CVE-2026-23346 (GCVE-0-2026-23346)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-25 10:27 – Updated: 2026-04-13 06:05
VLAI?
Title
arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot() The only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap() implementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a 'pgprot_t' value determined from the user mapping of the target 'pfn' being accessed by the kernel. On arm64, the 'pgprot_t' contains all of the non-address bits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up returning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when accessed from the kernel on systems with PAN: | Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000 | ... | Call trace: | __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8 | generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8 | __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8 | access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30 | environ_read+0x238/0x3e8 | vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0 | ksys_read+0xcc/0x178 | __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68 Extract only the memory type from the user 'pgprot_t' in ioremap_prot() and assert that we're being passed a user mapping, to protect us against any changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid falsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro which simply wraps __ioremap_prot().
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
Linux Linux Affected: 893dea9ccd08dab924839354aba21d4ed7a9abc0 , < 3d64dcc0799c2d6921ba027716b7be721eb19fa8 (git)
Affected: 893dea9ccd08dab924839354aba21d4ed7a9abc0 , < d1ad8fe7f72d73e1617bac79f2ec7a3bedf47e2a (git)
Affected: 893dea9ccd08dab924839354aba21d4ed7a9abc0 , < 8f098037139b294050053123ab2bc0f819d08932 (git)
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    Linux Linux Affected: 6.0
Unaffected: 0 , < 6.0 (semver)
Unaffected: 6.18.17 , ≤ 6.18.* (semver)
Unaffected: 6.19.7 , ≤ 6.19.* (semver)
Unaffected: 7.0 , ≤ * (original_commit_for_fix)
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{
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          "product": "Linux",
          "programFiles": [
            "arch/arm64/include/asm/io.h"
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          "value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\narm64: io: Extract user memory type in ioremap_prot()\n\nThe only caller of ioremap_prot() outside of the generic ioremap()\nimplementation is generic_access_phys(), which passes a \u0027pgprot_t\u0027 value\ndetermined from the user mapping of the target \u0027pfn\u0027 being accessed by\nthe kernel. On arm64, the \u0027pgprot_t\u0027 contains all of the non-address\nbits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up\nreturning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when\naccessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:\n\n  | Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000\n  | ...\n  | Call trace:\n  |   __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8\n  |   generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8\n  |   __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8\n  |   access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30\n  |   environ_read+0x238/0x3e8\n  |   vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0\n  |   ksys_read+0xcc/0x178\n  |   __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68\n\nExtract only the memory type from the user \u0027pgprot_t\u0027 in ioremap_prot()\nand assert that we\u0027re being passed a user mapping, to protect us against\nany changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid\nfalsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro\nwhich simply wraps __ioremap_prot()."
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    "dateReserved": "2026-01-13T15:37:45.999Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-04-13T06:05:29.719Z",
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On arm64, the \u0027pgprot_t\u0027 contains all of the non-address\\nbits from the pte, including the permission controls, and so we end up\\nreturning a new user mapping from ioremap_prot() which faults when\\naccessed from the kernel on systems with PAN:\\n\\n  | Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address ffff80008ea89000\\n  | ...\\n  | Call trace:\\n  |   __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8\\n  |   generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8\\n  |   __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8\\n  |   access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30\\n  |   environ_read+0x238/0x3e8\\n  |   vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0\\n  |   ksys_read+0xcc/0x178\\n  |   __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68\\n\\nExtract only the memory type from the user \u0027pgprot_t\u0027 in ioremap_prot()\\nand assert that we\u0027re being passed a user mapping, to protect us against\\nany changes in future that may require additional handling. To avoid\\nfalsely flagging users of ioremap(), provide our own ioremap() macro\\nwhich simply wraps __ioremap_prot().\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\\n\\narm64: io: Extraer el tipo de memoria de usuario en ioremap_prot()\\n\\nEl \u00fanico llamador de ioremap_prot() fuera de la implementaci\u00f3n gen\u00e9rica de ioremap() es generic_access_phys(), que pasa un valor \u0027pgprot_t\u0027 determinado a partir del mapeo de usuario del \u0027pfn\u0027 objetivo al que accede el kernel. En arm64, el \u0027pgprot_t\u0027 contiene todos los bits no relacionados con la direcci\u00f3n del pte, incluidos los controles de permiso, y as\u00ed terminamos devolviendo un nuevo mapeo de usuario desde ioremap_prot() que falla cuando se accede desde el kernel en sistemas con PAN:\\n\\n  | No se puede manejar la lectura del kernel desde memoria ilegible en la direcci\u00f3n virtual ffff80008ea89000\\n  | ...\\n  | Rastro de llamada:\\n  |   __memcpy_fromio+0x80/0xf8\\n  |   generic_access_phys+0x20c/0x2b8\\n  |   __access_remote_vm+0x46c/0x5b8\\n  |   access_remote_vm+0x18/0x30\\n  |   environ_read+0x238/0x3e8\\n  |   vfs_read+0xe4/0x2b0\\n  |   ksys_read+0xcc/0x178\\n  |   __arm64_sys_read+0x4c/0x68\\n\\nExtraer solo el tipo de memoria del \u0027pgprot_t\u0027 de usuario en ioremap_prot() y afirmar que se nos est\u00e1 pasando un mapeo de usuario, para protegernos contra cualquier cambio futuro que pueda requerir manejo adicional. Para evitar marcar err\u00f3neamente a los usuarios de ioremap(), proporcionar nuestra propia macro ioremap() que simplemente envuelve a __ioremap_prot().\"}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H\",\"baseScore\":5.5,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"LOW\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"integrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.8,\"impactScore\":3.6}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"NVD-CWE-noinfo\"}]}],\"configurations\":[{\"nodes\":[{\"operator\":\"OR\",\"negate\":false,\"cpeMatch\":[{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.0.1\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.18.17\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"1E4E7304-41DC-42ED-AFC0-8B1962A7CF99\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.19\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.19.7\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"69245D10-0B71-485E-80C3-A64F077004D3\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.0:-:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"7BE551E5-89CF-47A8-9B26-03CE727FBA37\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"F253B622-8837-4245-BCE5-A7BF8FC76A16\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"4AE85AD8-4641-4E7C-A2F4-305E2CD9EE64\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"F666C8D8-6538-46D4-B318-87610DE64C34\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"02259FDA-961B-47BC-AE7F-93D7EC6E90C2\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"58A9FEFF-C040-420D-8F0A-BFDAAA1DF258\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"1D2315C0-D46F-4F85-9754-F9E5E11374A6\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"512EE3A8-A590-4501-9A94-5D4B268D6138\"}]}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3d64dcc0799c2d6921ba027716b7be721eb19fa8\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f098037139b294050053123ab2bc0f819d08932\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d1ad8fe7f72d73e1617bac79f2ec7a3bedf47e2a\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]}]}}"
  }
}


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  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
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