GCVE Workshop - 22 September 2026 (14:00-18:00), Luxembourg Before The Vulnopticon Conference - Registration

GHSA-VFP3-V2GW-7WFQ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-25 16:13 – Updated: 2026-08-25 16:13
VLAI
Summary
Echo: Encoded slash (%2F) bypasses route-level protection and exposes static files
Details

Summary

Echo's router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving %2F as-is), while StaticDirectoryHandler unescapes %2F to / before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.

Details

Root cause 1 — router.go lines 798-802: The router uses req.URL.RawPath for route matching when useEscapedPathForRouting is false (the default). This means /admin%2Fsecret.txt is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the /admin/* route pattern.

if !r.useEscapedPathForRouting && req.URL.RawPath != "" {
    path = req.URL.RawPath
}

Root cause 2 — echo.go lines 559-568: StaticDirectoryHandler calls url.PathUnescape() on the path parameter before opening files. This converts %2F back to /, resolving admin/secret.txt on disk.

if !disablePathUnescaping {
    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)
    p = tmpPath
}
name := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, "/")))

PoC (Screenshot)

Sample: image

403: image

Bypass with encoded slash: image

Impact

Unauthorized static file disclosure. Applications that protect route prefixes with authentication middleware while also serving static files from a broader root are vulnerable. An attacker only needs to encode the slash (/%2F) in the URL to bypass all route-level protection.

Common affected pattern:

adminGroup := e.Group("/admin", authMiddleware)
e.StaticFS("/", os.DirFS("public"))
Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/labstack/echo/v5"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.2.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/labstack/echo/v4"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.15.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/labstack/echo"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "last_affected": "3.3.10"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55677"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-22"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-25T16:13:29Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-26T17:16:34Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nEcho\u0027s router and static file handler disagree on URL path decoding. The router matches routes using the raw encoded path (preserving `%2F` as-is), while `StaticDirectoryHandler` unescapes `%2F` to `/` before resolving filesystem paths. This allows an attacker to bypass route-level access controls and read static files without authorization.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause 1 \u2014 `router.go` lines 798-802:**\nThe router uses `req.URL.RawPath` for route matching when `useEscapedPathForRouting` is false (the default). This means `/admin%2Fsecret.txt` is treated as a single path segment and does NOT match the `/admin/*` route pattern.\n\n```go\nif !r.useEscapedPathForRouting \u0026\u0026 req.URL.RawPath != \"\" {\n    path = req.URL.RawPath\n}\n```\n\n**Root cause 2 \u2014 `echo.go` lines 559-568:**\n`StaticDirectoryHandler` calls `url.PathUnescape()` on the path parameter before opening files. This converts `%2F` back to `/`, resolving `admin/secret.txt` on disk.\n\n```go\nif !disablePathUnescaping {\n    tmpPath, err := url.PathUnescape(p)\n    p = tmpPath\n}\nname := filepath.ToSlash(filepath.Clean(strings.TrimPrefix(p, \"/\")))\n```\n\n### PoC (Screenshot)\nSample:\n\u003cimg width=\"1291\" height=\"970\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/0bc58059-3e6d-4678-ab25-a5c79b006738\" /\u003e\n\n403:\n\u003cimg width=\"526\" height=\"194\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/2f55ffdd-87b2-4a1b-8a13-130ebad0f257\" /\u003e\n\nBypass with encoded slash:\n\u003cimg width=\"592\" height=\"203\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1191cd39-ae8f-4d7e-8fb1-cb9cf31f484f\" /\u003e\n\n### Impact\n\nUnauthorized static file disclosure. Applications that protect route prefixes with authentication middleware while also serving static files from a broader root are vulnerable. An attacker only needs to encode the slash (`/` \u2192 `%2F`) in the URL to bypass all route-level protection.\n\nCommon affected pattern:\n```go\nadminGroup := e.Group(\"/admin\", authMiddleware)\ne.StaticFS(\"/\", os.DirFS(\"public\"))\n```",
  "id": "GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq",
  "modified": "2026-08-25T16:13:29Z",
  "published": "2026-08-25T16:13:29Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/security/advisories/GHSA-vfp3-v2gw-7wfq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55677"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/pull/3009"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/pull/3011"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/8d1ae9d3360a71672418856d58753af25f2c3986"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/commit/c3fa2a27ff92b2b8db360de614f999ef1da24725"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v4.15.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/labstack/echo/releases/tag/v5.2.0"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Echo: Encoded slash (%2F) bypasses route-level protection and exposes static files"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Loading…

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Loading…

Loading…

Loading…