Search
Find a vulnerability
Search criteria
ⓘ
Use this form to refine search results.
Full-text search supports keyword queries with ranking and filtering.
You can combine vendor, product, and sources to narrow results.
Enable “Apply ordering” to sort by date instead of relevance.
4 vulnerabilities found for Reachy Mini by Pollen Robotics
CVE-2026-96456 (GCVE-0-2026-96456)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-09-23 10:03 – Updated: 2026-09-23 13:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device
Summary
The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.
The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.
Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.
This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-23 13:56 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/se… | vendor-advisory |
| https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini | product |
| https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/bl… | product |
| https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-62661 | related |
| https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55419 | related |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pollen Robotics | Reachy Mini |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1.11.0
(semver)
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-96456",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-23T13:56:00.359870Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T13:58:37.766Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pypi.org",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "reachy_mini",
"platforms": [
"Linux"
],
"product": "Reachy Mini",
"programFiles": [
"src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "WriteValue"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini",
"vendor": "Pollen Robotics",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "1.11.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Natan Nehorai | JFrog"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else\u0027s successful authentication.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device\u0027s identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOnce any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else\u0027s successful authentication.\n\n\n\nThe authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device\u0027s identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.\n\n\n\nOnce any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.\n\n\n\nThis is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root."
}
],
"exploits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eJFrog holds a private proof of concept. Full exploit details are not included in this record.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "JFrog holds a private proof of concept. Full exploit details are not included in this record."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 6.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-362",
"description": "CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization (\u0027Race Condition\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-287",
"description": "CWE-287 Improper Authentication",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T10:03:06.643Z",
"orgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d",
"shortName": "JFROG"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/security/advisories/GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf"
},
{
"name": "Reachy Mini",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini"
},
{
"name": "bluetooth_service.py - WriteValue ignores the caller identity in options",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-62661 - Bluetooth command handler path traversal (step 3 of the chain)",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-62661"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-55419 - unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API (step 1 of the chain)",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55419"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.4"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d",
"assignerShortName": "JFROG",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-96456",
"datePublished": "2026-09-23T10:03:06.643Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-23T09:53:09.797Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T13:58:37.766Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-96455 (GCVE-0-2026-96455)
Vulnerability from nvd – Published: 2026-09-23 10:01 – Updated: 2026-09-23 13:59
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint
Summary
The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.
The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.
How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.
One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.
Severity
8.8 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-23 13:59 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
5 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pollen Robotics | Reachy Mini |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1.11.0
(semver)
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-96455",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-23T13:59:27.912505Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T13:59:45.518Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pypi.org",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "reachy_mini",
"platforms": [
"Linux"
],
"product": "Reachy Mini",
"programFiles": [
"src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py",
"src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py",
"src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "install_app"
},
{
"name": "install_package"
},
{
"name": "_resolve_bind_host"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini",
"vendor": "Pollen Robotics",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "1.11.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Yuval Moravchick | JFrog"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler\u0027s only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package\u0027s own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHow far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor\u0027s own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOne related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler\u0027s only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.\n\n\n\nThe endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package\u0027s own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.\n\n\n\nHow far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor\u0027s own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.\n\n\n\nOne related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all."
}
],
"exploits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eJFrog holds a private proof of concept, including a recording, that was shared with the vendor as part of the original disclosure on 2026-05-17. Full exploit details are not included in this record.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "JFrog holds a private proof of concept, including a recording, that was shared with the vendor as part of the original disclosure on 2026-05-17. Full exploit details are not included in this record."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-306",
"description": "CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-494",
"description": "CWE-494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T10:01:15.099Z",
"orgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d",
"shortName": "JFROG"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Reachy Mini",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini"
},
{
"name": "apps.py - install_app has no authentication dependency",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py"
},
{
"name": "main.py - _resolve_bind_host binds 0.0.0.0 on the wireless version",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py"
},
{
"name": "PR #1207 - CORS restricted to localhost (does not address this issue)",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/pull/1207"
},
{
"name": "reachy_mini v1.11.0 - latest release, still affected",
"tags": [
"release-notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/releases/tag/v1.11.0"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.4"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d",
"assignerShortName": "JFROG",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-96455",
"datePublished": "2026-09-23T10:01:15.099Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-23T09:53:08.502Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T13:59:45.518Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-96456 (GCVE-0-2026-96456)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-23 10:03 – Updated: 2026-09-23 13:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device
Summary
The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.
The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.
Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.
This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-23 13:56 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/se… | vendor-advisory |
| https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini | product |
| https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/bl… | product |
| https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-62661 | related |
| https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55419 | related |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pollen Robotics | Reachy Mini |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1.11.0
(semver)
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-96456",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-23T13:56:00.359870Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T13:58:37.766Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pypi.org",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "reachy_mini",
"platforms": [
"Linux"
],
"product": "Reachy Mini",
"programFiles": [
"src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "WriteValue"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini",
"vendor": "Pollen Robotics",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "1.11.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Natan Nehorai | JFrog"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else\u0027s successful authentication.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device\u0027s identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOnce any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThis is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else\u0027s successful authentication.\n\n\n\nThe authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device\u0027s identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.\n\n\n\nOnce any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.\n\n\n\nThis is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root."
