CVE-2026-133620 (GCVE-0-2026-133620)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 08:18 – Updated: 2026-11-20 08:18| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/4c5… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 08:07 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/4c5e3394749147c721c2724a08a5e1fdfba58e98.patch
8cd6f3a1afb4… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
4c5e33947491
|
fix: [security] Confine template repository reads to their | 8cd6f3a1afb4… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces canonical (realpath-based) path resolution and enforces that every repository root and every child file or directory resolves within the configured REPOSITORY_BASE_PATH using os.path.commonpath. All code paths that previously performed raw os.path.join or normpath operations (registration, editing, discovery scan, entry scan, manifest read, and template file read) now go through the new validated helpers. Scans that encounter an escaping path roll back any partial database updates and return an error, preventing partial state corruption.
Patch summary
Added _resolve_repo_path() (realpath-based resolution) and _repo_base_path() (validates path is inside REPOSITORY_BASE_PATH via commonpath). Added _repo_child_path() to validate child paths stay within the repository base. Replaced all os.path.normpath/os.path.join usages in _read_manifest, _read_entry_file, _scan_local_entries, repositories_scan, repository_add, and repository_edit with the new validated helpers. Added early-return guards (base is None checks) in repository_check, _scan_local_entries, and repositories_scan. Added db.session.rollback() before returning errors in _scan_local_entries to prevent partial entry updates. Updated user-manual.md to document the new path confinement requirement.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: Flowintel is a network-accessible web application. AC:L: Path traversal via a simple path string or symlink requires no special conditions. AT:N: No attack target manipulation. PR:L: The code references current_user, indicating an authenticated session is required to register or edit repositories. UI:N: No victim interaction needed. VC:L: Arbitrary file read exposes sensitive data on the vulnerable system. VI/VA/SC/SI/SA:N: No evidence of integrity, availability, or cross-system impact.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-22 The primary weakness is that user-supplied repository paths and file references were not confined to the intended base directory, allowing traversal to arbitrary filesystem locations.
- CWE-59 The old code used os.path.normpath which does not resolve symlinks, and the startswith guard could be bypassed by symlinked manifests or template files pointing outside the repository. The fix uses os.path.realpath to resolve links before validation.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The attacker manipulates path inputs (repository local_path, entry download_url, or directory entries) to reference files outside the intended restricted directory. This is the closest standard CAPEC pattern for the observed vulnerability. The symlink variant is a sub-technique of the same pattern.
Assumptions to verify
- PR:L assumes the repository add/edit endpoints require authentication based on the presence of current_user in the code; if the endpoints are unauthenticated, PR should be N.
- VC:L assumes the service account can read sensitive files; if the process runs with minimal privileges, impact may be lower.
- The affected_version field in metadata is '0' which appears to be a placeholder; the actual first affected version is not specified in the patch.
- CAPEC-126 is the closest standard pattern; a more specific symlink-traversal CAPEC was not available, so the mapping covers both the path traversal and symlink escape aspects.
- No public exploit or PoC is referenced; exploitation status is assumed to be 'none'.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
7 | 11 | medium | 5 |
- 2026-11-06 09:54 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (4c5e3394749147c721c2724a08a5e1fdfba58e98): fix: [security] Confine template repository reads to their https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/4c5e3394749147c721c2724a08a5e1fdfba58e98.patch
- 2026-11-20 08:07 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/4c5e3394749147c721c2724a08a5e1fdfba58e98.patch
{
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],
"title": "Flowintel Template Repository Path Traversal and Symlink Escape Allows Arbitrary File Read",
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"The affected_version field in metadata is \u00270\u0027 which appears to be a placeholder; the actual first affected version is not specified in the patch.",
"CAPEC-126 is the closest standard pattern; a more specific symlink-traversal CAPEC was not available, so the mapping covers both the path traversal and symlink escape aspects.",
"No public exploit or PoC is referenced; exploitation status is assumed to be \u0027none\u0027."
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Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
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Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.