PYSEC-2026-3866

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-09-10 09:44 - Updated: 2026-09-10 11:02
VLAI
Details

Summary

The POST /webhooks/nextcloud endpoint has no authentication by default: WEBHOOK_SECRET defaults to None and is never required by startup validation. When unset, the receiver accepts any unauthenticated POST. The user_id is taken directly from the attacker-supplied payload and passed to Qdrant, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to delete or corrupt vector embeddings for any user.

Details

Vulnerable file: nextcloud_mcp_server/vector/webhook_receiver.py, function handle_nextcloud_webhook(), lines 55-67

Root cause 1: Auth check is guarded by if secret: - skipped entirely when WEBHOOK_SECRET is unset.

Root cause 2: webhook_secret: str | None = None in config - no startup validator enforces it, even when vector sync is enabled.

Trusted field: payload["user"]["uid"] in webhook_parser.py is used as-is for all Qdrant operations - no cross-check against an authenticated session.

webhook_receiver.py, lines 55-67:

secret = get_settings().webhook_secret  # None by default
if secret:                           # skipped entirely when unset
    ... validate Bearer header ...
else:
    _warn_missing_secret_once()     # just logs, still processes

webhook_parser.py, line 57:

user_id = payload["user"]["uid"]     # attacker-controlled

PoC

No credentials required. Works on any deployment where WEBHOOK_SECRET is not explicitly set (the default).

POST /webhooks/nextcloud
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "event": {
    "class": "OCP\\Files\\Events\\Node\\BeforeNodeDeletedEvent",
    "node": { "path": "/victim/files/Notes/any.md", "id": 12345 }
  },
  "user": { "uid": "victim" },
  "time": 0
}

Result: Qdrant deletes all vector embeddings for victim doc 12345 with no authentication. Attacker can loop over doc IDs for mass deletion. All user targets accepted.

Impact

  • Anyone on the network with access to port 8000 - no credentials needed.
  • Attacker can delete or trigger re-index of any user's vector embeddings in Qdrant by spoofing user.uid in the payload.
  • Mass-sending delete events for all doc IDs destroys the entire semantic search index for all users, requiring a full re-scan to recover.

Recommend Fix

  1. Enforce WEBHOOK_SECRET at startup ( file config_validators.py )
if vector_sync_enabled and not settings.webhook_secret:
    raise ConfigurationError(
        "WEBHOOK_SECRET must be set when vector sync is enabled"
    )
  1. Reject requests when secret is unset ( file webhook_receiver.py )
secret = get_settings().webhook_secret
if not secret:
    return JSONResponse({"status": "unavailable"}, status_code=503)
provided = request.headers.get("authorization", "").encode()
if not hmac.compare_digest(provided, f"Bearer {secret}".encode()):
    return JSONResponse({"status": "unauthorized"}, status_code=401)
Impacted products
Name purl
nextcloud-mcp-server pkg:pypi/nextcloud-mcp-server

