CVE-2026-133852 (GCVE-0-2026-133852)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-20 14:40 – Updated: 2026-11-20 16:33- CWE-862 - Missing Authorization
| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd2… | patch |
qwen3.8:27b
2 events
advisory
bcp-05-x-01bcp-05-x-02bcp-05-x-03
Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.
| Model | Source | Identifier |
|---|---|---|
| qwen3.8:27b | ollama | qwen3.8:27b |
- Generator
-
patch2vuln.pyon 2026-11-20 14:21 - Model
qwen3.8:27b- Input
-
https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
ef4bf88c9ae2… - Confidence
- medium
| Commit | Subject | Patch SHA-256 |
|---|---|---|
fd23a3cb577b
|
fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged | ef4bf88c9ae2… |
Fix summary
The approval-workflow enforcement for privileged cases is now applied unconditionally at task creation time. The privileged-case check no longer depends on the presence of an acting user, and template-based case creation explicitly assigns the configured Requested status to tasks when the target case is privileged. Ordinary (non-privileged) cases retain the default Created status, preserving existing behavior.
Patch summary
Two one-line changes were made. In app/case/common_core.py, the condition guarding the Requested-status assignment was changed from 'if current_user and case.privileged_case' to 'if case.privileged_case', removing the dependency on a non-null user. In app/templating/TemplateCase.py, the hardcoded 'status_id=1' in the task-copy constructor was replaced with a conditional expression that selects the configured TASK_REQUESTED status when the case is privileged and falls back to 1 otherwise.
CVSS rationale
AV:N: flowintel is a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: the bypass is triggered simply by the absence of a user context or by using the template-creation path; no race condition or special timing is needed. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target is required. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with permission to create tasks from templates or instantiate cases from templates. UI:N: no victim interaction is required. VC:L: tasks in privileged cases become immediately accessible without approval, potentially exposing restricted case content. VI:L: the integrity of the approval workflow is compromised; tasks are in an unauthorized state. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: no secondary impacts on other systems are evidenced.
Weakness rationale
- CWE-862 The approval workflow (a form of authorization gate) for privileged-case tasks was not enforced under certain code paths (no user context, template-based creation), allowing tasks to skip the required approval step. The narrowest defensible CWE is Missing Authorization because the security control (approval) was simply absent in those paths.
Attack pattern rationale
- CAPEC-108 The vulnerability is triggered by the absence of a user parameter, which causes the privileged-case authorization check to be skipped. An attacker who can influence whether a user context is supplied (e.g., via an API endpoint that does not enforce authentication for this code path) effectively tampers with the parameter to bypass the control. This is the closest CAPEC available; the mapping is uncertain because the primary defect is a missing check rather than active parameter manipulation, but CAPEC-108 best captures the 'missing/absent parameter leads to skipped validation' pattern.
Assumptions to verify
- The 'privileged case' designation implies a higher-sensitivity classification requiring supervisory approval; the exact business meaning is inferred from the code context and commit message.
- PR:L assumes the attacker needs an authenticated account with template-creation permissions; the patch does not specify the exact role or permission required.
- CAPEC-108 is the closest available mapping; the primary defect is a missing conditional check rather than active parameter manipulation, so the mapping is approximate.
- The affected version range '0 to <4.1.0' is taken from the explicit analyst context; the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.
- VC:L assumes that bypassing the approval step exposes task content that would otherwise be restricted; the patch does not detail what content is protected.
- The commit message references 'Tool: Codex' which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation, not as a credit.
Model comparison
Selected qwen3.8:27b
by deterministic-consensus-v1
The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required.
