CVE-2026-56422 (GCVE-0-2026-56422)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-06-22 11:43 – Updated: 2026-06-22 11:43
VLAI
Title
MISP Core: Mass Assignment and Object Re-ownership via Unvalidated Request Fields
Summary
Multiple MISP core controllers and model capture paths accepted client-controlled request fields such as primary keys (id) and ownership/scope foreign keys (event_id, org_id, user_id, sharing_group_id, galaxy_cluster_uuid, organisation_uuid, and related nested object identifiers) without consistently stripping, pinning, or revalidating them against the server-authorized object. In affected paths, an authenticated user with access to one authorized object could submit crafted REST or form payloads that caused MISP to save data against a different object than the one checked by the authorization logic. Depending on the endpoint, this could allow object overwrite, object re-parenting, ownership transfer, unauthorized sharing-group scoping, event/object injection, proposal retargeting, or stored attacker-controlled content appearing in another user’s context. The fixes harden affected create/edit/import flows by stripping client-supplied primary keys on create-only saves, re-pinning route- or database-authorized identifiers before save operations, validating effective sharing-group scope, and adding field whitelists where ownership fields must never be editable. The initial broad fix also added a central CRUDComponent::edit() primary-key re-pin so payload-supplied IDs cannot redirect saves away from the already-authorized row. GitHub’s patch for 7acf8220c describes this central issue as CRUDComponent::edit() copying supplied fields, including a payload primary key, onto the loaded record, allowing CakePHP save() to update an arbitrary row unless the loaded ID is re-pinned.
Severity
9.4 (Critical)
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H
CWE
  • CWE-639 - Authorization Bypass Through User-Controlled Key
Assigner
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version
misp misp Affected: 0 , ≤ 2.5.41 (semver)
Create a notification for this product.
Credits
Andras Iklody (the Insomniac MISP lead dev) Jeroen Pinoy Claude (the international export version)
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

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Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

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  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
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