GHSA-W4H4-7FF5-56XR
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-06 18:34 – Updated: 2026-09-08 21:33Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.
server_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client's own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying nc=00000001, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.
An attacker who observes one successful qop=auth exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-86219"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-294"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-06T18:17:23Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "Authen::SASL::Perl::DIGEST_MD5 versions before 2.2100 for Perl accept replayed authentication responses via unverified nonce in server_step.\n\nserver_start generates a fresh nonce and sends it in the challenge, and nothing later compares that value against the nonce the client returns. server_step derives the expected digest from the client\u0027s own parameters, so a response verifies whenever its digest matches the nonce it carries. The count table it also checks is keyed on the client-supplied nonce and starts empty in each new server object, so a captured first response, carrying `nc=00000001`, passes that too. RFC 2831 defines the nonce in the response as the value the server sent in the preceding challenge.\n\nAn attacker who observes one successful `qop=auth` exchange can replay the captured response against a later session for the same service, host, realm and user, and authenticate as that user without knowing the password.",
"id": "GHSA-w4h4-7ff5-56xr",
"modified": "2026-09-08T21:33:03Z",
"published": "2026-09-06T18:34:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-86219"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/perl-authen-sasl/perl-authen-sasl/commit/94337367030612842924f697cead29964a96448d.patch"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc2831#section-2.1.2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L203-222"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2000/source/lib/Authen/SASL/Perl/DIGEST_MD5.pm#L410-414"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://metacpan.org/release/EHUELS/Authen-SASL-2.2100/changes"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-40918"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.