CVE-2026-133658 (GCVE-0-2026-133658)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 10:55 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:38| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 10:45 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch
dbf4ccb08942… - Confidence
- high
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
48e9e1b847ec
|
fix: [security] Matrix relays use the represented user's | dbf4ccb08942… |
Fix summary
The fix introduces a protected, non-editable is_bot database marker to identify trusted relay accounts, replacing the previous reliance on editable name and email fields. The user resolution function now returns the same principal for both authentication/permission checks and request handlers, ensuring that a represented user's actual role governs all operations. Relay requests without a valid MATRIX-ID, bot-to-bot requests, and ordinary API keys carrying a MATRIX-ID header are all refused. New bot accounts are assigned the Read Only role instead of Admin. Only administrators can edit or delete registered bot accounts, preventing OrgAdmins from resetting bot credentials. An operator script (bin/register_matrix_bot.py) provides explicit, ID-based bot registration without relying on profile fields.
Patch summary
Added an is_bot Boolean column to the User model via a new Alembic migration (default false). Replaced get_user_api() calls with a new get_user_from_api(headers) function that resolves a single acting user for both permission checks and handlers, enforcing that bot requests require a valid MATRIX-ID and that the resolved user is not itself a bot. Updated all API endpoints (admin, calendar, assignment, templating, tools) and permission decorators to use the new resolution function. Added is_bot checks in admin edit/delete handlers to restrict bot account management to administrators. Modified init_db.py to assign new bots the Read Only role and set is_bot=True. Added bin/register_matrix_bot.py for explicit operator registration by database user ID. Updated installation and user documentation to describe the new relay security model and upgrade procedure.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the Flowintel REST API. AC:L: Exploitation requires only sending a standard API request with the relay's API key and a MATRIX-ID header; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs a valid Flowintel user account with a restricted role (e.g., Read Only) and access to the relay's API key or the ability to send relay-formatted requests. UI:N: No user interaction is required; the attack is fully automated via API calls. VC:N: No direct confidentiality impact on the vulnerable component is evidenced. VI:N: The vulnerable component's own integrity is not directly compromised. VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N: No impact on other systems. SI:H: The primary impact is on data integrity, as restricted users can create, modify, or delete cases, tasks, calendar events, templates, and directory entries they should not have access to. SA:N: No impact on other systems' security.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-285 The primary vulnerability is that permission/role checks evaluated the relay bot's Admin role while the actual request handlers acted as the represented (lower-privileged) user. This mismatch in the authorization principal allowed restricted users to perform actions beyond their granted permissions.
- CWE-287 The relay bot's identity was established by matching editable user profile fields (first_name, last_name) rather than a protected credential or marker. This allowed ordinary users to modify their profiles to match the expected bot identity and be recognized as the trusted relay, constituting an authentication weakness.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-126 The relay bot held Admin-level privileges that were incorrectly applied during authorization checks for requests intended to act on behalf of a lower-privileged user. An attacker with a restricted account exploited this privilege misalignment to perform unauthorized write operations. The secondary vector (editable name-based bot identification) further enabled privilege escalation by allowing impersonation of the high-privilege relay account. CAPEC-126 is the closest match as it covers scenarios where a system's privilege assignment or enforcement is misconfigured, allowing a lower-privileged actor to leverage higher privileges.
Assumptions to verify
- The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected release is not confirmed by the patch alone.
- CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs a valid user account and access to the relay's API key; if the relay's API key is trivially obtainable, PR could be lower.
- The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern; the vulnerability combines authorization confusion (CWE-285) with weak identity binding (CWE-287), and no single CAPEC captures both aspects precisely.
- The assumption that the Matrix relay is an external service sending requests with a shared API key is inferred from the code structure and documentation; the exact deployment topology is not fully specified in the patch.
