CVE-2026-123769 (GCVE-0-2026-123769)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-13 09:35 – Updated: 2026-11-13 09:35
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
SureDash <= 1.13.0 - Authenticated (Custom+) Privilege Escalation to /suredash/v1/save-settings REST Endpoint
Summary
The SureDash – Community, Courses & Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker's control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker's own account to receive the complete administrator role.
Severity
8.8 (High)
CWE
- CWE-269 - Improper Privilege Management
Assigner
References
7 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| brainstormforce | SureDash – Community, Courses & Member Dashboard |
Affected:
0 , ≤ 1.13.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
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"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/2f317dcd-dc4f-482a-8faa-91cd9c022276?source=cve"
},
{
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/inc/utils/sanitizer.php#L101"
},
{
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/inc/utils/settings.php#L604"
},
{
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/inc/services/router.php#L108"
},
{
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/core/routers/backend.php#L1309"
},
{
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/suredash/tags/1.13.0/core/routers/social-logins.php#L472"
},
{
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3794229/suredash/trunk/core/routers/backend.php"
}
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"time": "2026-11-12T20:55:05.000Z",
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"title": "SureDash \u003c= 1.13.0 - Authenticated (Custom+) Privilege Escalation to /suredash/v1/save-settings REST Endpoint"
}
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"value": "The SureDash \u2013 Community, Courses \u0026 Member Dashboard plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.0 This is due to the `save_settings()` REST handler at `/suredash/v1/save-settings` being gated only by `admin_permission_callback()`, which authorizes any holder of the custom `manage_portal_dashboard` capability (Portal Manager role) without requiring `promote_users`, `edit_users`, or `manage_options`, combined with `sanitize_settings_data()` iterating all attacker-supplied keys with no allow-list, allowing arbitrary keys such as `default_role` to pass through `sanitize_text_field()` unchanged and be persisted into the `portal_settings` option via `update_option()` with no role-validity check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers with Portal Manager-level access and above to poison the `default_role` setting to `administrator`, after which any subsequent new-user registration through the publicly accessible block-register endpoint reads the corrupted setting and passes it directly to `wp_insert_user()`, producing a full WordPress Administrator account under the attacker\u0027s control. The exploit requires two steps: a POST to the authenticated `save-settings` endpoint to overwrite `default_role`, followed by triggering a new registration through the unauthenticated block-register endpoint to receive the escalated account. Successful exploitation causes the attacker\u0027s own account to receive the complete administrator role."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-123769",
"lastModified": "2026-11-13T10:17:27.953",
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}
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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