{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "praisonai-platform",
          "vendor": "MervinPraison",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.1.4"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "PraisonAI Platform is the platform layer for the PraisonAI multi-agent teams system. Versions prior to 0.1.4 have an authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=\"member\"`). Any member can rewrite the workspace\u0027s `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object \u2014 depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there. PraisonAI Platform version 0.1.4 patches the issue."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-47411",
  "lastModified": "2026-07-21T18:59:43.940",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "LOW",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
          "baseScore": 6.5,
          "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
          "confidentialityImpact": "NONE",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
        "impactScore": 3.6,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-47411",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "partial"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-07-21T17:52:15.640262Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-07-21T18:16:59.663",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-269"
        },
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-862"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Primary"
    }
  ]
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47411"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-269",
      "CWE-862"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-01T14:23:08Z",
    "nvd_published_at": null,
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=\"member\"`). Any member can rewrite the workspace\u0027s `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object \u2014 depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74; `services/workspace_service.py`\u0027s `update()` method.\n**Root cause:** `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to default `min_role=\"member\"`. `WorkspaceService.update(workspace_id, name, description, settings)` writes the new fields to the workspace row without any caller-permission check. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is never consulted.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74.\n\n```python\n@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}\", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)\nasync def update_workspace(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    body: WorkspaceUpdate,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # \u003c-- BUG: defaults to min_role=\"member\"\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)\n    ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, body.settings)  # \u003c-- writes any value\n    if ws is None:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Workspace not found\")\n    return WorkspaceResponse.model_validate(ws)\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** workspace name and settings are owner-tier fields. Renaming the workspace to a profanity is a low-impact griefing vector; rewriting the JSON `settings` blob is potentially a much higher-impact configuration injection (depending on what fields downstream code reads from `settings`, the attacker may flip feature flags, redirect webhook URLs, change LLM provider keys for shared configs, disable audit logging, etc.). The `require_workspace_member(min_role)` parameter is implemented and unused. This endpoint should require owner.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker is a member of workspace `W` with role \"member\". State: attacker holds JWT.\n2. Attacker sends `PATCH /workspaces/W` with `Authorization: Bearer \u003cattacker_jwt\u003e` and body `{\"name\": \"Compromised\", \"description\": \"Owned by attacker\", \"settings\": {\"allow_public_invite\": true, \"ai_provider_url\": \"https://attacker.example/v1\"}}`. State: control flow enters `update_workspace`.\n3. `require_workspace_member(W, attacker)` passes. `WorkspaceService.update(W, ...)` writes the three fields. State: workspace `W` now has attacker-chosen name, description, and settings.\n4. The settings JSON is read by any downstream code that consults workspace settings (LLM proxying, invite flows, webhook routing). If the deployment uses settings-keyed configuration overrides, those overrides now point at attacker-controlled endpoints.\n5. Final state: with one member-level token plus one PATCH, the attacker rewrites the workspace\u0027s metadata and settings, with effects ranging from cosmetic (rename) to substantive (settings-keyed config injection).\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, no confidentiality directly (though settings rewrites may enable indirect data exfiltration via attacker-pointed integration URLs), high integrity, no availability claim.\n**Attacker capability:** rewrite any workspace\u0027s name, description, and settings JSON. The actual blast radius depends on what fields the deployment reads from `settings` \u2014 but that field is documented as a free-form JSON blob, so any future configuration the platform adds there becomes attacker-tunable.\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any membership token in the target workspace.\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. With the suggested fix below, member-tier tokens fail the gate and the metadata rewrite is rejected with 403.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@\n @router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}\", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)\n async def update_workspace(\n     workspace_id: str,\n     body: WorkspaceUpdate,\n-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),  # see member-update-role advisory for helper\n     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n ):\n     ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)\n     ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, body.settings)\n     if ws is None:\n         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Workspace not found\")\n     return WorkspaceResponse.model_validate(ws)\n```\n\nDefence-in-depth: validate the keys allowed in `body.settings` against an allowlist so the field cannot become an arbitrary config-injection primitive even for owners. The four companion workspace-mutation endpoints (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `delete_workspace`) exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.",
  "id": "GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq",
  "modified": "2026-06-01T14:23:08Z",