- CVSS SI:H is assigned based on the ability to perform unauthorized write operations; if the relay also exposes read operations beyond the user's scope, VC could be elevated, but the patch evidence primarily demonstrates write-privilege escalation.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
8 | 11 | high | 5 |
- 2026-11-02 11:09 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d): fix: [security] Matrix relays use the represented user's https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch
- 2026-11-20 10:44 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-133658",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T16:23:57.090779Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T16:38:55.420Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"modules": [
"Matrix relay / bot integration",
"API authorization decorators",
"Admin user management",
"Calendar API",
"Assignment API",
"Templating API",
"Tools/Import API"
],
"product": "flowintel",
"programFiles": [
"app/utils/utils.py",
"app/decorators.py",
"app/admin/admin.py",
"app/admin/admin_api.py",
"app/calendar/calendar_api.py",
"app/my_assignment/my_assignment_api.py",
"app/templating/templating_api.py",
"app/tools/tools_api.py",
"app/db_class/db.py"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel",
"vendor": "flowintel",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.1.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "elhoim"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "David Cruciani"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Flowintel contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in its Matrix relay (bot) integration. When the relay forwarded API requests on behalf of a represented user, the authorization and permission checks evaluated the relay bot\u0027s elevated role while the request handlers acted as the lower-privileged represented user. This mismatch allowed users with restricted roles (e.g., Read Only) to perform write operations, directory lookups, calendar modifications, assignment changes, template creation, and import actions they were not authorized to perform.\n\nAdditionally, relay authority was determined by matching editable user profile fields (name and email) rather than a protected, non-spoofable identifier. An ordinary user who modified their profile to match the expected bot name could be recognized as the trusted relay, enabling impersonation of the bot and potential access to its elevated privileges.\n\nPreconditions:\n- A valid Flowintel user account with a restricted role (e.g., Read Only)\n- Access to the Matrix relay integration or the ability to send API requests with the relay\u0027s API key and a MATRIX-ID header\n- For the impersonation vector: ability to edit one\u0027s own profile name fields\n\nSecurity impact:\n- Unauthorized write operations by users with read-only or otherwise restricted permissions\n- Potential impersonation of the trusted relay bot by ordinary users\n- Bypass of organization-level access controls and role-based restrictions\n- Unauthorized modification of cases, tasks, calendar events, templates, and user directory entries\n\nAffected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0"
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-126 Exploiting Incorrectly Adjusted Privileges"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 6.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
},
{
"format": "SSVC",
"other": {
"content": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T10:45:37Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "SSVC"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-285",
"description": "CWE-285 Improper Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
},
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-287",
"description": "CWE-287 Improper Authentication",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T10:55:19.840Z",
"orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"shortName": "CIRCL"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The fix introduces a protected, non-editable is_bot database marker to identify trusted relay accounts, replacing the previous reliance on editable name and email fields. The user resolution function now returns the same principal for both authentication/permission checks and request handlers, ensuring that a represented user\u0027s actual role governs all operations. Relay requests without a valid MATRIX-ID, bot-to-bot requests, and ordinary API keys carrying a MATRIX-ID header are all refused. New bot accounts are assigned the Read Only role instead of Admin. Only administrators can edit or delete registered bot accounts, preventing OrgAdmins from resetting bot credentials. An operator script (bin/register_matrix_bot.py) provides explicit, ID-based bot registration without relying on profile fields."
}
],
"title": "Flowintel Matrix Relay Authorization Bypass Allows Privilege Escalation and Bot Impersonation",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "full",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The affected version range is inferred from the explicit context (affected_version 0, fixed_version 4.1.0); the exact earliest affected release is not confirmed by the patch alone.",
"CVSS PR:L assumes the attacker needs a valid user account and access to the relay\u0027s API key; if the relay\u0027s API key is trivially obtainable, PR could be lower.",
"The CAPEC-126 mapping is the closest available pattern; the vulnerability combines authorization confusion (CWE-285) with weak identity binding (CWE-287), and no single CAPEC captures both aspects precisely.",
"The assumption that the Matrix relay is an external service sending requests with a shared API key is inferred from the code structure and documentation; the exact deployment topology is not fully specified in the patch.",
"CVSS SI:H is assigned based on the ability to perform unauthorized write operations; if the relay also exposes read operations beyond the user\u0027s scope, VC could be elevated, but the patch evidence primarily demonstrates write-privilege escalation."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-126",
"rationale": "The relay bot held Admin-level privileges that were incorrectly applied during authorization checks for requests intended to act on behalf of a lower-privileged user. An attacker with a restricted account exploited this privilege misalignment to perform unauthorized write operations. The secondary vector (editable name-based bot identification) further enabled privilege escalation by allowing impersonation of the high-privilege relay account. CAPEC-126 is the closest match as it covers scenarios where a system\u0027s privilege assignment or enforcement is misconfigured, allowing a lower-privileged actor to leverage higher privileges."
