CVE-2026-23394 (GCVE-0-2026-23394)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-03-25 10:33 – Updated: 2026-04-18 08:58
VLAI?
Title
af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.
Summary
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.
Igor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of
an alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.
This is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit
cbcf01128d0a ("af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK").
After GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited
commit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and
reintroduced the same issue.
The problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without
interacting with GC.
Consider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is
close()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.
The bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from
sk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead()
for sk-A and sk-B.
GC thread User thread
--------- -----------
unix_vertex_dead(sk-A)
-> true <------.
\
`------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK)
invalidate !! -> sk-A's file refcount : 1 -> 2
close(sk-B)
-> sk-B's file refcount : 2 -> 1
unix_vertex_dead(sk-B)
-> true
Initially, sk-A's file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B
recvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the
same as the number of its inflight fds.
However, sk-A's file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK,
which invalidates the previous evaluation.
At this moment, sk-B's file refcount is 2; one by the open fd,
and one by the inflight fd in sk-A. The subsequent close()
releases one refcount by the former.
Finally, GC incorrectly concludes that both sk-A and sk-B are dead.
One option is to restore the locking dance in unix_peek_fds(),
but we can resolve this more elegantly thanks to the new algorithm.
The point is that the issue does not occur without the subsequent
close() and we actually do not need to synchronise MSG_PEEK with
the dead SCC detection.
When the issue occurs, close() and GC touch the same file refcount.
If GC sees the refcount being decremented by close(), it can just
give up garbage-collecting the SCC.
Therefore, we only need to signal the race during MSG_PEEK with
a proper memory barrier to make it visible to the GC.
Let's use seqcount_t to notify GC when MSG_PEEK occurs and let
it defer the SCC to the next run.
This way no locking is needed on the MSG_PEEK side, and we can
avoid imposing a penalty on every MSG_PEEK unnecessarily.
Note that we can retry within unix_scc_dead() if MSG_PEEK is
detected, but we do not do so to avoid hung task splat from
abusive MSG_PEEK calls.
Severity ?
No CVSS data available.
Assigner
References
Impacted products
| Vendor | Product | Version | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux |
Affected:
118f457da9ed58a79e24b73c2ef0aa1987241f0e , < 72cf49ad50c16270b52bc512d9c2df5743922968
(git)
Affected: 118f457da9ed58a79e24b73c2ef0aa1987241f0e , < 37dd7ab332396eb8dd80b2dc7ea4b61abf767436 (git) Affected: 118f457da9ed58a79e24b73c2ef0aa1987241f0e , < e5b31d988a41549037b8d8721a3c3cae893d8670 (git) Affected: 61a75360dca93c945ef6bd757f8b8a96f39b77cb (git) Affected: 7b1ffbd3b22e755d481d49647dcb7c5cfbde5844 (git) |
||
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"value": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\naf_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.\n\nIgor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of\nan alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.\n\nThis is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit\ncbcf01128d0a (\"af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK\").\n\nAfter GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited\ncommit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and\nreintroduced the same issue.\n\nThe problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without\ninteracting with GC.\n\nConsider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is\nclose()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.\n\nThe bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from\nsk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead()\nfor sk-A and sk-B.\n\n GC thread User thread\n --------- -----------\n unix_vertex_dead(sk-A)\n -\u003e true \u003c------.\n \\\n `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK)\n invalidate !! -\u003e sk-A\u0027s file refcount : 1 -\u003e 2\n\n close(sk-B)\n -\u003e sk-B\u0027s file refcount : 2 -\u003e 1\n unix_vertex_dead(sk-B)\n -\u003e true\n\nInitially, sk-A\u0027s file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B\nrecvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the\nsame as the number of its inflight fds.\n\nHowever, sk-A\u0027s file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK,\nwhich invalidates the previous evaluation.\n\nAt this moment, sk-B\u0027s file refcount is 2; one by the open fd,\nand one by the inflight fd in sk-A. The subsequent close()\nreleases one refcount by the former.\n\nFinally, GC incorrectly concludes that both sk-A and sk-B are dead.\n\nOne option is to restore the locking dance in unix_peek_fds(),\nbut we can resolve this more elegantly thanks to the new algorithm.\n\nThe point is that the issue does not occur without the subsequent\nclose() and we actually do not need to synchronise MSG_PEEK with\nthe dead SCC detection.\n\nWhen the issue occurs, close() and GC touch the same file refcount.\nIf GC sees the refcount being decremented by close(), it can just\ngive up garbage-collecting the SCC.\n\nTherefore, we only need to signal the race during MSG_PEEK with\na proper memory barrier to make it visible to the GC.\n\nLet\u0027s use seqcount_t to notify GC when MSG_PEEK occurs and let\nit defer the SCC to the next run.\n\nThis way no locking is needed on the MSG_PEEK side, and we can\navoid imposing a penalty on every MSG_PEEK unnecessarily.\n\nNote that we can retry within unix_scc_dead() if MSG_PEEK is\ndetected, but we do not do so to avoid hung task splat from\nabusive MSG_PEEK calls."
