CVE-2026-67543 (GCVE-0-2026-67543)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-11-11 21:39 – Updated: 2026-11-11 21:39
VLAI
Title
Heym Unsandboxed skill code execution: skills run via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools mandate
Summary
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation — only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist — so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.
Severity
8.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
CWE
  • CWE-94 - Improper Control of Generation of Code
  • CWE-269 - Improper Privilege Management
Assigner
GitHub_M CNA under the mitre root
CNA scorecard C 72/100 over 7763 records in the last 180 days details
References
Impacted products
Vendor Product Version CPE status
heymrun heym Affected: < 0.0.70
guessed Create a notification for this product.
Show details on NVD website
To clipboard 

{
  "containers": {
    "cna": {
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        {
          "product": "heym",
          "vendor": "heymrun",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 0.0.70"
            }
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      ],
      "descriptions": [
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          "value": "Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation \u2014 only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist \u2014 so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
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            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
            "baseScore": 8.8,
            "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
            "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
            "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
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      "providerMetadata": {
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        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/2155057f4153a1e3a7b789d104f7fa96e92964e5",
          "tags": [
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          "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/2155057f4153a1e3a7b789d104f7fa96e92964e5"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/28bb2901e4dea128ac493f67ee9478d230b7a3d7",
          "tags": [
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          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/28bb2901e4dea128ac493f67ee9478d230b7a3d7"
        },
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_MISC"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "Heym Unsandboxed skill code execution: skills run via a local backend subprocess without the Docker isolation that Python tools mandate"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-67543",
    "datePublished": "2026-11-11T21:39:53.192Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-07-29T18:47:17.074Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-11-11T21:39:53.192Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2",
  "vulnerability-lookup:meta": {
    "epss": {
      "cve": "CVE-2026-67543",
      "date": "2026-11-12",
      "epss": "0.00642",
      "percentile": "0.51307"
    },
    "nvd": {
      "cve": {
        "affected": [
          {
            "affectedData": [
              {
                "product": "heym",
                "vendor": "heymrun",
                "versions": [
                  {
                    "status": "affected",
                    "version": "\u003c 0.0.70"
                  }
                ]
              }
            ],
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com"
          }
        ],
        "cveTags": [],
        "descriptions": [
          {
            "lang": "en",
            "value": "Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, heym hardens one untrusted-code path but not its sibling. The Python tool executor (python_tool_executor.py) treats user code as untrusted and mandates a Docker sandbox (no network, read-only fs, non-root, no docker socket), failing closed. The skill executor (skill_python_executor.py) runs skill Python via a local backend subprocess with no Docker isolation \u2014 only a 512 MB RLIMIT and a 7-key env denylist \u2014 so a skill executes inside the backend execution context, with filesystem access, network egress, and non-denylisted environment variables that should not be exposed to untrusted/shared skills. In the shipped Docker config (backend runs as root + /var/run/docker.sock mounted), this escalates to host root. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70."
          }
        ],
        "id": "CVE-2026-67543",
        "lastModified": "2026-11-11T22:17:29.140",
        "metrics": {
          "cvssMetricV31": [
            {
              "cvssData": {
                "attackComplexity": "LOW",
                "attackVector": "NETWORK",
                "availabilityImpact": "HIGH",
                "baseScore": 8.8,
                "baseSeverity": "HIGH",
                "confidentialityImpact": "HIGH",
                "integrityImpact": "HIGH",
                "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
                "scope": "UNCHANGED",
                "userInteraction": "NONE",
                "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
                "version": "3.1"
              },
              "exploitabilityScore": 2.8,
              "impactScore": 5.9,
              "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
              "type": "Secondary"
            }
          ]
        },
        "published": "2026-11-11T22:17:28.997",
        "references": [
          {
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/2155057f4153a1e3a7b789d104f7fa96e92964e5"
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          },
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            "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70"
          },
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            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "url": "https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-hcv7-mg77-pg73"
          }
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        "sourceIdentifier": "security-advisories@github.com",
        "vulnStatus": "Deferred",
        "weaknesses": [
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                "value": "CWE-94"
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              {
                "lang": "en",
                "value": "CWE-269"
              }
            ],
            "source": "security-advisories@github.com",
            "type": "Primary"
          }
        ]
      }
    }
  }
}



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