CVE-2026-56386 (GCVE-0-2026-56386)
Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-10-21 11:37 – Updated: 2026-10-21 13:07| URL | Tags |
|---|---|
| https://lists.apache.org/thread/2pf15ojj0vr7rtx95… | vendor-advisory |
| Vendor | Product | Version | CPE status | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apache Software Foundation | Apache bRPC |
Affected:
0 , < 1.18.0
(semver)
|
guessed |
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Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
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