CVE-2026-19184 (GCVE-0-2026-19184)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-05 08:06 – Updated: 2026-10-05 13:23
VLAI
EPSS
VEX
Title
Out-of-bounds write in the NXP GAU ADC driver due to byte-versus-sample buffer size validation mismatch
Summary
The NXP GAU ADC driver (drivers/adc/adc_mcux_gau_adc.c) validated the caller-supplied sequence->buffer_size, which is expressed in bytes, against the number of active channels, which is a sample count. It then stored that byte count directly in data->results_length and used it in mcux_gau_adc_read_samples() as the number of uint16_t slots available. Because each conversion result occupies sizeof(uint16_t) bytes, a buffer that was accepted as "large enough" could be written with up to twice its size in bytes, so every sample past the buffer's midpoint was written out of bounds.
adc_read() and adc_read_async() are Zephyr system calls. The syscall verifier in drivers/adc/adc_handlers.c only confirms that the caller owns buffer_size writable bytes (K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE); deciding whether that size is sufficient for the requested channels and extra_samplings is delegated entirely to the driver. On a build with CONFIG_USERSPACE=y, a user-mode thread that has been granted the ADC device object could therefore submit a deliberately half-sized buffer and cause the driver's work-queue handler — which runs in supervisor mode, outside the caller's MPU restrictions — to write ADC conversion results past the end of that buffer, at an address and for a length of the caller's choosing.
The overrun is bounded by the requested sequence: with sequence->options->extra_samplings set, the sampling loop walks the buffer pointer forward across every sampling, so the total overrun can reach the full size of the supplied buffer (kilobytes for a large extra_samplings). The written words are 16-bit ADC conversion results, so the content is only partially attacker-influenced (via the selected analog input, gain and resolution), but the destination and length are fully controlled — sufficient for kernel memory corruption, a crash, or a userspace-to-kernel privilege escalation. Builds without CONFIG_USERSPACE, or on SoCs other than NXP RW61x with the GAU ADC node enabled, are not exposed to the privilege boundary; there the same defect only causes a silent overflow when the application itself passes an undersized buffer.
The fix replaces the ad-hoc check with the shared adc_sequence_validate_buffer() helper (validating against num_channels * sizeof(uint16_t)), stores buffer_size / sizeof(uint16_t) in results_length, and corrects the loop bound to a post-decrement so exactly the available number of slots may be written.
Severity
8.4 (High)
SSVC
Exploitation: none
Automatable: no
Technical Impact: partial
CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)
Decision recorded 2026-10-05 13:23 UTC
CWE
- CWE-787 - bounds
Assigner
References
2 references
Impacted products
1 product
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| zephyrproject | zephyr |
Affected:
3.7.0 , < 4.5.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Experimental. This forecast is provided for visualization only and may change without notice. Do not use it for operational decisions.
Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the
vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base
model, served locally by ML-Gateway.
They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
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