  "published": "2026-06-01T14:23:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can rewrite workspace name, description, and settings via PATCH /workspaces/{id}"
}

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "PyPI",
        "name": "praisonai-platform",
        "purl": "pkg:pypi/praisonai-platform"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.1.4"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ],
      "versions": [
        "0.1.0",
        "0.1.1",
        "0.1.2",
        "0.1.3"
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-47411",
    "GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq"
  ],
  "details": "## Summary\n\n**Type:** Authorization bypass enabling workspace metadata + settings tampering. The `PATCH /workspaces/{workspace_id}` endpoint is gated only by `require_workspace_member(workspace_id)` (default `min_role=\"member\"`). Any member can rewrite the workspace\u0027s `name`, `description`, and the `settings` JSON blob. The settings field is a free-form JSON object \u2014 depending on which downstream code reads it, this becomes a configuration-injection primitive for any setting the platform exposes there.\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74; `services/workspace_service.py`\u0027s `update()` method.\n**Root cause:** `Depends(require_workspace_member)` resolves to default `min_role=\"member\"`. `WorkspaceService.update(workspace_id, name, description, settings)` writes the new fields to the workspace row without any caller-permission check. The role hierarchy (`MemberService.has_role`) is never consulted.\n\n## Affected Code\n\n**File:** `src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py`, lines 63-74.\n\n```python\n@router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}\", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)\nasync def update_workspace(\n    workspace_id: str,\n    body: WorkspaceUpdate,\n    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),         # \u003c-- BUG: defaults to min_role=\"member\"\n    session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n):\n    ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)\n    ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, body.settings)  # \u003c-- writes any value\n    if ws is None:\n        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Workspace not found\")\n    return WorkspaceResponse.model_validate(ws)\n```\n\n**Why it\u0027s wrong:** workspace name and settings are owner-tier fields. Renaming the workspace to a profanity is a low-impact griefing vector; rewriting the JSON `settings` blob is potentially a much higher-impact configuration injection (depending on what fields downstream code reads from `settings`, the attacker may flip feature flags, redirect webhook URLs, change LLM provider keys for shared configs, disable audit logging, etc.). The `require_workspace_member(min_role)` parameter is implemented and unused. This endpoint should require owner.\n\n## Exploit Chain\n\n1. Attacker is a member of workspace `W` with role \"member\". State: attacker holds JWT.\n2. Attacker sends `PATCH /workspaces/W` with `Authorization: Bearer \u003cattacker_jwt\u003e` and body `{\"name\": \"Compromised\", \"description\": \"Owned by attacker\", \"settings\": {\"allow_public_invite\": true, \"ai_provider_url\": \"https://attacker.example/v1\"}}`. State: control flow enters `update_workspace`.\n3. `require_workspace_member(W, attacker)` passes. `WorkspaceService.update(W, ...)` writes the three fields. State: workspace `W` now has attacker-chosen name, description, and settings.\n4. The settings JSON is read by any downstream code that consults workspace settings (LLM proxying, invite flows, webhook routing). If the deployment uses settings-keyed configuration overrides, those overrides now point at attacker-controlled endpoints.\n5. Final state: with one member-level token plus one PATCH, the attacker rewrites the workspace\u0027s metadata and settings, with effects ranging from cosmetic (rename) to substantive (settings-keyed config injection).\n\n## Security Impact\n\n**Severity:** sec-moderate. CVSS 6.5: network attack, low complexity, low privileges, no user interaction, scope unchanged, no confidentiality directly (though settings rewrites may enable indirect data exfiltration via attacker-pointed integration URLs), high integrity, no availability claim.\n**Attacker capability:** rewrite any workspace\u0027s name, description, and settings JSON. The actual blast radius depends on what fields the deployment reads from `settings` \u2014 but that field is documented as a free-form JSON blob, so any future configuration the platform adds there becomes attacker-tunable.\n**Preconditions:** `praisonai-platform` is deployed multi-tenant; attacker has any membership token in the target workspace.\n**Differential:** source-inspection-verified. With the suggested fix below, member-tier tokens fail the gate and the metadata rewrite is rejected with 403.\n\n## Suggested Fix\n\n```diff\n--- a/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n+++ b/src/praisonai-platform/praisonai_platform/api/routes/workspaces.py\n@@ -63,11 +63,11 @@\n @router.patch(\"/{workspace_id}\", response_model=WorkspaceResponse)\n async def update_workspace(\n     workspace_id: str,\n     body: WorkspaceUpdate,\n-    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(require_workspace_member),\n+    user: AuthIdentity = Depends(_require_workspace_owner),  # see member-update-role advisory for helper\n     session: AsyncSession = Depends(get_db),\n ):\n     ws_svc = WorkspaceService(session)\n     ws = await ws_svc.update(workspace_id, body.name, body.description, body.settings)\n     if ws is None:\n         raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail=\"Workspace not found\")\n     return WorkspaceResponse.model_validate(ws)\n```\n\nDefence-in-depth: validate the keys allowed in `body.settings` against an allowlist so the field cannot become an arbitrary config-injection primitive even for owners. The four companion workspace-mutation endpoints (`add_member`, `update_member_role`, `remove_member`, `delete_workspace`) exhibit the same default-min-role gap and are filed as their own advisories.",
  "id": "PYSEC-2026-2937",
  "modified": "2026-07-13T16:05:38.312807Z",
  "published": "2026-07-13T15:35:23.490169Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://pypi.org/project/praisonai-platform"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-rcmc-q9rj-4wmq"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47411"
    }
  ],
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "praisonai-platform: Any workspace member can rewrite workspace name, description, and settings via PATCH /workspaces/{id}"
}