oesa-2026-3012
Vulnerability from osv_openeuler
This module enables an Apache 2.x web server to operate as an OpenID Connect Relying Party(RP) to an OpenID Connect Provider(OP).
Security Fix(es):
An out-of-bounds read and a one-byte out-of-bounds write exist in the state-cookie parser of mod_auth_openidc. oidc_state_cookies_parse_token() (src/state.c) scans a cookie token for the = that separates the cookie name from its value with a loop whose only real termination condition is finding a = byte — it does not stop at the string terminator. The cookie != NULL test can never become false, because cookie is only ever incremented (never reassigned to NULL). A request whose Cookie header contains a token that begins with the configured state-cookie prefix (default mod_auth_openidc_state_) but contains no = makes the loop walk past the end of the token buffer, reading adjacent process memory until it happens to encounter a = (0x3D) byte, and then writing a NUL byte at that out-of-bounds location. This parser runs early on requests that begin a new authentication flow and on requests to the OIDCRedirectURI callback — before any session or state validation — so the condition is reachable by an unauthenticated, remote client that fully controls the Cookie header.(CVE-2026-54789)
| URL | Type | |
|---|---|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"ecosystem_specific": {
"aarch64": [
"mod_auth_openidc-2.4.19.4-1.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"mod_auth_openidc-debuginfo-2.4.19.4-1.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm",
"mod_auth_openidc-debugsource-2.4.19.4-1.oe2403sp4.aarch64.rpm"
],
"src": [
"mod_auth_openidc-2.4.19.4-1.oe2403sp4.src.rpm"
],
"x86_64": [
"mod_auth_openidc-2.4.19.4-1.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"mod_auth_openidc-debuginfo-2.4.19.4-1.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm",
"mod_auth_openidc-debugsource-2.4.19.4-1.oe2403sp4.x86_64.rpm"
]
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "openEuler:24.03-LTS-SP4",
"name": "mod_auth_openidc",
"purl": "pkg:rpm/openEuler/mod_auth_openidc\u0026distro=openEuler-24.03-LTS-SP4"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.4.19.4-1.oe2403sp4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"database_specific": {
"severity": "High"
},
"details": "This module enables an Apache 2.x web server to operate as an OpenID Connect Relying Party(RP) to an OpenID Connect Provider(OP).\r\n\r\nSecurity Fix(es):\n\nAn out-of-bounds read and a one-byte out-of-bounds write exist in the state-cookie parser of `mod_auth_openidc`. `oidc_state_cookies_parse_token()` (`src/state.c`) scans a cookie token for the `=` that separates the cookie name from its value with a loop whose only real termination condition is finding a `=` byte \u2014 it does not stop at the string terminator. The `cookie != NULL` test can never become false, because `cookie` is only ever incremented (never reassigned to `NULL`). A request whose `Cookie` header contains a token that begins with the configured state-cookie prefix (default `mod_auth_openidc_state_`) but contains no `=` makes the loop walk past the end of the token buffer, reading adjacent process memory until it happens to encounter a `=` (`0x3D`) byte, and then writing a `NUL` byte at that out-of-bounds location. This parser runs early on requests that begin a new authentication flow and on requests to the `OIDCRedirectURI` callback \u2014 before any session or state validation \u2014 so the condition is reachable by an unauthenticated, remote client that fully controls the `Cookie` header.(CVE-2026-54789)",
"id": "OESA-2026-3012",
"modified": "2026-08-06T11:11:54Z",
"published": "2026-07-19T11:11:54Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://www.openeuler.org/zh/security/security-bulletins/detail/?id=openEuler-SA-2026-3012"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-54789"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.7.2",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "mod_auth_openidc security update",
"upstream": [
"CVE-2026-54789"
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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