}
],
"commit": "48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d",
"confidence": "high",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "reporter",
"value": "elhoim"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "David Cruciani"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N: The vulnerability is exploitable over the network via the Flowintel REST API. AC:L: Exploitation requires only sending a standard API request with the relay\u0027s API key and a MATRIX-ID header; no race conditions or special timing are needed. AT:N: No manipulation of the attack target is required. PR:L: The attacker needs a valid Flowintel user account with a restricted role (e.g., Read Only) and access to the relay\u0027s API key or the ability to send relay-formatted requests. UI:N: No user interaction is required; the attack is fully automated via API calls. VC:N: No direct confidentiality impact on the vulnerable component is evidenced. VI:N: The vulnerable component\u0027s own integrity is not directly compromised. VA:N: No availability impact. SC:N: No impact on other systems. SI:H: The primary impact is on data integrity, as restricted users can create, modify, or delete cases, tasks, calendar events, templates, and directory entries they should not have access to. SA:N: No impact on other systems\u0027 security.",
"fixSummary": "The fix introduces a protected, non-editable is_bot database marker to identify trusted relay accounts, replacing the previous reliance on editable name and email fields. The user resolution function now returns the same principal for both authentication/permission checks and request handlers, ensuring that a represented user\u0027s actual role governs all operations. Relay requests without a valid MATRIX-ID, bot-to-bot requests, and ordinary API keys carrying a MATRIX-ID header are all refused. New bot accounts are assigned the Read Only role instead of Admin. Only administrators can edit or delete registered bot accounts, preventing OrgAdmins from resetting bot credentials. An operator script (bin/register_matrix_bot.py) provides explicit, ID-based bot registration without relying on profile fields.",
"generatedAt": "2026-11-20T10:45:37.315057Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"potentialErrors": [],
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 11,
"assumptionCount": 5,
"confidence": "high",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 8
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "dbf4ccb089427ea3ea10f0eef1dadb94d73795b0f16ad72ea0cc9094526a9762",
"patchSummary": "Added an is_bot Boolean column to the User model via a new Alembic migration (default false). Replaced get_user_api() calls with a new get_user_from_api(headers) function that resolves a single acting user for both permission checks and handlers, enforcing that bot requests require a valid MATRIX-ID and that the resolved user is not itself a bot. Updated all API endpoints (admin, calendar, assignment, templating, tools) and permission decorators to use the new resolution function. Added is_bot checks in admin edit/delete handlers to restrict bot account management to administrators. Modified init_db.py to assign new bots the Read Only role and set is_bot=True. Added bin/register_matrix_bot.py for explicit operator registration by database user ID. Updated installation and user documentation to describe the new relay security model and upgrade procedure.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d",
"date": "Mon, 2 Nov 2026 12:09:41 +0100",
"patchSha256": "dbf4ccb089427ea3ea10f0eef1dadb94d73795b0f16ad72ea0cc9094526a9762",
"retrievedAt": "2026-11-20T10:44:40.177307Z",
"source": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch",
"subject": "fix: [security] Matrix relays use the represented user\u0027s"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch",
"ssvc": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T10:45:37Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"subject": "fix: [security] Matrix relays use the represented user\u0027s",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-285",
"rationale": "The primary vulnerability is that permission/role checks evaluated the relay bot\u0027s Admin role while the actual request handlers acted as the represented (lower-privileged) user. This mismatch in the authorization principal allowed restricted users to perform actions beyond their granted permissions."
},
{
"cweId": "CWE-287",
"rationale": "The relay bot\u0027s identity was established by matching editable user profile fields (first_name, last_name) rather than a protected credential or marker. This allowed ordinary users to modify their profiles to match the expected bot identity and be recognized as the trusted relay, constituting an authentication weakness."
}
]
}
},
"bcp-05-x-03": {
"x_timeline": {
"events": [
{
"description": "Corrective change authored (48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d): fix: [security] Matrix relays use the represented user\u0027s",
"id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-02T11:09:41Z",
"type": "fix-developed"
},
{
"description": "Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.",
"id": "evt-fix-available-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d.patch"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T10:44:40.177307Z",
"type": "fix-available"
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20399"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-133658",
"datePublished": "2026-11-20T10:55:19.840Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-20T10:55:15.774Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T16:38:55.420Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"modules": [
"Matrix relay / bot integration",
"API authorization decorators",
"Admin user management",
"Calendar API",
"Assignment API",
"Templating API",
"Tools/Import API"
],
"product": "flowintel",
"programFiles": [
"app/utils/utils.py",
"app/decorators.py",
"app/admin/admin.py",
"app/admin/admin_api.py",
"app/calendar/calendar_api.py",
"app/my_assignment/my_assignment_api.py",
"app/templating/templating_api.py",
"app/tools/tools_api.py",
"app/db_class/db.py"
],
"repo": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel",
"vendor": "flowintel",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.1.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "Flowintel contains a privilege escalation vulnerability in its Matrix relay (bot) integration. When the relay forwarded API requests on behalf of a represented user, the authorization and permission checks evaluated the relay bot\u0027s elevated role while the request handlers acted as the lower-privileged represented user. This mismatch allowed users with restricted roles (e.g., Read Only) to perform write operations, directory lookups, calendar modifications, assignment changes, template creation, and import actions they were not authorized to perform.\n\nAdditionally, relay authority was determined by matching editable user profile fields (name and email) rather than a protected, non-spoofable identifier. An ordinary user who modified their profile to match the expected bot name could be recognized as the trusted relay, enabling impersonation of the bot and potential access to its elevated privileges.\n\nPreconditions:\n- A valid Flowintel user account with a restricted role (e.g., Read Only)\n- Access to the Matrix relay integration or the ability to send API requests with the relay\u0027s API key and a MATRIX-ID header\n- For the impersonation vector: ability to edit one\u0027s own profile name fields\n\nSecurity impact:\n- Unauthorized write operations by users with read-only or otherwise restricted permissions\n- Potential impersonation of the trusted relay bot by ordinary users\n- Bypass of organization-level access controls and role-based restrictions\n- Unauthorized modification of cases, tasks, calendar events, templates, and user directory entries\n\nAffected versions: Flowintel prior to 4.1.0"
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-133658",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T17:18:19.787",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 6.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "HIGH",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:H/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"ssvcData": {
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T10:45:37Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-133658",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "total"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T16:23:57.090779Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-20T11:18:33.650",
"references": [
{
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/48e9e1b847ecd22da11e70829f1ecfaa0df3791d"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-285"
},
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-287"
}
],
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.