PYSEC-2026-2488
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 15:02 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:04Summary
The ConformityCheck class in giskard-checks rendered the rule parameter through Jinja2's default Template() constructor. Because the rule string is silently interpreted as a Jinja2 template, a developer may not realize that template expressions embedded in rule definitions are evaluated at runtime. In a scenario where check definitions are loaded from an untrusted source (e.g. a shared project file or externally contributed configuration), this could lead to arbitrary code execution.
giskard-checks is a local developer testing library with no network-facing service. Check definitions, including the rule parameter, are provided in application code or project configuration files and executed locally. Exploitation requires write access to a check definition and subsequent execution of the test suite by a developer.
However, the implicit template evaluation of the rule parameter is not obvious from the API surface. This hidden behavior increases the likelihood of a developer inadvertently passing untrusted input to it when integrating the library into a larger system.
Affected Component
conformity.py, line 59:
from jinja2 import Template
...
formatted_rule = Template(self.rule).render(trace=trace)
Affected Versions
giskard-checks < 1.0.2b1
Patched Version
giskard-checks >= 1.0.2b1 (template parsing removed from rule evaluation entirely)
Remediation
Upgrade to giskard-checks >= 1.0.2b1. The template rendering has been removed from rule evaluation.
Credit
Giskard-AI thanks @dhabaleshwar for identifying the unsandboxed template usage.
| Name | purl | giskard-checks | pkg:pypi/giskard-checks |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "giskard-checks",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/giskard-checks"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.0.2b1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"1.0.1a1",
"1.0.1a2",
"1.0.1b1"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40320",
"GHSA-7xjm-g8f4-rp26"
],
"details": "## Summary\n \nThe `ConformityCheck` class in `giskard-checks` rendered the `rule` parameter through Jinja2\u0027s default `Template()` constructor. Because the `rule` string is silently interpreted as a Jinja2 template, a developer may not realize that template expressions embedded in rule definitions are evaluated at runtime. In a scenario where check definitions are loaded from an untrusted source (e.g. a shared project file or externally contributed configuration), this could lead to arbitrary code execution.\n\n`giskard-checks` is a local developer testing library with no network-facing service. Check definitions, including the `rule` parameter, are provided in application code or project configuration files and executed locally. Exploitation requires write access to a check definition and subsequent execution of the test suite by a developer.\n\nHowever, the implicit template evaluation of the `rule` parameter is not obvious from the API surface. This hidden behavior increases the likelihood of a developer inadvertently passing untrusted input to it when integrating the library into a larger system. \n\n## Affected Component\n \n`conformity.py`, line 59:\n```python\nfrom jinja2 import Template\n...\nformatted_rule = Template(self.rule).render(trace=trace)\n```\n \n## Affected Versions\n \n`giskard-checks` \u003c 1.0.2b1\n \n## Patched Version\n \n`giskard-checks` \u003e= **1.0.2b1** (template parsing removed from rule evaluation entirely)\n \n## Remediation\n \nUpgrade to `giskard-checks` \u003e= 1.0.2b1. The template rendering has been removed from rule evaluation.\n \n## Credit\n \nGiskard-AI thanks @dhabaleshwar for identifying the unsandboxed template usage.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-2488",
"modified": "2026-07-13T16:04:07.565990Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T15:02:47.672303Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Giskard-AI/giskard-oss/security/advisories/GHSA-7xjm-g8f4-rp26"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40320"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Giskard-AI/giskard-oss"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Giskard-AI/giskard-oss/releases/tag/giskard-checks%2Fv1.0.2b1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/giskard-checks"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7xjm-g8f4-rp26"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:L/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Giskard has Unsandboxed Jinja2 Template Rendering in ConformityCheck"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
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