PYSEC-2026-4036

Vulnerability from pysec - Published: 2026-10-01 16:38 - Updated: 2026-10-01 17:10
VLAI
Details

Impact

djust.tenants isolation was enforced only on the HTTP path. The current tenant was stored in threading.local() and set exclusively by the HTTP-only TenantMiddleware, so on the live (WebSocket/SSE) path get_current_tenant() was always None during mount and every event handler — and the tenant-aware QuerySet manager failed OPEN (returned the unfiltered queryset, ignoring STRICT_MODE), disclosing every tenant's rows to whoever held the socket. threading.local was additionally shared across connections on the sync_to_async executor thread.

Patches

Fixed in djust 1.0.7. Tenant storage moved to a contextvars.ContextVar (per async task); the resolved tenant is bound around WS/SSE mount and every dispatch; both managers scope the base queryset once and fail CLOSED (.none() under the default STRICT_MODE); and system check S006 warns when STRICT_MODE=False.

Workarounds

No workaround on the live path short of upgrading.

Impacted products
Name purl
djust pkg:pypi/djust

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "djust",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/djust"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "1.0.7"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.2",
        "0.1.3",
        "0.1.4",
        "0.1.5",
        "0.1.6",
        "0.1.7",
        "0.1.8",
        "0.1.9",
        "0.2.0",
        "0.2.1",
        "0.2.2",
        "0.3.0",
        "0.3.1",
        "0.3.2",
        "0.3.4",
        "0.3.5",
        "0.3.6",
        "0.3.7",
        "0.3.8",
        "0.4.0",
        "0.4.1",
        "0.4.2",
        "0.4.3",
        "0.4.4",
        "0.9.0",
        "0.9.1",
        "0.9.2",
        "0.9.4",
        "0.9.5",
        "0.9.6",
        "0.9.7",
        "1.0.0",
        "1.0.0rc11",
        "1.0.1",
        "1.0.2",
        "1.0.3",
        "1.0.4",
        "1.0.5",
        "1.0.6"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-61595",
    "GHSA-3492-cvg7-9mr2"
  ],
  "details": "### Impact\n`djust.tenants` isolation was enforced only on the HTTP path. The current tenant was stored in `threading.local()` and set exclusively by the HTTP-only `TenantMiddleware`, so on the live (WebSocket/SSE) path `get_current_tenant()` was always `None` during mount and every event handler \u2014 and the tenant-aware `QuerySet` manager failed **OPEN** (returned the unfiltered queryset, ignoring `STRICT_MODE`), disclosing **every** tenant\u0027s rows to whoever held the socket. `threading.local` was additionally shared across connections on the `sync_to_async` executor thread.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in **djust 1.0.7**. Tenant storage moved to a `contextvars.ContextVar` (per async task); the resolved tenant is bound around WS/SSE mount and every dispatch; both managers scope the base queryset once and fail **CLOSED** (`.none()` under the default `STRICT_MODE`); and system check **S006** warns when `STRICT_MODE=False`.\n\n### Workarounds\nNo workaround on the live path short of upgrading.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-4036",
  "modified": "2026-10-01T17:10:21.158005Z",
  "published": "2026-10-01T16:38:31.006339Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/security/advisories/GHSA-3492-cvg7-9mr2"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/djust-org/djust/releases/tag/v1.0.7"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/djust"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-3492-cvg7-9mr2"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61595"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "djust: Multi-tenant isolation fails open on the WebSocket/SSE path, disclosing other tenants\u0027 data"
}



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