}
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"dateUpdated": "2026-04-18T08:58:28.303Z",
"orgId": "416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67",
"shortName": "Linux"
},
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{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72cf49ad50c16270b52bc512d9c2df5743922968"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37dd7ab332396eb8dd80b2dc7ea4b61abf767436"
},
{
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5b31d988a41549037b8d8721a3c3cae893d8670"
}
],
"title": "af_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.",
"x_generator": {
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}
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"cveId": "CVE-2026-23394",
"datePublished": "2026-03-25T10:33:18.180Z",
"dateReserved": "2026-01-13T15:37:46.011Z",
"dateUpdated": "2026-04-18T08:58:28.303Z",
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},
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"cve": "CVE-2026-23394",
"date": "2026-04-24",
"epss": "0.00033",
"percentile": "0.0952"
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"nvd": "{\"cve\":{\"id\":\"CVE-2026-23394\",\"sourceIdentifier\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"published\":\"2026-03-25T11:16:40.190\",\"lastModified\":\"2026-04-24T15:20:29.353\",\"vulnStatus\":\"Analyzed\",\"cveTags\":[],\"descriptions\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\\n\\naf_unix: Give up GC if MSG_PEEK intervened.\\n\\nIgor Ushakov reported that GC purged the receive queue of\\nan alive socket due to a race with MSG_PEEK with a nice repro.\\n\\nThis is the exact same issue previously fixed by commit\\ncbcf01128d0a (\\\"af_unix: fix garbage collect vs MSG_PEEK\\\").\\n\\nAfter GC was replaced with the current algorithm, the cited\\ncommit removed the locking dance in unix_peek_fds() and\\nreintroduced the same issue.\\n\\nThe problem is that MSG_PEEK bumps a file refcount without\\ninteracting with GC.\\n\\nConsider an SCC containing sk-A and sk-B, where sk-A is\\nclose()d but can be recv()ed via sk-B.\\n\\nThe bad thing happens if sk-A is recv()ed with MSG_PEEK from\\nsk-B and sk-B is close()d while GC is checking unix_vertex_dead()\\nfor sk-A and sk-B.\\n\\n GC thread User thread\\n --------- -----------\\n unix_vertex_dead(sk-A)\\n -\u003e true \u003c------.\\n \\\\\\n `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK)\\n invalidate !! -\u003e sk-A\u0027s file refcount : 1 -\u003e 2\\n\\n close(sk-B)\\n -\u003e sk-B\u0027s file refcount : 2 -\u003e 1\\n unix_vertex_dead(sk-B)\\n -\u003e true\\n\\nInitially, sk-A\u0027s file refcount is 1 by the inflight fd in sk-B\\nrecvq. GC thinks sk-A is dead because the file refcount is the\\nsame as the number of its inflight fds.\\n\\nHowever, sk-A\u0027s file refcount is bumped silently by MSG_PEEK,\\nwhich invalidates the previous evaluation.\\n\\nAt this moment, sk-B\u0027s file refcount is 2; one by the open fd,\\nand one by the inflight fd in sk-A. The subsequent close()\\nreleases one refcount by the former.\\n\\nFinally, GC incorrectly concludes that both sk-A and sk-B are dead.\\n\\nOne option is to restore the locking dance in unix_peek_fds(),\\nbut we can resolve this more elegantly thanks to the new algorithm.\\n\\nThe point is that the issue does not occur without the subsequent\\nclose() and we actually do not need to synchronise MSG_PEEK with\\nthe dead SCC detection.\\n\\nWhen the issue occurs, close() and GC touch the same file refcount.\\nIf GC sees the refcount being decremented by close(), it can just\\ngive up garbage-collecting the SCC.\\n\\nTherefore, we only need to signal the race during MSG_PEEK with\\na proper memory barrier to make it visible to the GC.