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GHSA-RQFV-2MW9-78G2

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 20:35 – Updated: 2026-09-11 20:35
VLAI
Summary
MySQL MCP Server: Missing Origin/Host Validation in SSE Transport Enables Unauthenticated SQL Execution (DNS Rebinding / Direct Exposure)
Details

Summary

In SSE/HTTP transport mode, mysql_mcp_server constructs SseServerTransport without passing security_settings. As a result, the MCP Python SDK's DNS-rebinding protection (Origin/Host header validation) is disabled; the Starlette application has no CORS or TrustedHost middleware; and the service binds to 0.0.0.0 by default with no authentication on any route.

Trigger condition: MCP_TRANSPORT=sse. The default stdio mode is not affected.

Attack Scenarios

Scenario A — Direct exposure: Any network attacker can invoke execute_sql to run arbitrary SQL without credentials → full data dump, and via MySQL FILE privileges, arbitrary file read/write and RCE.

Scenario B — DNS rebinding (local bind): An attacker lures a victim's browser to a malicious page, rebinds their domain to 127.0.0.1, and uses the browser as a proxy to invoke execute_sql as same-origin.

Root Cause

In src/mysql_mcp_server/server.py:

  1. SseServerTransport is constructed without security_settings — the SDK defaults enable_dns_rebinding_protection to False.
  2. The Starlette app has no CORS or TrustedHost middleware.
  3. All three routes (/, /sse, /messages/) are unauthenticated.
  4. The service binds to 0.0.0.0 by default.
  5. The sink is cursor.execute(query) with a fully attacker-controlled query.

Impact

  • Unauthenticated arbitrary SQL execution against the configured database
  • Full data exfiltration and modification
  • If the MySQL account holds FILE privilege: arbitrary file read (LOAD_FILE) and write (INTO OUTFILE) — potential RCE via webshell drop
  • Internet-wide scanning has identified 25 publicly reachable SSE instances of this project

Fix

Released in v0.4.2: DNS-rebinding protection is now enabled by passing TransportSecuritySettings(enable_dns_rebinding_protection=True) to SseServerTransport, and the documented recommended bind address is 127.0.0.1.

Credits

Discovered by Huanchen, SongWu (JHU), and BrookeYangRui (JHU).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mysql-mcp-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.4.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-59971"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-306",
      "CWE-346"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-11T20:35:42Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\nIn SSE/HTTP transport mode, `mysql_mcp_server` constructs `SseServerTransport` without passing `security_settings`. As a result, the MCP Python SDK\u0027s DNS-rebinding protection (Origin/Host header validation) is disabled; the Starlette application has no CORS or TrustedHost middleware; and the service binds to `0.0.0.0` by default with no authentication on any route.\n\n**Trigger condition:** `MCP_TRANSPORT=sse`. The default stdio mode is not affected.\n\n## Attack Scenarios\n\n**Scenario A \u2014 Direct exposure:** Any network attacker can invoke `execute_sql` to run arbitrary SQL without credentials \u2192 full data dump, and via MySQL `FILE` privileges, arbitrary file read/write and RCE.\n\n**Scenario B \u2014 DNS rebinding (local bind):** An attacker lures a victim\u0027s browser to a malicious page, rebinds their domain to `127.0.0.1`, and uses the browser as a proxy to invoke `execute_sql` as same-origin.\n\n## Root Cause\n\nIn `src/mysql_mcp_server/server.py`:\n\n1. `SseServerTransport` is constructed without `security_settings` \u2014 the SDK defaults `enable_dns_rebinding_protection` to `False`.\n2. The Starlette app has no CORS or TrustedHost middleware.\n3. All three routes (`/`, `/sse`, `/messages/`) are unauthenticated.\n4. The service binds to `0.0.0.0` by default.\n5. The sink is `cursor.execute(query)` with a fully attacker-controlled query.\n\n## Impact\n\n- Unauthenticated arbitrary SQL execution against the configured database\n- Full data exfiltration and modification\n- If the MySQL account holds `FILE` privilege: arbitrary file read (`LOAD_FILE`) and write (`INTO OUTFILE`) \u2014 potential RCE via webshell drop\n- Internet-wide scanning has identified 25 publicly reachable SSE instances of this project\n\n## Fix\n\nReleased in v0.4.2: DNS-rebinding protection is now enabled by passing `TransportSecuritySettings(enable_dns_rebinding_protection=True)` to `SseServerTransport`, and the documented recommended bind address is `127.0.0.1`.\n\n## Credits\n\nDiscovered by Huanchen, SongWu (JHU), and BrookeYangRui (JHU).",
  "id": "GHSA-rqfv-2mw9-78g2",
  "modified": "2026-09-11T20:35:42Z",
  "published": "2026-09-11T20:35:42Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/designcomputer/mysql_mcp_server/security/advisories/GHSA-rqfv-2mw9-78g2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/designcomputer/mysql_mcp_server/issues/92"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/designcomputer/mysql_mcp_server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/designcomputer/mysql_mcp_server/releases/tag/v0.4.2"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MySQL MCP Server: Missing Origin/Host Validation in SSE Transport Enables Unauthenticated SQL Execution (DNS Rebinding / Direct Exposure)"
}



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