GHSA-XVR9-35CR-46V9

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-28 22:47 – Updated: 2026-08-28 22:47
VLAI
Summary
org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client has Inappropriate Encoding for Output Context
Details

Summary

The connector encodes and decodes all character data assuming the connection character set is UTF-8. A server can change character_set_client mid-session to a non-UTF-8 charset, after which the driver and server interpret the same bytes under different encodings, causing silent data corruption and a client/server charset-confusion mismatch.

Details

The driver encodes and decodes all character data on the assumption that the connection character set is UTF-8. Charset can be changed by commands like SET NAMES... commands.

If the new charset is not UTF-8, the driver continues to read and write UTF-8 while the server interprets the same bytes under a different encoding. The result is silent data corruption and a client/server charset-confusion mismatch. Charset confusion of this kind is also the primitive that can defeat byte-wise quoting/escaping when client and server disagree on a multi-byte encoding.

Impact

Silent data corruption and a client/server encoding mismatch once the connection's charset diverges from UTF-8. Because the mismatch undermines the assumption that quoting/escaping operates on UTF-8 bytes, it belongs to the charset-confusion class that can lead to SQL injection.

Patches

Fixed in 2.7.14, 3.3.5, 3.4.3, and 3.5.9. Upgrade to the patched release on your branch (3.5.x → 3.5.9, 3.4.x → 3.4.3, 3.0/3.1/3.2/3.3.x → 3.3.5, 2.x → 2.7.14). Once the connection is fully initialized, any subsequent charset change to a value that is not utf8 / utf8mb3 / utf8mb4 is rejected: the driver raises a SQLException with SQLState 08000 (connection exception) and closes the connection rather than continuing to exchange data under a mismatched encoding.

Workarounds

There is no reliable application-level workaround.

Credit

Reported by Yalguun Tumenkhuu (@fg0x0).

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "2.7.14"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.3.5"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.4.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.4.3"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Maven",
        "name": "org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.5.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.5.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55858"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-838"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-08-28T22:47:19Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe connector encodes and decodes all character data assuming the connection character set is UTF-8. A server can change character_set_client mid-session to a non-UTF-8 charset, after which the driver and server interpret the same bytes under different encodings, causing silent data corruption and a client/server charset-confusion mismatch.\n\n### Details\n\nThe driver encodes and decodes all character data on the assumption that the connection character set is UTF-8. \nCharset can be changed by commands like SET NAMES... commands.\n\nIf the new charset is not UTF-8, the driver continues to read and write UTF-8 while the server interprets the same bytes under a different encoding. The result is silent data corruption and a client/server charset-confusion mismatch. Charset confusion of this kind is also the primitive that can defeat byte-wise quoting/escaping when client and server disagree on a multi-byte encoding.\n\n### Impact\n\nSilent data corruption and a client/server encoding mismatch once the connection\u0027s charset diverges from UTF-8. Because the mismatch undermines the assumption that quoting/escaping operates on UTF-8 bytes, it belongs to the charset-confusion class that can lead to SQL injection.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in 2.7.14, 3.3.5, 3.4.3, and 3.5.9. Upgrade to the patched release on your branch (3.5.x \u2192 3.5.9, 3.4.x \u2192 3.4.3, 3.0/3.1/3.2/3.3.x \u2192 3.3.5, 2.x \u2192 2.7.14). Once the connection is fully initialized, any subsequent charset change to a value that is not utf8 / utf8mb3 / utf8mb4 is rejected: the driver raises a SQLException with SQLState 08000 (connection exception) and closes the connection rather than continuing to exchange data under a mismatched encoding.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nThere is no reliable application-level workaround.\n\n### Credit\n\nReported by Yalguun Tumenkhuu ([@fg0x0](https://github.com/fg0x0/)).",
  "id": "GHSA-xvr9-35cr-46v9",
  "modified": "2026-08-28T22:47:19Z",
  "published": "2026-08-28T22:47:19Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j/security/advisories/GHSA-xvr9-35cr-46v9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j/commit/300716bef1e1d0370a41be7863b88aa2d55fbb69"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j/commit/7b3c69221b5463ee03472654040b3f6b9e5329c7"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j/commit/8cfd9df697372ad4ed09fe87a34b34babb6d43d6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j/commit/c555c9b477521be0c35c3a5461f9f46681553607"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j/releases/tag/2.7.14"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j/releases/tag/3.3.5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j/releases/tag/3.4.3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mariadb-corporation/mariadb-connector-j/releases/tag/3.5.9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://jira.mariadb.org/browse/CONJ-1317"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "org.mariadb.jdbc:mariadb-java-client has Inappropriate Encoding for Output Context"
}



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