\\n\\nLet\u0027s use seqcount_t to notify GC when MSG_PEEK occurs and let\\nit defer the SCC to the next run.\\n\\nThis way no locking is needed on the MSG_PEEK side, and we can\\navoid imposing a penalty on every MSG_PEEK unnecessarily.\\n\\nNote that we can retry within unix_scc_dead() if MSG_PEEK is\\ndetected, but we do not do so to avoid hung task splat from\\nabusive MSG_PEEK calls.\"},{\"lang\":\"es\",\"value\":\"En el kernel de Linux, la siguiente vulnerabilidad ha sido resuelta:\\n\\naf_unix: Abandonar la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC) si MSG_PEEK intervino.\\n\\nIgor Ushakov inform\u00f3 que la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC) purg\u00f3 la cola de recepci\u00f3n de un socket activo debido a una condici\u00f3n de carrera con MSG_PEEK con una buena reproducci\u00f3n.\\n\\nEste es exactamente el mismo problema previamente solucionado por el commit cbcf01128d0a (\u0027af_unix: corregir recolecci\u00f3n de basura vs MSG_PEEK\u0027).\\n\\nDespu\u00e9s de que la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC) fue reemplazada por el algoritmo actual, el commit citado elimin\u00f3 la \u0027danza de bloqueo\u0027 en unix_peek_fds() y reintrodujo el mismo problema.\\n\\nEl problema es que MSG_PEEK incrementa un contador de referencias de archivo sin interactuar con la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC).\\n\\nConsidere un SCC que contiene sk-A y sk-B, donde sk-A est\u00e1 close()d (cerrado) pero puede ser recv()ed (recibido) a trav\u00e9s de sk-B.\\n\\nLo malo sucede si sk-A es recv()ed (recibido) con MSG_PEEK desde sk-B y sk-B est\u00e1 close()d (cerrado) mientras la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC) est\u00e1 verificando unix_vertex_dead() para sk-A y sk-B.\\n\\n Hilo de GC Hilo de usuario\\n --------- -----------\\n unix_vertex_dead(sk-A)\\n -\u0026gt; true \u0026lt;------.\\n \\\\\\n `------ recv(sk-B, MSG_PEEK)\\n \u00a1\u00a1invalidar!! -\u0026gt; contador de referencias de archivo de sk-A : 1 -\u0026gt; 2\\n\\n close(sk-B)\\n -\u0026gt; contador de referencias de archivo de sk-B : 2 -\u0026gt; 1\\n unix_vertex_dead(sk-B)\\n -\u0026gt; true\\n\\nInicialmente, el contador de referencias de archivo de sk-A es 1 por el descriptor de archivo en tr\u00e1nsito en la cola de recepci\u00f3n de sk-B. La recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC) piensa que sk-A est\u00e1 muerto porque el contador de referencias de archivo es el mismo que el n\u00famero de sus descriptores de archivo en tr\u00e1nsito.\\n\\nSin embargo, el contador de referencias de archivo de sk-A es incrementado silenciosamente por MSG_PEEK, lo que invalida la evaluaci\u00f3n anterior.\\n\\nEn este momento, el contador de referencias de archivo de sk-B es 2; uno por el descriptor de archivo abierto, y uno por el descriptor de archivo en tr\u00e1nsito en sk-A. El close() (cierre) subsiguiente libera un contador de referencias por el primero.\\n\\nFinalmente, la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC) concluye incorrectamente que tanto sk-A como sk-B est\u00e1n muertos.\\n\\nUna opci\u00f3n es restaurar la \u0027danza de bloqueo\u0027 en unix_peek_fds(), pero podemos resolver esto de manera m\u00e1s elegante gracias al nuevo algoritmo.\\n\\nEl punto es que el problema no ocurre sin el close() (cierre) subsiguiente y en realidad no necesitamos sincronizar MSG_PEEK con la detecci\u00f3n de SCC muertos.\\n\\nCuando ocurre el problema, close() (el cierre) y la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC) tocan el mismo contador de referencias de archivo. Si la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC) ve que el contador de referencias es decrementado por close() (el cierre), puede simplemente abandonar la recolecci\u00f3n de basura del SCC.