GHSA-V9RJ-XJFV-XJ9R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 22:07 – Updated: 2026-09-16 22:07
VLAI
Summary
djust: WebSocket/runtime reconstructed request omits the client Host, causing host/subdomain TenantResolvers to misresolve the tenant on the live path
Details

Impact

The WebSocket handle_mount and ViewRuntime._build_request rebuild an HttpRequest via RequestFactory().get(...) with no HTTP_HOST, so request.get_host() defaulted to "testserver" on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain TenantResolvers then misresolved the tenant — None on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With STRICT_MODE=False the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (cross-tenant disclosure); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy).

Patches

Fixed in djust 1.0.7. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against ALLOWED_HOSTS (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django's split_domain_port so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated — with the TLS scheme — into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly.

Workarounds

No workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Most exposed when combined with STRICT_MODE=False.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "djust"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61589"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-348",
      "CWE-639"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-16T22:07:52Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\nThe WebSocket `handle_mount` and `ViewRuntime._build_request` rebuild an `HttpRequest` via `RequestFactory().get(...)` with no `HTTP_HOST`, so `request.get_host()` defaulted to `\"testserver\"` on the live path. Host/subdomain/domain `TenantResolver`s then misresolved the tenant \u2014 `None` on the live path while the HTTP path resolved correctly. With `STRICT_MODE=False` the tenant-scoped managers returned unscoped rows (**cross-tenant disclosure**); with the default they returned an empty queryset (broken tenancy).\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **djust 1.0.7**. The handshake Host is extracted from the ASGI scope, validated against `ALLOWED_HOSTS` (the same logic as the CSWSH Origin gate, parsed with Django\u0027s `split_domain_port` so malformed Hosts are rejected at the boundary), and propagated \u2014 with the TLS scheme \u2014 into the reconstructed request, so live-path tenant resolution matches HTTP exactly.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workaround on the live path short of upgrading. Most exposed when combined with `STRICT_MODE=False`.",
  "id": "GHSA-v9rj-xjfv-xj9r",
  "modified": "2026-09-16T22:07:52Z",
  "published": "2026-09-16T22:07:52Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/security/advisories/GHSA-v9rj-xjfv-xj9r"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "djust: WebSocket/runtime reconstructed request omits the client Host, causing host/subdomain TenantResolvers to misresolve the tenant on the live path"
}



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