n\n### Resolution\n\nUpdate to a patched OpenClaw release when one is listed for this advisory. If the Patched versions field is populated, use that version or later.\n\n### Mitigations\n\nrestrict MCP loopback access to trusted operators until patched. As general hardening, keep channel and tool allowlists narrow, avoid sharing one Gateway between mutually untrusted users, and disable the affected feature when it is not needed.",
"id": "GHSA-rj6p-xmxr-qj4h",
"modified": "2026-07-02T17:13:42Z",
"published": "2026-07-02T17:11:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw/security/advisories/GHSA-rj6p-xmxr-qj4h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53818"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/openclaw/openclaw"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/openclaw-owner-only-tool-policy-bypass-via-mcp-loopback"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "OpenClaw: MCP loopback could skip owner-only tool policy for non-owner callers"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.