GSD-2021-32842

Vulnerability from gsd - Updated: 2023-12-13 01:23
Details
SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Starting version 1.0.0 and prior to version 1.3.3, a check was added if the destination file is under a destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `_baseDirectory` ends with slash. If the _baseDirectory is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. Version 1.3.3 fixed this vulnerability.
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Aliases
CVE-2021-32842
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{
  "GSD": {
    "alias": "CVE-2021-32842",
    "description": "SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Starting version 1.0.0 and prior to version 1.3.3, a check was added if the destination file is under a destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `_baseDirectory` ends with slash. If the _baseDirectory is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. Version 1.3.3 fixed this vulnerability.",
    "id": "GSD-2021-32842"
  },
  "gsd": {
    "metadata": {
      "exploitCode": "unknown",
      "remediation": "unknown",
      "reportConfidence": "confirmed",
      "type": "vulnerability"
    },
    "osvSchema": {
      "aliases": [
        "CVE-2021-32842"
      ],
      "details": "SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Starting version 1.0.0 and prior to version 1.3.3, a check was added if the destination file is under a destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `_baseDirectory` ends with slash. If the _baseDirectory is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. Version 1.3.3 fixed this vulnerability.",
      "id": "GSD-2021-32842",
      "modified": "2023-12-13T01:23:08.828491Z",
      "schema_version": "1.4.0"
    }
  },
  "namespaces": {
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        "ASSIGNER": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "ID": "CVE-2021-32842",
        "STATE": "PUBLIC",
        "TITLE": "Path Traversal in SharpZipLib"
      },
      "affects": {
        "vendor": {
          "vendor_data": [
            {
              "product": {
                "product_data": [
                  {
                    "product_name": "sharpziplib",
                    "version": {
                      "version_data": [
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003c",
                          "version_name": "1.3.3",
                          "version_value": "1.3.3"
                        },
                        {
                          "version_affected": "\u003e=",
                          "version_name": "1.0.0",
                          "version_value": "1.0.0"
                        }
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              "vendor_name": "icsharpcode"
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            "value": "SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Starting version 1.0.0 and prior to version 1.3.3, a check was added if the destination file is under a destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `_baseDirectory` ends with slash. If the _baseDirectory is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. Version 1.3.3 fixed this vulnerability."
          }
        ]
      },
      "generator": {
        "engine": "Vulnogram 0.0.9"
      },
      "impact": {
        "cvss": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "LOCAL",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 4,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "LOW",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        }
      },
      "problemtype": {
        "problemtype_data": [
          {
            "description": [
              {
                "lang": "eng",
                "value": "CWE-22 Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory (\u0027Path Traversal\u0027)"
              }
            ]
          }
        ]
      },
      "references": {
        "reference_data": [
          {
            "name": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-125-sharpziplib/",
            "refsource": "CONFIRM",
            "url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-125-sharpziplib/"
          },
          {
            "name": "https://github.com/icsharpcode/SharpZipLib/releases/tag/v1.3.3",
            "refsource": "MISC",
            "url": "https://github.com/icsharpcode/SharpZipLib/releases/tag/v1.3.3"
          }
        ]
      },
      "source": {
        "discovery": "INTERNAL"
      }
    },
    "gitlab.com": {
      "advisories": [
        {
          "affected_range": "[1.0.0,1.3.3)",
          "affected_versions": "All versions starting from 1.0.0 before 1.3.3",
          "cwe_ids": [
            "CWE-1035",
            "CWE-937"
          ],
          "date": "2022-02-01",
          "description": "SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. A check was added if the destination file is under a destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `_baseDirectory` ends with slash. If the `_baseDirectory` is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. fixed this vulnerability.",
          "fixed_versions": [
            "1.3.3"
          ],
          "identifier": "CVE-2021-32842",
          "identifiers": [
            "GHSA-mm6g-mmq6-53ff",
            "CVE-2021-32842"
          ],
          "not_impacted": "All versions before 1.0.0, all versions starting from 1.3.3",
          "package_slug": "nuget/SharpZipLib",
          "pubdate": "2022-02-01",
          "solution": "Upgrade to version 1.3.3 or above.",
          "title": "Path traversal in SharpZipLib",
          "urls": [
            "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-32842",
            "https://github.com/icsharpcode/SharpZipLib/releases/tag/v1.3.3",
            "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-125-sharpziplib/",
            "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-mm6g-mmq6-53ff"
          ],
          "uuid": "913a1d7a-08ca-4d4f-81f8-8415e32c6b73"
        }
      ]
    },
    "nvd.nist.gov": {
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        "nodes": [
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            "children": [],
            "cpe_match": [
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                "cpe23Uri": "cpe:2.3:a:sharpziplib_project:sharpziplib:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
                "cpe_name": [],
                "versionEndExcluding": "1.3.3",
                "versionStartIncluding": "1.0.0",
                "vulnerable": true
              }
            ],
            "operator": "OR"
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          "ID": "CVE-2021-32842"
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        "description": {
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              "value": "SharpZipLib (or #ziplib) is a Zip, GZip, Tar and BZip2 library. Starting version 1.0.0 and prior to version 1.3.3, a check was added if the destination file is under a destination directory. However, it is not enforced that `_baseDirectory` ends with slash. If the _baseDirectory is not slash terminated like `/home/user/dir` it is possible to create a file with a name thats begins as the destination directory one level up from the directory, i.e. `/home/user/dir.sh`. Because of the file name and destination directory constraints, the arbitrary file creation impact is limited and depends on the use case. Version 1.3.3 fixed this vulnerability."
            }
          ]
        },
        "problemtype": {
          "problemtype_data": [
            {
              "description": [
                {
                  "lang": "en",
                  "value": "CWE-22"
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          "reference_data": [
            {
              "name": "https://github.com/icsharpcode/SharpZipLib/releases/tag/v1.3.3",
              "refsource": "MISC",
              "tags": [
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                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://github.com/icsharpcode/SharpZipLib/releases/tag/v1.3.3"
            },
            {
              "name": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-125-sharpziplib/",
              "refsource": "CONFIRM",
              "tags": [
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                "Third Party Advisory"
              ],
              "url": "https://securitylab.github.com/advisories/GHSL-2021-125-sharpziplib/"
            }
          ]
        }
      },
      "impact": {
        "baseMetricV2": {
          "acInsufInfo": false,
          "cvssV2": {
            "accessComplexity": "LOW",
            "accessVector": "NETWORK",
            "authentication": "NONE",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.0,
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "PARTIAL",
            "vectorString": "AV:N/AC:L/Au:N/C:N/I:P/A:N",
            "version": "2.0"
          },
          "exploitabilityScore": 10.0,
          "impactScore": 2.9,
          "obtainAllPrivilege": false,
          "obtainOtherPrivilege": false,
          "obtainUserPrivilege": false,
          "severity": "MEDIUM",
          "userInteractionRequired": false
        },
        "baseMetricV3": {
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            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 5.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "integrityImpact": "LOW",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          },
          "exploitabilityScore": 3.9,
          "impactScore": 1.4
        }
      },
      "lastModifiedDate": "2022-02-07T19:09Z",
      "publishedDate": "2022-01-26T21:15Z"
    }
  }
}



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