GHSA-VFP3-V2GW-7WFQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 16:13 – Updated: 2026-08-25 16:13Summary
Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving %2F as-is), while StaticDirectoryHandler unescapes %2F to / before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.
Details
Root cause 1 — router.go lines 798-802:
The router uses req.URL.RawPath for route matching when useEscapedPathForRouting is false (the default). This means /admin%2Fsecret.txt is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the /admin/* route pattern.
if !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != "" {
path = req.URL.RawPath
}
Root cause 2 — echo.go lines 559-568:
StaticDirectoryHandler calls url.PathUnescape() on the path parameter before opening files. This converts %2F back to /, resolving admin/secret.txt on disk.
if !disablePathUnescaping {
tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)
p = tmpPath
}
name := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/")))
PoC (Screenshot)
Sample:
403:
Bypass with encoded slash:
Impact
Unauthorized static file disclosure. Applications that protect route prefixes with authentication middleware while also serving static files from a broader root are vulnerable. An attacker only needs to encode the slash (/ → %2F) in the URL to bypass all route-level protection.
Common affected pattern:
adminGroup := e.Group("/admin", authMiddleware)
e.StaticFS("/", os.DirFS("public"))
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "5.2.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/labstack/echo/v4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.15.3"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/labstack/echo"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "3.3.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55677"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-22"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T16:13:29Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T17:16:34Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nEcho\u0027s router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving `%2F` as-is), while `StaticDirectoryHandler` unescapes `%2F` to `/` before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 \u2014 `router.go` lines 798-802:**\nThe router uses `req.URL.RawPath` for route matching when `useEscapedPathForRouting` is false (the default). This means `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the `/admin/*` route pattern.\n\n```go\nif !r.useEscapedPathForRouting \u0026\u0026 req.URL.RawPath != \"\" {\n path = req.URL.RawPath\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause 2 \u2014 `echo.go` lines 559-568:**\n`StaticDirectoryHandler` calls `url.PathUnescape()` on the path parameter before opening files. This converts `%2F` back to `/`, resolving `admin/secret.txt` on disk.\n\n```go\nif !disablePathUnescaping {\n tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)\n p = tmpPath\n}\nname := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")))\n```\n\n### PoC (Screenshot)\nSample:\n\u003cimg width=\"1291\" height=\"970\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bc58059-3e6d-4678-ab25-a5c79b006738\" /\u003e\n\n403:\n\u003cimg width=\"526\" height=\"194\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f55ffdd-87b2-4a1b-8a13-130ebad0f257\" /\u003e\n\nBypass with encoded slash:\n\u003cimg width=\"592\" height=\"203\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1191cd39-ae8f-4d7e-8fb1-cb9cf31f484f\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthorized static file disclosure. Applications that protect route prefixes with authentication middleware while also serving static files from a broader root are vulnerable. An attacker only needs to encode the slash (`/` \u2192 `%2F`) in the URL to bypass all route-level protection.\n\nCommon affected pattern:\n```go\nadminGroup := e.Group(\"/admin\", authMiddleware)\ne.StaticFS(\"/\", os.DirFS(\"public\"))\n```",
"id": "GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq",
"modified": "2026-08-25T16:13:29Z",
"published": "2026-08-25T16:13:29Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55677"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/pull/3009"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/pull/3011"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/8d1ae9d3360a71672418856d58753af25f2c3986"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/c3fa2a27ff92b2b8db360de614f999ef1da24725"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.15.3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.2.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Echo: Encoded slash (%2F) bypasses route-level protection and exposes static files"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.