GHSA-W239-58X2-Q8P5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-07 02:07 – Updated: 2026-06-08 23:47The DAG-CBOR and DAG-JSON decoders recurse on each nested map or list without a depth limit. A payload containing deeply nested collections causes the decoder to recurse once per level, growing the goroutine stack until the Go runtime terminates the process with a fatal stack overflow (distinct from a recoverable panic).
For DAG-CBOR, a payload of approximately 2 MB, consisting of repeated 0x81 (array-of-1) bytes followed by a terminator, produces around 2 million recursion frames and reliably exhausts Go's default 1 GB goroutine stack. The existing allocation budget does not prevent this: each nested collection header costs only a handful of budget units, so the stack is exhausted before the budget is. DAG-JSON has equivalent exposure via [[[...]]]-style payloads; it has no budget system and is therefore unprotected against recursion depth as well.
Schema-free decoding (using basicnode.Prototype.Any) allows arbitrary nesting depth. Schema-bound decoding bounds nesting only when the schema itself is non-recursive and contains no fields typed as Any; schemas with recursive type references or any Any-typed fields permit unconstrained nesting at those points.
The fix adds a configurable MaxDepth option to both decoders, defaulting to 1024 nested levels. The decoder returns ErrDecodeDepthExceeded when a payload nests beyond the limit. Well-formed IPLD data rarely approaches this depth in practice; the default is generous for legitimate use while preventing stack exhaustion.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/ipld/go-ipld-prime"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.23.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-42328"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-674"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-07T02:07:21Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-27T18:16:22Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "The DAG-CBOR and DAG-JSON decoders recurse on each nested map or list without a depth limit. A payload containing deeply nested collections causes the decoder to recurse once per level, growing the goroutine stack until the Go runtime terminates the process with a fatal stack overflow (distinct from a recoverable panic).\n\nFor DAG-CBOR, a payload of approximately 2 MB, consisting of repeated `0x81` (array-of-1) bytes followed by a terminator, produces around 2 million recursion frames and reliably exhausts Go\u0027s default 1 GB goroutine stack. The existing allocation budget does not prevent this: each nested collection header costs only a handful of budget units, so the stack is exhausted before the budget is. DAG-JSON has equivalent exposure via `[[[...]]]`-style payloads; it has no budget system and is therefore unprotected against recursion depth as well.\n\nSchema-free decoding (using `basicnode.Prototype.Any`) allows arbitrary nesting depth. Schema-bound decoding bounds nesting only when the schema itself is non-recursive and contains no fields typed as `Any`; schemas with recursive type references or any `Any`-typed fields permit unconstrained nesting at those points.\n\nThe fix adds a configurable `MaxDepth` option to both decoders, defaulting to 1024 nested levels. The decoder returns `ErrDecodeDepthExceeded` when a payload nests beyond the limit. Well-formed IPLD data rarely approaches this depth in practice; the default is generous for legitimate use while preventing stack exhaustion.",
"id": "GHSA-w239-58x2-q8p5",
"modified": "2026-06-08T23:47:37Z",
"published": "2026-05-07T02:07:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/ipld/go-ipld-prime/security/advisories/GHSA-w239-58x2-q8p5"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-42328"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/ipld/go-ipld-prime"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "go-ipld-prime\u0027s DAG-CBOR and DAG-JSON decoders have unbounded recursion depth"
}
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