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "nextcloud-mcp-server",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/nextcloud-mcp-server"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.117.2"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.100.0",
        "0.101.0",
        "0.101.1",
        "0.101.2",
        "0.101.3",
        "0.101.4",
        "0.102.0",
        "0.103.0",
        "0.104.0",
        "0.104.1",
        "0.105.0",
        "0.106.0",
        "0.107.0",
        "0.108.0",
        "0.108.1",
        "0.108.2",
        "0.108.3",
        "0.109.0",
        "0.109.1",
        "0.110.0",
        "0.110.1",
        "0.110.2",
        "0.111.0",
        "0.112.0",
        "0.113.0",
        "0.113.1",
        "0.114.0",
        "0.115.0",
        "0.115.1",
        "0.116.0",
        "0.117.0",
        "0.117.1",
        "0.17.1",
        "0.65.3",
        "0.65.4",
        "0.66.0",
        "0.66.1",
        "0.66.2",
        "0.67.0",
        "0.68.0",
        "0.68.1",
        "0.68.2",
        "0.68.3",
        "0.68.4",
        "0.69.0",
        "0.70.0",
        "0.70.1",
        "0.70.2",
        "0.70.3",
        "0.70.4",
        "0.71.0",
        "0.72.0",
        "0.72.1",
        "0.72.2",
        "0.72.3",
        "0.72.4",
        "0.72.5",
        "0.72.6",
        "0.72.7",
        "0.73.0",
        "0.73.1",
        "0.73.2",
        "0.74.0",
        "0.75.0",
        "0.75.1",
        "0.75.2",
        "0.76.0",
        "0.77.0",
        "0.77.1",
        "0.78.0",
        "0.79.0",
        "0.79.1",
        "0.79.2",
        "0.79.3",
        "0.80.0",
        "0.81.0",
        "0.82.0",
        "0.83.0",
        "0.83.1",
        "0.83.2",
        "0.83.3",
        "0.83.4",
        "0.84.0",
        "0.84.1",
        "0.84.2",
        "0.85.0",
        "0.85.1",
        "0.86.0",
        "0.86.1",
        "0.86.2",
        "0.86.3",
        "0.86.4",
        "0.87.0",
        "0.87.1",
        "0.87.2",
        "0.88.0",
        "0.88.1",
        "0.88.2",
        "0.88.3",
        "0.89.0",
        "0.90.0",
        "0.90.1",
        "0.90.2",
        "0.91.0",
        "0.91.1",
        "0.91.2",
        "0.91.3",
        "0.92.0",
        "0.92.1",
        "0.93.0",
        "0.94.0",
        "0.94.1",
        "0.95.0",
        "0.96.0",
        "0.97.0",
        "0.98.0",
        "0.98.1",
        "0.99.0"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-55640",
    "GHSA-8vh3-g2qg-2h2c"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\nThe `POST /webhooks/nextcloud` endpoint has no authentication by default: `WEBHOOK_SECRET` defaults to `None` and is never required by startup validation. When unset, the receiver accepts any unauthenticated POST. The `user_id` is taken directly from the attacker-supplied payload and passed to Qdrant, allowing an unauthenticated attacker to delete or corrupt vector embeddings for any user.\n\n## Details\n**Vulnerable file:** `nextcloud_mcp_server/vector/webhook_receiver.py`, function `handle_nextcloud_webhook()`, **lines 55-67**\n\n**Root cause 1**: Auth check is guarded by `if secret`: - skipped entirely when `WEBHOOK_SECRET` is unset.\n\n**Root cause 2**: `webhook_secret: str | None = None` in config - no startup validator enforces it, even when vector sync is enabled.\n\n**Trusted field**: `payload[\"user\"][\"uid\"]` in `webhook_parser.py` is used as-is for all Qdrant operations - no cross-check against an authenticated session.\n\n`webhook_receiver.py`, **lines 55-67**:\n```python\nsecret = get_settings().webhook_secret  # None by default\nif secret:                           # skipped entirely when unset\n    ... validate Bearer header ...\nelse:\n    _warn_missing_secret_once()     # just logs, still processes\n```\n`webhook_parser.py`, **line 57**:\n```python\nuser_id = payload[\"user\"][\"uid\"]     # attacker-controlled\n```\n## PoC\n**No credentials required**. Works on any deployment where `WEBHOOK_SECRET` is not explicitly set (the default).\n```json\nPOST /webhooks/nextcloud\nContent-Type: application/json\n\n{\n  \"event\": {\n    \"class\": \"OCP\\\\Files\\\\Events\\\\Node\\\\BeforeNodeDeletedEvent\",\n    \"node\": { \"path\": \"/victim/files/Notes/any.md\", \"id\": 12345 }\n  },\n  \"user\": { \"uid\": \"victim\" },\n  \"time\": 0\n}\n```\n**Result:** **Qdrant** deletes all vector embeddings for `victim` doc `12345` with **no authentication**. Attacker can loop over doc IDs for mass deletion.  All user targets accepted.\n\n\n## Impact\n+ Anyone on the network with access to port `8000` - no credentials needed.\n+ Attacker can delete or trigger re-index of any user\u0027s vector embeddings in Qdrant by spoofing `user.uid` in the payload.\n+ Mass-sending delete events for all doc IDs destroys the entire semantic search index for all users, requiring a full re-scan to recover.\n\n## Recommend Fix\n1. Enforce `WEBHOOK_SECRET` at startup ( file `config_validators.py` )\n```python\nif vector_sync_enabled and not settings.webhook_secret:\n    raise ConfigurationError(\n        \"WEBHOOK_SECRET must be set when vector sync is enabled\"\n    )\n```\n2. Reject requests when secret is unset ( file `webhook_receiver.py` )\n```python\nsecret = get_settings().webhook_secret\nif not secret:\n    return JSONResponse({\"status\": \"unavailable\"}, status_code=503)\nprovided = request.headers.get(\"authorization\", \"\").encode()\nif not hmac.compare_digest(provided, f\"Bearer {secret}\".encode()):\n    return JSONResponse({\"status\": \"unauthorized\"}, status_code=401)\n```",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-3866",
  "modified": "2026-09-10T11:02:15.625917Z",
  "published": "2026-09-10T09:44:56.031196Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cbcoutinho/nextcloud-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-8vh3-g2qg-2h2c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cbcoutinho/nextcloud-mcp-server/commit/4fc2b10945108cf1008ec9698291de6706ffcb73"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/cbcoutinho/nextcloud-mcp-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/cbcoutinho/nextcloud-mcp-server/tree/v0.117.2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/nextcloud-mcp-server"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8vh3-g2qg-2h2c"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55640"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "nextcloud-mcp-server: Unauthenticated `POST /webhooks/nextcloud` allows arbitrary vector data deletion when `WEBHOOK_SECRET` is unset ( default )"
}



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