\\n\\nPor lo tanto, solo necesitamos se\u00f1alar la condici\u00f3n de carrera durante MSG_PEEK con una barrera de memoria adecuada para hacerla visible a la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC).\\n\\nUsemos seqcount_t para notificar a la recolecci\u00f3n de basura (GC) cuando ocurre MSG_PEEK y permitirle aplazar el SCC a la siguiente ejecuci\u00f3n.\\n\\nDe esta manera, no se necesita bloqueo en el lado de MSG_PEEK, y podemos evitar imponer una penalizaci\u00f3n a cada MSG_PEEK innecesariamente.\\n\\nTenga en cuenta que podemos reintentar dentro de unix_scc_dead() si se detecta MSG_PEEK, pero no lo hacemos para evitar la \u0027salpicadura\u0027 de tareas colgadas por llamadas abusivas a MSG_PEEK.\"}],\"metrics\":{\"cvssMetricV31\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"cvssData\":{\"version\":\"3.1\",\"vectorString\":\"CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H\",\"baseScore\":4.7,\"baseSeverity\":\"MEDIUM\",\"attackVector\":\"LOCAL\",\"attackComplexity\":\"HIGH\",\"privilegesRequired\":\"LOW\",\"userInteraction\":\"NONE\",\"scope\":\"UNCHANGED\",\"confidentialityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"integrityImpact\":\"NONE\",\"availabilityImpact\":\"HIGH\"},\"exploitabilityScore\":1.0,\"impactScore\":3.6}]},\"weaknesses\":[{\"source\":\"nvd@nist.gov\",\"type\":\"Primary\",\"description\":[{\"lang\":\"en\",\"value\":\"CWE-362\"}]}],\"configurations\":[{\"nodes\":[{\"operator\":\"OR\",\"negate\":false,\"cpeMatch\":[{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.1.141\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.2\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"B0A3421E-59FE-4E16-9DC6-4CAF59C361C7\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.6.93\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.7\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"4CAF81AF-E0B7-4112-B091-4DE2CB164414\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.10.1\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.18.23\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"7109F074-E2CB-44FB-A4DB-E45B24EF0E17\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"versionStartIncluding\":\"6.19\",\"versionEndExcluding\":\"6.19.10\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"96D34333-38BE-4414-9E79-6EB764329581\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:6.10:-:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"9EA80796-744E-45F5-8632-2AB4F7889FCD\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"F253B622-8837-4245-BCE5-A7BF8FC76A16\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc2:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"4AE85AD8-4641-4E7C-A2F4-305E2CD9EE64\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"F666C8D8-6538-46D4-B318-87610DE64C34\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"02259FDA-961B-47BC-AE7F-93D7EC6E90C2\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"58A9FEFF-C040-420D-8F0A-BFDAAA1DF258\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"1D2315C0-D46F-4F85-9754-F9E5E11374A6\"},{\"vulnerable\":true,\"criteria\":\"cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*\",\"matchCriteriaId\":\"512EE3A8-A590-4501-9A94-5D4B268D6138\"}]}]}],\"references\":[{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37dd7ab332396eb8dd80b2dc7ea4b61abf767436\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/72cf49ad50c16270b52bc512d9c2df5743922968\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]},{\"url\":\"https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e5b31d988a41549037b8d8721a3c3cae893d8670\",\"source\":\"416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67\",\"tags\":[\"Patch\"]}]}}"
}
}
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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