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GHSA-W4H4-7FF5-56XR

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-06 18:34 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:33
VLAI
Details

Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.

server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying nc=00000001, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.

An attacker who observes one successful qop=auth exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-86219"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-294"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-06T18:17:23Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.\n\nserver_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client\u0027s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.\n\nAn attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.",
  "id": "GHSA-w4h4-7ff5-56xr",
  "modified": "2026-09-08T21:33:03Z",
  "published": "2026-09-06T18:34:39Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86219"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/perl-authen-sasl/perl-authen-sasl/commit/94337367030612842924f697cead29964a96448d.patch"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2831#section-2.1.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L203-222"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L410-414"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2100/changes"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40918"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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