| Model | Score | Agreement | Confidence | Assumptions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
qwen3.8:27b |
6 | 11 | medium | 6 |
- 2026-11-17 10:02 UTC Fix developed Corrective change authored (fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1): fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
- 2026-11-20 14:21 UTC Fix available Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time. https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1
{
"containers": {
"adp": [
{
"metrics": [
{
"other": {
"content": {
"id": "CVE-2026-133852",
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "no"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T16:22:14.438766Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "ssvc"
}
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T16:33:54.226Z",
"orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"shortName": "CISA-ADP"
},
"title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
}
],
"cna": {
"affected": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"modules": [
"app/case/common_core.py",
"app/templating/TemplateCase.py"
],
"product": "flowintel",
"programFiles": [],
"repo": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel",
"vendor": "flowintel",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.1.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"cpeApplicability": [
{
"nodes": [
{
"cpeMatch": [
{
"criteria": "cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*",
"vulnerable": true
}
],
"negate": false,
"operator": "OR"
}
]
}
],
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "David Cruciani"
}
],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "flowintel is a case management application that enforces an approval workflow for tasks in privileged cases. Tasks in such cases are required to start in a Requested status, meaning they must receive explicit approval before becoming active.\n\nA logic flaw in the task-creation path allowed tasks to be initialized with a Created status (bypassing the approval step) in two scenarios:\n\n- When a task was created from a template and no acting user was supplied, the privileged-case check was skipped entirely, leaving the task in Created status.\n- When a case was created from a template, all copied tasks were unconditionally assigned the Created status regardless of the case\u0027s privileged designation.\n\nAn authenticated user with the ability to create tasks from templates or to instantiate cases from templates could therefore place tasks directly into an active state within privileged cases, circumventing the intended approval gate. This may expose restricted case content or permit actions that should require supervisory sign-off.\n\nAffected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0."
}
],
"impacts": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-108",
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CAPEC-108 Parameter Tampering"
}
]
}
],
"metrics": [
{
"cvssV4_0": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"format": "CVSS",
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
},
{
"format": "SSVC",
"other": {
"content": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T14:21:30Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"type": "SSVC"
},
"scenarios": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "GENERAL"
}
]
}
],
"problemTypes": [
{
"descriptions": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"description": "CWE-862 Missing Authorization",
"lang": "en",
"type": "CWE"
}
]
}
],
"providerMetadata": {
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T14:40:25.523Z",
"orgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"shortName": "CIRCL"
},
"references": [
{
"name": "Security patch",
"tags": [
"patch"
],
"url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1"
}
],
"solutions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "The approval-workflow enforcement for privileged cases is now applied unconditionally at task creation time. The privileged-case check no longer depends on the presence of an acting user, and template-based case creation explicitly assigns the configured Requested status to tasks when the target case is privileged. Ordinary (non-privileged) cases retain the default Created status, preserving existing behavior."
}
],
"title": "flowintel Privileged Case Task Approval Bypass via Missing User Context and Template Creation",
"x_gcve": [
{
"extensions": {
"bcp-05-x-01": {
"ai_annotations": [
{
"ai_level": "generated",
"description": "Draft vulnerability metadata was generated from a git-format patch using an Ollama-hosted language model. Human validation is required before publication.",
"gna_source": 1,
"models": [
{
"gna_source": 1,
"identifier": "qwen3.8:27b",
"name": "qwen3.8:27b",
"source": "ollama"
}
],
"review_status": "full",
"scope": "record",
"tags": [
"ai-computer-assisted:llm-generated",
"ai-computer-assisted:classification"
]
}
]
},
"bcp-05-x-02": {
"x_patch2vuln": {
"assumptions": [
"The \u0027privileged case\u0027 designation implies a higher-sensitivity classification requiring supervisory approval; the exact business meaning is inferred from the code context and commit message.",
"PR:L assumes the attacker needs an authenticated account with template-creation permissions; the patch does not specify the exact role or permission required.",
"CAPEC-108 is the closest available mapping; the primary defect is a missing conditional check rather than active parameter manipulation, so the mapping is approximate.",
"The affected version range \u00270 to \u003c4.1.0\u0027 is taken from the explicit analyst context; the patch itself does not encode version boundaries.",
"VC:L assumes that bypassing the approval step exposes task content that would otherwise be restricted; the patch does not detail what content is protected.",
"The commit message references \u0027Tool: Codex\u0027 which is noted as the AI tool used for implementation, not as a credit."
