CVE-2026-96456 (GCVE-0-2026-96456)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-23 10:03 – Updated: 2026-09-23 13:58
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Reachy Mini Bluetooth PIN authentication can be bypassed by racing an authenticated device
Summary
The Reachy Mini Bluetooth service asks a connecting device for a PIN before it will accept commands. The check protects the session but not the caller, so an attacker in Bluetooth range can ride along on someone else's successful authentication.
The authenticated state is kept in a single shared flag on the service instance rather than per device. BlueZ passes the calling device's identity to the characteristic write handler in the options argument, but WriteValue(self, value, options) in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/services/bluetooth/bluetooth_service.py ignores options entirely. The handler therefore has no idea which device sent a given write, and it cannot tell the authenticated one from any other.
Once any device completes the PIN exchange, the flag is set and every nearby device can send CMD_ commands until it resets. An attacker simply waits within radio range for a legitimate user to authenticate, then writes commands into the same window. No PIN is ever guessed or brute-forced.
This is the second step of a three-step chain that JFrog documented against the robot. The first is the unrestricted file upload in the media sounds API, tracked as CVE-2026-55419, which places an attacker-controlled script on the filesystem. This issue then provides command access over Bluetooth. The third is the Bluetooth command handler path traversal, tracked as CVE-2026-62661, which runs that script as root.
Severity
6.3 (Medium)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-09-23 13:56 UTC
CWE
Assigner
References
5 references
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/se… | vendor-advisory |
| https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini | product |
| https://github.com/pollen-robotics/reachy_mini/bl… | product |
| https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-62661 | related |
| https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-55419 | related |
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pollen Robotics | Reachy Mini |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1.11.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.
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