}
],
"exploits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eJFrog holds a private proof of concept. Full exploit details are not included in this record.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "JFrog holds a private proof of concept. Full exploit details are not included in this record."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "LOW",
"baseScore": 6.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"integrityImpact": "LOW",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "CHANGED",
"userInteraction": "REQUIRED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:L/A:L",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-362",
"description": "CWE-362 Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization (\u0027Race Condition\u0027)",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-287",
"description": "CWE-287 Improper Authentication",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T10:03:06.643Z",
"orgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d",
"shortName": "JFROG"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf",
"tags": [
"vendor-advisory"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/security/advisories/GHSA-993g-hgjh-whmf"
},
{
"name": "Reachy Mini",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini"
},
{
"name": "bluetooth_service.py - WriteValue ignores the caller identity in options",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-62661 - Bluetooth command handler path traversal (step 3 of the chain)",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-62661"
},
{
"name": "CVE-2026-55419 - unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API (step 1 of the chain)",
"tags": [
"related"
],
"url": "https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55419"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.4"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d",
"assignerShortName": "JFROG",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-96456",
"datePublished": "2026-09-23T10:03:06.643Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-23T09:53:09.797Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T13:58:37.766Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}
CVE-2026-96455 (GCVE-0-2026-96455)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-23 10:01 – Updated: 2026-09-23 13:59
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint
Summary
The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.
The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.
How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.
One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.
Severity
8.8 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: total
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-23 13:59 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
5 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Pollen Robotics | Reachy Mini |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1.11.0
(semver)
|
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-96455",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-09-23T13:59:27.912505Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T13:59:45.518Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"collectionURL": "https://pypi.org",
"defaultStatus": "affected",
"packageName": "reachy_mini",
"platforms": [
"Linux"
],
"product": "Reachy Mini",
"programFiles": [
"src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py",
"src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py",
"src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py"
],
"programRoutines": [
{
"name": "install_app"
},
{
"name": "install_package"
},
{
"name": "_resolve_bind_host"
}
],
"repo": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini",
"vendor": "Pollen Robotics",
"versions": [
{
"lessThanOrEqual": "1.11.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "finder",
"value": "Yuval Moravchick | JFrog"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eThe Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler\u0027s only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eThe endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package\u0027s own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eHow far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor\u0027s own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.\u003c/p\u003e\u003cp\u003eOne related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler\u0027s only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential.\n\n\n\nThe endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package\u0027s own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker.\n\n\n\nHow far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor\u0027s own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials.\n\n\n\nOne related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all."
}
],
"exploits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"supportingMedia": [
{
"base64": false,
"type": "text/html",
"value": "\u003cp\u003eJFrog holds a private proof of concept, including a recording, that was shared with the vendor as part of the original disclosure on 2026-05-17. Full exploit details are not included in this record.\u003c/p\u003e"
}
],
"value": "JFrog holds a private proof of concept, including a recording, that was shared with the vendor as part of the original disclosure on 2026-05-17. Full exploit details are not included in this record."
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV3_1": {
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackVector": "ADJACENT_NETWORK",
"availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
"baseScore": 8.8,
"baseSeverity": "HIGH",
"confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
"integrityImpact": "HIGH",
"privilegesRequired": "NONE",
"scope": "UNCHANGED",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"version": "3.1"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-306",
"description": "CWE-306 Missing Authentication for Critical Function",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-494",
"description": "CWE-494 Download of Code Without Integrity Check",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T10:01:15.099Z",
"orgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d",
"shortName": "JFROG"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Reachy Mini",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini"
},
{
"name": "apps.py - install_app has no authentication dependency",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py"
},
{
"name": "main.py - _resolve_bind_host binds 0.0.0.0 on the wireless version",
"tags": [
"product"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/blob/main/src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py"
},
{
"name": "PR #1207 - CORS restricted to localhost (does not address this issue)",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/pull/1207"
},
{
"name": "reachy_mini v1.11.0 - latest release, still affected",
"tags": [
"release-notes"
],
"url": "https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/releases/tag/v1.11.0"
}
],
"source": {
"discovery": "EXTERNAL"
},
"title": "Reachy Mini daemon allows unauthenticated remote code execution through the app installation endpoint",
"x_generator": {
"engine": "Vulnogram 1.0.4"
}
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "48a46f29-ae42-4e1d-90dd-c1676c1e5e6d",
"assignerShortName": "JFROG",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-96455",
"datePublished": "2026-09-23T10:01:15.099Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-09-23T09:53:08.502Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-09-23T13:59:45.518Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2"
}