],
"capecRationale": [
{
"capecId": "CAPEC-108",
"rationale": "The vulnerability is triggered by the absence of a user parameter, which causes the privileged-case authorization check to be skipped. An attacker who can influence whether a user context is supplied (e.g., via an API endpoint that does not enforce authentication for this code path) effectively tampers with the parameter to bypass the control. This is the closest CAPEC available; the mapping is uncertain because the primary defect is a missing check rather than active parameter manipulation, but CAPEC-108 best captures the \u0027missing/absent parameter leads to skipped validation\u0027 pattern."
}
],
"commit": "fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1",
"confidence": "medium",
"credits": [
{
"lang": "en",
"type": "remediation developer",
"value": "David Cruciani"
}
],
"cvssRationale": "AV:N: flowintel is a web application accessible over the network. AC:L: the bypass is triggered simply by the absence of a user context or by using the template-creation path; no race condition or special timing is needed. AT:N: no manipulation of a separate attack target is required. PR:L: the attacker must be an authenticated user with permission to create tasks from templates or instantiate cases from templates. UI:N: no victim interaction is required. VC:L: tasks in privileged cases become immediately accessible without approval, potentially exposing restricted case content. VI:L: the integrity of the approval workflow is compromised; tasks are in an unauthorized state. VA:N: no availability impact. SC/SI/SA:N: no secondary impacts on other systems are evidenced.",
"fixSummary": "The approval-workflow enforcement for privileged cases is now applied unconditionally at task creation time. The privileged-case check no longer depends on the presence of an acting user, and template-based case creation explicitly assigns the configured Requested status to tasks when the target case is privileged. Ordinary (non-privileged) cases retain the default Created status, preserving existing behavior.",
"generatedAt": "2026-11-20T14:21:30.590126Z",
"generator": "patch2vuln.py",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"modelComparison": {
"potentialErrors": [],
"rankings": [
{
"agreementScore": 11,
"assumptionCount": 6,
"confidence": "medium",
"model": "qwen3.8:27b",
"score": 6
}
],
"selectedModel": "qwen3.8:27b",
"selectionMethod": "deterministic-consensus-v1",
"selectionNotice": "The selected result is closest to model consensus; this heuristic does not establish factual correctness and human review remains required."
},
"patchSha256": "ef4bf88c9ae2f0d59b98cffbeb804fbbbeeb8017452a730e8c60200aa01ca687",
"patchSummary": "Two one-line changes were made. In app/case/common_core.py, the condition guarding the Requested-status assignment was changed from \u0027if current_user and case.privileged_case\u0027 to \u0027if case.privileged_case\u0027, removing the dependency on a non-null user. In app/templating/TemplateCase.py, the hardcoded \u0027status_id=1\u0027 in the task-copy constructor was replaced with a conditional expression that selects the configured TASK_REQUESTED status when the case is privileged and falls back to 1 otherwise.",
"patchTruncated": false,
"patches": [
{
"commit": "fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1",
"date": "Tue, 17 Nov 2026 11:02:12 +0100",
"patchSha256": "ef4bf88c9ae2f0d59b98cffbeb804fbbbeeb8017452a730e8c60200aa01ca687",
"retrievedAt": "2026-11-20T14:21:01.216442Z",
"source": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1",
"sourceUrl": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1",
"subject": "fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged"
}
],
"source": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1",
"ssvc": {
"options": [
{
"Exploitation": "none"
},
{
"Automatable": "yes"
},
{
"Technical Impact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T14:21:30Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
},
"subject": "fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged",
"weaknessRationale": [
{
"cweId": "CWE-862",
"rationale": "The approval workflow (a form of authorization gate) for privileged-case tasks was not enforced under certain code paths (no user context, template-based creation), allowing tasks to skip the required approval step. The narrowest defensible CWE is Missing Authorization because the security control (approval) was simply absent in those paths."
}
]
}
},
"bcp-05-x-03": {
"x_timeline": {
"events": [
{
"description": "Corrective change authored (fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1): fix: [security] Require initial approval for privileged",
"id": "evt-fix-developed-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-17T10:02:12Z",
"type": "fix-developed"
},
{
"description": "Patch retrieved from the supplied URL; retrieval time is used as the default availability time.",
"id": "evt-fix-available-1",
"references": [
"https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1"
],
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T14:21:01.216442Z",
"type": "fix-available"
}
]
}
}
},
"recordType": "advisory",
"vulnId": "GCVE-1-2026-20420"
}
]
}
},
"cveMetadata": {
"assignerOrgId": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"assignerShortName": "CIRCL",
"cveId": "CVE-2026-133852",
"datePublished": "2026-11-20T14:40:25.523Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-11-20T14:40:19.091Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-11-20T16:33:54.226Z",
"state": "PUBLISHED"
},
"dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
"dataVersion": "5.2",
"vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
"nvd": {
"cve": {
"affected": [
{
"affectedData": [
{
"cpes": [
"cpe:2.3:a:flowintel:flowintel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*"
],
"modules": [
"app/case/common_core.py",
"app/templating/TemplateCase.py"
],
"product": "flowintel",
"repo": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel",
"vendor": "flowintel",
"versions": [
{
"lessThan": "4.1.0",
"status": "affected",
"version": "0",
"versionType": "semver"
}
]
}
],
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8"
}
],
"cveTags": [],
"descriptions": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "flowintel is a case management application that enforces an approval workflow for tasks in privileged cases. Tasks in such cases are required to start in a Requested status, meaning they must receive explicit approval before becoming active.\n\nA logic flaw in the task-creation path allowed tasks to be initialized with a Created status (bypassing the approval step) in two scenarios:\n\n- When a task was created from a template and no acting user was supplied, the privileged-case check was skipped entirely, leaving the task in Created status.\n- When a case was created from a template, all copied tasks were unconditionally assigned the Created status regardless of the case\u0027s privileged designation.\n\nAn authenticated user with the ability to create tasks from templates or to instantiate cases from templates could therefore place tasks directly into an active state within privileged cases, circumventing the intended approval gate. This may expose restricted case content or permit actions that should require supervisory sign-off.\n\nAffected versions: flowintel prior to 4.1.0."
}
],
"id": "CVE-2026-133852",
"lastModified": "2026-11-20T17:18:23.297",
"metrics": {
"cvssMetricV40": [
{
"cvssData": {
"Automatable": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Recovery": "NOT_DEFINED",
"Safety": "NOT_DEFINED",
"attackComplexity": "LOW",
"attackRequirements": "NONE",
"attackVector": "NETWORK",
"availabilityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"baseScore": 5.3,
"baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
"confidentialityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"exploitMaturity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"integrityRequirement": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackComplexity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackRequirements": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedAttackVector": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedPrivilegesRequired": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedSubIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedUserInteraction": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnAvailabilityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnConfidentialityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"modifiedVulnIntegrityImpact": "NOT_DEFINED",
"privilegesRequired": "LOW",
"providerUrgency": "NOT_DEFINED",
"subAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"subConfidentialityImpact": "NONE",
"subIntegrityImpact": "NONE",
"userInteraction": "NONE",
"valueDensity": "NOT_DEFINED",
"vectorString": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"version": "4.0",
"vulnAvailabilityImpact": "NONE",
"vulnConfidentialityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnIntegrityImpact": "LOW",
"vulnerabilityResponseEffort": "NOT_DEFINED"
},
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
],
"ssvcV203": [
{
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"ssvcData": {
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "yes"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "Supplier",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T14:21:30Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
},
{
"source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
"ssvcData": {
"id": "CVE-2026-133852",
"options": [
{
"exploitation": "none"
},
{
"automatable": "no"
},
{
"technicalImpact": "partial"
}
],
"role": "CISA Coordinator",
"timestamp": "2026-11-20T16:22:14.438766Z",
"version": "2.0.3"
}
}
]
},
"published": "2026-11-20T15:17:53.743",
"references": [
{
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"url": "https://github.com/flowintel/flowintel/commit/fd23a3cb577b1ac64b95f076578994188332b2d1"
}
],
"sourceIdentifier": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"vulnStatus": "Received",
"weaknesses": [
{
"description": [
{
"lang": "en",
"value": "CWE-862"
}
],
"source": "5a6e4751-2f3f-4070-9419-94fb35b644e8",
"type": "Secondary"
}
]
}
}
}
}
Solutions
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.